abstract: This paper examines how equity analysts' roles as information intermediaries and monitors affect corporate liquidity policy and its associated value of cash, providing new evidence that analysts have a direct impact on corporate liquidity policy. Greater analyst coverage (1) reduces information asymmetry between a firm and outside shareholders and (2) enhances the monitoring process. Consistent with these arguments, analyst coverage increases the value of cash, thereby allowing firms to hold more cash. The cash-to-assets ratio increases by 5.2 percentage points when moving from the bottom analyst-coverage decile to the top decile. The marginal value of $1 of corporate cash holdings is $0.93 for the bottom analyst-coverage decile and $1.83 for the top decile. The positive effects remain robust after a battery of endogeneity checks. I also perform tests employing a unique dataset that consists of public and private firms, as well as a dataset that consists of public firms that have gone private. A public firm with analyst coverage can hold approximately 8% more cash than its private counterpart. These findings constitute new evidence on the real effect of analyst coverage. / Dissertation/Thesis / Ph.D. Business Administration 2012

En la presente investigación, se realizó un estudio enfocado en la gestión en el área de obligaciones por pagar y la incidencia que causa en el flujo de efectivo dentro de las empresas de transporte urbano masivo en Lima Metropolitana. Desde el marco de la organización económica empresarial, cada empresa cuenta con un área de trabajo el cual tiene funciones y responsabilidades por cumplir para el crecimiento de la misma. Esta tesis está enfocada en el área de obligaciones por pagar, el cual representa pagos provenientes de operaciones realizadas en obtención de mercancías o en la prestación de servicios recibidos. Por lo que, resulta de suma importancia contar con un procedimiento controlado dado que, son los generadores de los egresos de la empresa. In the present investigation, a study focused on management in the area of liabilities payable and the incidence that it causes in the cash flow within the mass urban transport companies in Metropolitan Lima. Within the framework of the business economic organization, each company has a work area which has functions and responsibilities to fulfill for the growth of it. This thesis is focused on the area of obligations by pay, which represents payments from operations carried out in obtaining of merchandise or in the provision of services received. Therefore, it is a sum importance of having a controlled procedure given that they are the generators of the expenses of the company.

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I examine the effect of ownership structure on firms' propensities to save the proceeds of a share issuance as cash. Specifically, I focus on changes in cash savings at the time of a seasoned equity offering (SEO), a moment at which the firm experiences a large inflow of cash, to determine whether ownership structures such as managerial blockholdings or the presence of institutional investors materially affect firms' decisions regarding their level of cash savings. I find that firms with managerial blockholders are more inclined to save share issuance proceeds as cash, relative to firms with outside blockholders or no blockholders present. This finding could be interpreted as consistent with either managerial entrenchment or incentive alignment, so I distinguish between these competing forces by examining SEO announcement returns. The market's reaction to SEO announcements when managerial blockholders are present is significantly worse on average when the firm has excess cash, lending support to the entrenchment explanation. I also find that firms with greater total institutional ownership save more cash from equity issuance, which is consistent with the theory that greater firm monitoring allows optimal corporate cash holdings to increase because shareholders are less concerned about potential misuses of cash.