We discuss main facts of symmetric Nash equilibrium (SNE) of position auction proposed by Varian (2007). Then we describe more features in detail, such as (1) non-zero surplus of each bidder, (2) allocative and also Pareto efficiency in SNE and (3)the condition of existence of honest strategy in SNE. After that, we propose a best-response bidding strategy for repeated simultaneous position auction of incomplete information with simulation. This approach offers an explanation that how bidders may follow public information to achieve the same equilibrium of lower bound of SNE in the static model. Furthermore, the best-response bidding strategy has following merits: (1) non-zero surplus of each bidder in each round, (2) low information requirement for each bidder¡¦s calculation, (3) much lower increasing rate of rounds than increasing rate of positions and (4) easier rule for bidders to get started with.

This report examines an internship experience as the Auction and Fine Art Department Assistant at New Orleans Auction Galleries with discussion of the Company’s history, operating structure, and role in the auction market. In addition, an evaluation of the Company’s strengths, weakness, opportunities and threats and a discussion of the auction industry’s best practices used by international auction houses as they related to New Orleans Auction Galleries is also found. The report concludes with recommendations made by the intern, for the Company’s future sustainability in the auction market.

Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Management in Finance and Investment in the faculty of Commerce, Law and Management, Wits Businesss School, University of the Witwatersrand, 2012. / Idiosyncratic considerations relevant to South Africa’s economic and legal framework, as well as determining factors taken from the financial markets and the asset being auctioned are used to critically review the current auction mechanism used by the South African government to borrow funds publicly. A logistic regression with panel data is used in the empirical analysis. The dependent variable has a dichotomous outcome of uniform-price and discriminatory auction mechanisms. Data from 43 different countries over the period 2005 to 2011 are used for the analysis. It was hypothesized that countries with higher uncertainty about the price of their public debt, should use the auction mechanism that reduces under-pricing. Results from the logit regression supported this view. Upon comparing South Africa’s profile with the logit regression results, alongside a review of the literature, it becomes apparent that the proposed model does not provide a definitive answer. However, the model does aid policymakers’ decision on which auction mechanism should be preferred over the other for South Africa.

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Cizojazyčné resumé Public auctions The aim of my thesis written on the topic "Public auctions" is to compile a comprehensive analysis of the topic with focus on the present statue no. 26/2000 Sb., o veřejných dražbách, ve znění pozdějších předpisů (hereinafter referred to as "ZVD"), since it is the most important statue to regulate such legal issue. The legal regulation of public auction has come through a long historical development until its current form, which is in comparison with other countries in facto rare. The thesis is composed of seven chapters, each of them dealing with different aspects concerning auctions. Chapter one introduces the reader in the general matter of public auctions along with the historical context. Historical development of public auctions is divided into three parts, each of them representing certain period and seperated by crucial years. Very significant subchapter gathers distinct opinions of various jurists about legal principle of a public auction in relation to the legislature concerning privatization process in the early nineties of the twentieth century. Chapter two examines relevant Czech legislation. The chapter consists of three parts. First two parts focuse on two basic regimes that allow to organize public auctions in the Czech legislature. The main objective of...

eBay, the largest online auction company, which brings more efficient and safer dealing platform for C2C business model. Even if eBay is so popular in the world, it is still hardly known around Asia Pacific. Why is that¡H The research mainly indicated the story about eBay, recent situation and oncoming problem. After that, by three cases about the failure in Asia Pacific area, along with relevant information material and arranging other news on internet. This research probes into the reason why eBay is so prosperous all over the world but collapse in Asia Pacific.

Due to a rapid expansion of commercial usage on the Internet, on-line auction is showing its growing potential and economic benefit on business competition.¡@On-line auction is a totally new consuming experience for most people. However, though fast and convenient comparing to traditional shopping, social contacts, such as bargaining, are not provided during the process of on-line shopping.Moreover, stereotyped consuming behavior of " seeing is believing" and concerns on Internet security may also be obstacles for many consumers to shop on-line.Through investigating online auction users' expectation ,trying to find influencing factors for users to adopt on-auction shopping.Factors causing users to avoid on-line shopping are also of great interest.¡@Enterprises doing Internet business may find the results of this study useful in their marketing analysis and planning. A web-based questionnaire was employed.Items were grouped into three sections in the questionnaire: on-audtion shopping environment, on-line experience, and demographic information.¡@A total of 1698 questionnaire was collected. The results indicated that male subjects were higher motivated to shop on-line auction than their female counterparts.Subjects with on- line auction shopping experience were found to have significantly higher motivation to shop on-line auction than those without such experience.Security¡@problem of using credit card for payment via Internet still is the most concerns for many subjects. Provision of detail information regarding product description and procedures for making order, as well as a comprehensive after-sell service may largely encourage web users adopting on-line auction shopping.

This dissertation uses recently developed empirical methodologies for the study of multi-unit auctions to test the impacts of Financial Transmission Rights (FTRs) on the competitiveness of restructured electricity markets. FTRs are a special type of financial option that hedge against volatility in the cost of transporting electricity over the grid. Policy makers seek to use the prices of FTRs as market signals to incentivize efficient investment and utilization of transmission capacity. However, prices will not send the correct signals if market participants strategically use FTRs. This dissertation uses data from the Texas electricity market to test whether the prices of FTRs are efficient to achieve such goals. The auctions studied are multiunit, uniform-price, sealed-bid auctions. The first part of the dissertation studies the auctions on the spot market of the wholesale electricity industry. I derive structural empirical models to test theoretical predictions as to whether bidders fully internalize the effect of FTRs on profits into their bidding decisions. I find that bidders are learning as to how to optimally bid above marginal cost for their inframarginal capacities. The bidders also learn to bid to include FTRs into their profit maximization problem during the course of the first year. But starting from the second year, they deviated from optimal bidding that includes FTRs in the profit maximization problems. Counterfactual analysis show that the primary effect of FTRs on market outcomes is changing the level of prices rather than production efficiency. Finally, I find that in most months, the current allocations of FTRs are statistically equivalent to the optimal allocations. The second part of the dissertation studies the bidding behavior in the FTR auctions. I find that FTRs?? strategic impact on the FTR purchasing behavior is significant for large bidders ?? firms exercising market power in the FTR auctions. Second, trader forecasts future FTR credit very accurately while large generators?? forecasts of future FTR credit tends to be biased upward. Finally, The bid shading patterns are consistent with theoretical predictions and support the existence of common values.

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This dissertation is about an open question of cartel ratifiable conditions. My research goal is to establish a mechanism which is able to detect and explain cartels' activities. My research question in the second chapter is whether or not an efficient cartel mechanism is ratifiable in the first-price sealed-bid auction format with participation costs. R. McAfee and J. McMillan study the coordinated bidding strategies in a strong cartel, which is incentive-compatible and efficient. This chapter investigates this efficient collusive mechanism with two important conditions (1) bidders can update their information through a cartel's prior auction and (2) they have to pay participation costs to participate in seller's auction. The concept of ratifiability, introduced by P. Cramton and T. Palfrey, is applied to explore the first-price sealedbid auction with participation costs. I discovered that the efficient cartel mechanism, such as pre-auction knockout, would be ratified when either of the two conditions exists. However, this mechanism is no longer ratifiable when both conditions exist. The bidder with the highest value in the cartel would have incentive to betray, since doing so sends a credible signal of high value. Hence, the other bidders will be discouraged from participating in the seller's auction and the highest-value bidder maximizes his revenue. In the third chapter, I studied the seller's strategy when she faces a cartel in an auction mechanism. An active seller's optimal strategy is to raise the reserve price to a level that is higher than her own valuation. The collusive mechanism is sustainable even though its revenue is extracted by the higher reserve price. If the seller is authorized to change the auction mechanism, she can receive the expected payoff, prevent the formation of a ring and keep the auction efficient. Further, I presented two methods that could deter a cartel under specific conditions. One is the residual claimants method as proposed by Y. Che and J. Kim and the other is to set a positive participation cost as outlined in the first chapter. The residual claimants method can inhibit a ring in many cases, but it may have some trouble in preventing an efficient cartel mechanism when there is only one participant in the seller's auction. In the fourth chapter, I investigated how to achieve external efficiency in a repeated game. In particular, I looked into the allocation of the budgeted that allows an authority, such as the government, to differentiate collusive behavior and to expose agents to external threats. A threshold level of the budget payment is found in an incentive compatible collusive mechanism for which the government can prevent an agent from participating. In a two-stage model, I showed that if the government can boost exemption or have more budget to subsidize agents, it is less likely that a ring will be formed.