Many people still confused and misunderstand the differences between auction types: In fact, we have only two major types of auctions which are the forward auction and Reverse auction[22]. In a forward auction a single seller offers an item for sale with many competitive buyers driving the price upward: In a Reverse Auction, a single buyer wants to purchase a service or an item from many sellers, they drive the price downward: There are many differences between these type of auction: Including the progress of the auctions; winner selection criterion and other factors: The Reverse Auction nowadays is one of the most preferred types of online auctions: It gains popularity rapidly because of representing the buyers' side and helps him to drive prices down in contrary with the forward auction or traditional auction. The aim of this study is to identify the most common types of the Reverse auctions and compare them to one another to determine when should be used by a buyer and propose the most efficient implementation model for some types: The results of this study are: achieve a written report and a small demonstrator model on how to implement English Auction and Second-Sealed bid Auction.

The theory of auction has become an active research area spanning multiple disciplines such as economics, finance, marketing and management science. But a close examination of it reveals that most of the existing studies deal with ascending (i.e., English) auctions in which it is assumed that the bid increments are continuous. There is a clear lack of research on optimal descending (i.e., Dutch) auction design with discrete bid levels. This dissertation aims to fill this void by considering single-unit, open-bid, first price Dutch auctions in which the bid levels are restricted to a finite set of values, the number of bidders may be certain or uncertain, and a secret reserve price may be present or absent. These types of auctions are most attractive for selling products that are perishable (e.g., flowers) or whose value decreases with time (e.g., air flight seats and concert tickets) (Carare and Rothkopf, 2005). I began by conducting a comprehensive survey of the current literature to identify the key dimensions of an auction model. I then zeroed in on the particular combination of parameters that characterize the Dutch auctions of interest. As a significant departure from the traditional methods employed by applied economists and game theorists, a novel approach is taken by formulating the auctioning problem as a constrained mathematical program and applying standard nonlinear optimization techniques to solve it. In each of the basic Dutch auction model and its two extensions, interesting properties possessed by the optimal bid levels and the auctioneer's maximum expected revenue are uncovered. Numerical examples are provided to illustrate the major propositions where appropriate. The superiority of the optimal strategy recommended in this study over two commonly-used heuristic procedures for setting bid levels is also demonstrated both theoretically and empirically. Finally, economic as well as managerial implications of the findings reported in this dissertation research are discussed.

This paper studies the effects of auction mechanisms on the average price of auction results of Shanghai car license plate from 2004 to 2018. We construct two linear regression models and find that an iterated multi-unit auction has a lower efficiency than a seal-bid discriminatory multi-unit auction. We also find that the pre-set price-ceiling is positively correlated with the average winning price. These results suggest that the government can potentially manipulate auction results through the design of the auction mechanism, and through the setting of warning price as a price ceiling.

Research on auctions that involve more than one identical item for sale was,almost non-existing in the 90’s, but has since then been getting increasing attention. External incentives for this research have come from the US spectrum, sales, the European 3G mobile-phone auctions,  and Internet auctions. The policy relevance and the huge amount of money involved in many of them have helped the theory and experimental research advance. But in auctions where values are equal across bidders, common value auctions, that is, when the value depends on some outside parameter, equal to all bidders, the research is still embryonic. This thesis contributes to the topic with three studies. The first uses a Bayesian game to model a simple multi-unit common value auction, the task being to compare equilibrium strategies and the seller’s revenue from three auction formats; the discriminatory, the uniform and the Vickrey auction. The second study conducts an economic laboratory experiment on basis of the first study. The third study comprises an experiment on the multi-unit common value uniform auction and compares the dynamic and the static environments of this format. The most salient result in both experiments is that subjects overbid. They are victims of the winner’s curse and bid above the expected value, thus earning a negative profit. There is some learning, but most bidders continue to earn a negative profit also in later rounds. The competitive effect when participating in an auction seems to be stronger than the rationality concerns. In the first experiment, subjects in the Vickrey auction do somewhat better in small groups than subjects in the other auction types and, in the second experiment, subjects in the dynamic auction format perform much better than subjects in the static auction format; but still, they overbid. Due to this overbidding, the theoretical (but not the behavioral) prediction that the dynamic auction should render more revenue than the static fails inthe second experiment. Nonetheless, the higher revenue of the static auction comes at a cost; half of the auctions yield negative profits to the bidders, and the winner’s curse is more severely widespread in this format. Besides, only a minority of the bidders use the equilibrium bidding strategy.The bottom line is that the choice between the open and sealed-bid formats may be more important than the choice of price mechanism, especially in common value settings.

This paper investigates whether the bidding induces the occurrence of herding, and analyses the effects of behavioral factors, information, and fundamental characteristics of real estate on the performance of bank auction. Our sample is from July 2001 to January 2003, the real estate that intermediaries sold was held by bank in Taiwan, including 363 the real estate and the price of bidding under bank auction. We obtain some interesting implication. First of all, we find that herding of bidding not only could explain premium but also discount. After controlling informational factors and fundamental characteristics of real estate, it could not weaken the significance of herding of bidding. For the strategy of the reserve price by the vendor, the higher discount is to encourage bidding actively, which is consistent with the view of Welch (1992). Secondly, we find bidders could easily reduce search cost by observing the bidding of competitors under bank auction, and herding of bidding on the auction process could enhance efficiency of information aggregation. Furthermore, herding of bidding makes the performance of auction different between court and bank. Finally, we overcome the selective bias and find the real estate held by bank had poor performance under court auction; however, the real estate held by court had better performance under bank auction. This implies the mechanism of court auction should be transformed into the open-outcry bidding in order to achieve effective recovery of debt and the policy of reducing losses. Robustness analysis of this study, first of all, for the herd measure that not isolated from informational factors, we find the insignificant effect of behavioral factors on the performance of English mechanism, and auction premium and discount are dominated by the informational factors. Secondly, the choice of the methods about true value of real estate may affect the conditional probability of the herd measure, and make inconsistent conclusions that the effect of behavioral factors on the performance of English mechanism. Whether we choose cluster analysis or regression method to obtain the true value of real estate, the conclusion that the effect of behavioral factors on the performance of English mechanism could be supported, and those can not switch the results of the minimum sum method. Thus, the conclusion that behavioral factors influence the performance of the auction is full of evidences.

At May 2003, Taiwan¡¦s Internet auction market has been rising by one of eBay¡¦s advertisement ¡§ Mrs. Tang¡¦s favor Pan-Long vast is broken by her husband.¡¨ And that brings Taiwan¡¦s Internet auction market into the Warring States era. You can see that from the number of Yahoo auction¡¦s volume of merchandise trade, which grew suddenly from 2000 deals at September 2001 to 18 million deals at May 2003. it¡¦s growth rate is 900 times, and the sum of merchandise trade money is more than NT 100 billions. There are a lot of chances to make money in this burgeoning market. The consumer can save a lot of time and money from shopping on Internet auction, but this high technology benefit also creates various Internet cheating behavior. That¡¦s the reason why people love this new transaction way, but are afraid to get hut from it at the same time. So, this research is focus on the consumer purchasing motivation and perceptive risk, attempting to realize the consumer¡¦s demand and the behavior of avoiding perceptive risk by analyze how purchasing motivation and perceptive risk will effect the purchasing willing. And from analyzing the characteristics of the consumer, hope that we can provide suitable improving advises to the manager. This research has received 210 valid questionnaires. We use two level cluster analysis and discriminant analysis to separate our sample data into three clusters by purchasing motivation and perceptive risk: The sample data is separate into high-demand motivation cluster, middle-demand motivation cluster and low-demand motivation cluster. About the variable of perceptive risk, the data is separated into financial-performance risk cluster, security risk cluster and physical-time risk cluster. And then,£q2 analysis, one-way ANOVA, factor analysis, canonical correlation analysis and Pearson correlation analysis are used for deeper analysis and discussion. The following list is our research result and finding: 1. On the Internet auction, the consumer¡¦s purchasing motivation will effect their purchasing willing. When you have stronger motivation to purchase on Internet auction, your purchasing willing will be higher. 2. Perceptive risk will effect the consumer¡¦s willing to purchase on the Internet auction. When you have stronger perceptive risk to purchase on Internet auction, your purchasing willing will be lower. 3. Perceptive risk will effect the consumer¡¦s motivation to purchase on the Internet auction. When you have stronger perceptive risk to purchase on Internet auction, your motivation will be lower. 4. Perceptive risk, purchase motivation and purchase willing would be influenced by personal attribute. But the effect of demographic statistics variables, some of personal attributes, is not strong. In the contract, the effect of the other personal attributes, Internet behavior, make the perceptive risk, purchasing motivation and purchasing willing obviously different.

Goals of paper are to create grounded theories that will answer the question "how media inform about three art auctions". First is Hascoe action in London auction house Sotheby's, second one is auction of painting Tvar Modré in Adolf Loos Apartment and Gallery and the last one is auction of collection of oil paintings by František Kupka in Dorotheum. Firstly I describe historical phases of auction market and then it's mechanism. Theoretical part consists of information about offer of analyzed action houses and focuses on uniqueness of art pieces, previous owners or marketing strategies. Practical part of analysis defines research issue, paradigm, research materials and describe selected media. Then alalyzes three grounded theories that consist of open coding, axial coding and selective coding. All these phases are illustrated on graphic models and identify theoretical codes. Finally I describe media image of analyzed auctions.

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The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has been auctioning frequency licenses since 1994. To encourage long-run competition in the telecommunication industry, the commission granted bid discounts to the small firms in its spectrum auctions. The primary focus of the dissertation is to evaluate the effect of the program on the number of licenses won by small firms, and on the FCC's auction revenues. It also examines the consequences of access manipulations by large-firm affiliates which used legal loopholes to capture over $7 billion in discounts. The first chapter presents an overview of the FCC auction system and the discount program. It sets up the rest of the analysis. The second chapter of the dissertation applies a non-parametric estimation approach to recover the auction participants' value distribution through its bounds. Auction simulations using the distribution argue that the subsidy increases the share of small firm licenses from 25.9% to 27.6% at a low cost to the commission. They also imply that subsidy access by large firms has no significant effect on FCC's revenues but reduces the program's effectiveness by more than one third. The third chapter extends the analysis by introducing a parametric model that takes advantage of the bidder as well as license characteristics heterogeneity. My findings imply that perfect implementation of the program would triple the number of small firm licenses from 357, when no subsidies are present, to 942. It would also increase auction revenue from $31.89 billion to $34.17 billion. However, the access manipulations led to an increase in small firm licenses by just 266 for a total of 623, and a drop in FCC receipts to $30.21 billion. The results of my dissertation suggest that improving the program's eligibility regulations holds benefits for both small firms and the FCC. Tightening the commission's access criteria would increase welfare.

Opportunistic wireless channel access by non-licensed users has emerged as a promising solution for addressing the bandwidth scarcity challenge. In this thesis, we first design both a deterministic heuristic auction and a randomized auction with a provable performance bound with the guarantee of truthfulness, for networked secondary users. We then turn our attention to mobility support for the secondary users. We introduce two-dimensional bids that reflect a secondary user's willingness to pay for exclusive and nonexclusive channel usage, for the single-channel and multiple-channel scenarios, under which we prove their performances under desired equilibria, respectively. We also devise core-selecting auctions in a combinatorial setting, where secondary users can submit flexible preferences on channels. These auctions can resolve VCG's vulnerability to collusion and shill bidding, and improves seller revenue.