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At May 2003, Taiwan¡¦s Internet auction market has been rising by one of eBay¡¦s advertisement ¡§ Mrs. Tang¡¦s favor Pan-Long vast is broken by her husband.¡¨ And that brings Taiwan¡¦s Internet auction market into the Warring States era. You can see that from the number of Yahoo auction¡¦s volume of merchandise trade, which grew suddenly from 2000 deals at September 2001 to 18 million deals at May 2003. it¡¦s growth rate is 900 times, and the sum of merchandise trade money is more than NT 100 billions. There are a lot of chances to make money in this burgeoning market. The consumer can save a lot of time and money from shopping on Internet auction, but this high technology benefit also creates various Internet cheating behavior. That¡¦s the reason why people love this new transaction way, but are afraid to get hut from it at the same time. So, this research is focus on the consumer purchasing motivation and perceptive risk, attempting to realize the consumer¡¦s demand and the behavior of avoiding perceptive risk by analyze how purchasing motivation and perceptive risk will effect the purchasing willing. And from analyzing the characteristics of the consumer, hope that we can provide suitable improving advises to the manager. This research has received 210 valid questionnaires. We use two level cluster analysis and discriminant analysis to separate our sample data into three clusters by purchasing motivation and perceptive risk: The sample data is separate into high-demand motivation cluster, middle-demand motivation cluster and low-demand motivation cluster. About the variable of perceptive risk, the data is separated into financial-performance risk cluster, security risk cluster and physical-time risk cluster. And then,£q2 analysis, one-way ANOVA, factor analysis, canonical correlation analysis and Pearson correlation analysis are used for deeper analysis and discussion. The following list is our research result and finding: 1. On the Internet auction, the consumer¡¦s purchasing motivation will effect their purchasing willing. When you have stronger motivation to purchase on Internet auction, your purchasing willing will be higher. 2. Perceptive risk will effect the consumer¡¦s willing to purchase on the Internet auction. When you have stronger perceptive risk to purchase on Internet auction, your purchasing willing will be lower. 3. Perceptive risk will effect the consumer¡¦s motivation to purchase on the Internet auction. When you have stronger perceptive risk to purchase on Internet auction, your motivation will be lower. 4. Perceptive risk, purchase motivation and purchase willing would be influenced by personal attribute. But the effect of demographic statistics variables, some of personal attributes, is not strong. In the contract, the effect of the other personal attributes, Internet behavior, make the perceptive risk, purchasing motivation and purchasing willing obviously different.

The thesis investigates a number of auction formats both theoretically and empirically. The effect of different auction rules on the final price and on bidder valuations is analyzed. Results from an experimental sale of real goods, testing revenue equivalence of the open and sealed-bid second-price auction do not conform to theoretical predictions: the open auction leading to significantly lower prices than the sealed-bid auction. It turns out that the open auction format allows bidders to satisfy a tendency to "stick together" with their valuations. The empirical results motivate a dynamic bidding model of interdependent valuations, bidders being uncertain about their valuations and learning from the exit-prices of their rivals. Furthermore, bidding behavior on the Internet is investigated in the hard close and the automatically extended auction. Late bidding is shown to be a rational strategy in the hard close auction, but not in the automatically extended auction. Theoretical results show that the expected final price and seller revenue is lower in the hard close auction than in the automatically extended auction, where prestige-concerns can lead to an explosive final price. Moreover, Yahoo auction data confirms the strong presence of late bidding in the hard-close auction and the seller's preference for the automatically extended auction. (author´s abstract)

Diploma thesis entitled Trading on Internet Auctions deals with the analysis and comparison of important international and Czech internet auctions. Under examination are not only important auctions in terms of number of users, but also those that surpass other interesting business solutions and innovative thinking. The diploma thesis is divided into three chapters. The first chapter, entitled Establishment and Development of e-commerce describes the most important events and milestones for the development of e-commerce and the subsequent emergence of online auctions. The second chapter is specifically devoted to the analysis and comparison of foreign auction sites. The third chapter focused attention on the Czech auction sites, including the legal aspects that are related to trading on internet auctions. The whole thesis ends by conclusion and evaluation of reaching the given object.

The purpose of this master´s thesis is to process the manual for realization of internet auction focused in the car market – MotorHit.cz. It includes market and competition analysis and also analysis of general and professional (business) surrounding. The entire proposal of project solving was made from the obtained data and realized analyses.

Die Analyse von online vermitteltem Tausch, insbesondere derjenige bei Onlineauktionen, erfreut sich einiger Beliebtheit. Dafür gibt es neben der ökonomischen Bedeutung dieser Tauschform auch soziologische Gründe. Inzwischen zeigt eine beträchtliche Anzahl von Untersuchungen, dass online vermittelte Transaktionen durch ein Reputationssystem stabilisiert werden können. Dabei bewerten sich die beiden Transaktionspartner nach erfolgtem Tausch gegenseitig mittels eines von der Auktionsplattform bereitgestellten Bewertungssystems. Beide Tauschpartner haben die Möglichkeit, eine negative Bewertung mit einer ebensolchen zu vergelten, bzw. im Vorgriff darauf mit Vergeltung zu drohen, falls eine negative Bewertung erfolgen sollte. Es besteht hier also ein Kollektivgutproblem zweiter Ordnung, dessen Lösung Bedingung für eine stabile Gütertransaktion ist. In diesem Aufsatz wird analysiert, wie diese Stabilisierung theoretisch geschehen kann und welche empirischen Belege sich dafür anführen lassen. Dazu wird im nächsten Abschnitt vorerst der gesamte Tauschvorgang als ein zweifaches Vertrauensspiel modelliert und zwei einschlägige Lösungsansätze in Hypothesenform präsentiert. Dabei wird einmal von vollständig rationalen Akteuren und einmal von reziprok rationalen Akteuren ausgegangen. Die generierten Hypothesen werden anschließend anhand eines selbst erhobenen Datensatzes überprüft. Dieser enthält Angaben zu insgesamt 1800 Transaktionen und entsprechend 3600 potentiellen Bewertungen, die über eBay Deutschland getätigt wurden. Dabei wird neben der Analyse der Standardbewertungen insbesondere eine Analyse der dazugehörigen Freitextkommentare vorgenommen. Im vierten Abschnitt werden die Resultate theoretisch diskutiert und es wird auf der Basis der empirischen Ergebnisse zur Handlungsmotivation der Bewertenden ein Vorschlag gemacht, mit welchen institutionellen Maßnahmen der Bewertungsmechanismus verbessert werden könnte.

The aim of this thesis is to give a comprehensive overview about the internet auctions from several different perspectives, but mainly form the law-related perspective. The relation of the internet auctions to other branches of law is examined -- especially to the consumer protection or the questions of counterfeit goods. Part of this thesis is devoted to pay-per-bid auctions and their place in legal regulations in Czech Republic. The German regulations are also introduced a compared to the Czech ones. In the end there is an introduction to some interests from the auction world.