Kyrgyzstan has experienced two regime changes since 2005. The first, called the ‘Tulip Revolution’, which was modeled on ‘color’ revolutions aimed at democratization in Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine, changed the arrangement of elites in the power structure, but did nothing to weaken the vertical presidential system of power that perpetuated an unstable regime cycle. The second ‘April’ revolution in 2010 brought the creation of a parliamentary system with broadly decentralized power and drastically curtailed the powers of the president. Parliamentary elections in October 2010 created a broad representative body that has improved stability despite the difficulties of elite adjustment to parliamentary dynamics. Successful presidential elections in October 2011 further reinforced the legitimacy of the new system of government. Despite considerable progress, a deep divide between northern and southern elites, pervasive corruption, economic collapse and ethnic turbulence exacerbated by decades of unchecked nationalism all threaten the consolidation of Kyrgyzstan’s nascent democracy. Each of these problems will pose a significant challenge to the political elite, who now have a shared responsibility for the success or failure of policy. How elites react to this challenge will determine whether Kyrgyzstan will continue to gradually consolidate its democracy, or revert to a centralized power structure that has proved inherently unstable. / text

Although there is consensus that democracy has to be established in China, there are huge disagreements on what kind of democracy China should establish. Those disagreements can be divided into four major groups. New Leftists hold that the state should play the role of leadership and that the state capacity should be strengthened. They insist that the rule of the state should conform to the ideal of governance. However, the people are excluded from determining what the ideal of governance is. Also, the economic democracy they advocate would undermine the individual right to property, which would in turn impair people’s private freedom. Liberals hold that the unlimited state intervention in the market economy is the source of social injustices. They advocate the development of free market economy and the establishment of liberal democracy. At the same time, they also reflect on the problems of liberal democracy. There are two major problems. The first is that people are politically apathetic, which causes the crisis of legitimacy. The other is that liberal democracy is unlikely to result in morally good political decisions. So, it is argued that China’s democracy should meet the requirements of both legitimacy and justice. Confucian constitutionalism argues to restore Confucian values in the contemporary political reconstruction and thus advocates Confucian meritocracy with democracy only retained for instrumental reasons. It holds that only the politically competent and morally superior persons are eligible to participate in politics. However, there is no way to ensure that those selected through meritocracy are intellectually and morally superior. It is also hard to make Confucianism compatible with reasonable pluralism, causing the risk of undermining personal rights and freedom. The official opinion on democracy recognizes the necessity to develop democracy and stresses the Party’s leadership in its development which it holds should be implemented in accordance with China’s current political, economic and cultural conditions. / published_or_final_version / Philosophy / Doctoral / Doctor of Philosophy

abstract / Politics and Public Administration / Doctoral / Doctor of Philosophy

No description available.

No description available.

What is democracy and what makes it just or fair? The orthodox answer to both questions holds that democracy is reducible to the idea and ideal of procedural equality. On this view, democracy is a set of institutions that provides citizens with equal procedural opportunities to influence political decisions, and this fact about democracy is what makes it just or fair. / The position defended in this essay holds that the orthodox answer of proceduralism is mistaken. The conceptual ideal that animates proceduralism---the notion of an equal distribution of political power---is theoretically impossible, and the closest proxy---a decision-making process that terminates in simple majority rule---cannot be justified as fair in virtue of the way that it distributes power. / In order to be fair, democratic institutions must satisfy both process- and outcome-oriented criteria of fairness. Fairness overall requires both just outcomes and a fair political process that promotes everyone's interests in public recognition, agency, and moral membership in a community of equals. Procedural equality is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of fairness overall. / A proceduralist account of the fairness of democratic institutions is most appealing in the context of conscientious disagreement about questions of substantive justice. Its implicit promise in that context is to provide a neutral and impartial way to solve otherwise intractable moral disputes. In this context, too, the promise of proceduralism is illusory. Here, however, proceduralism is not alone in its failure; for no account of democratic institutions can render them fair in the presence of conscientious moral disagreement.

Originally issued as a doctoral dissertation (2006) / Cover incorrectly lists series no. as 14. Includes bibliographical references (p. 353-381)

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Adelaide, Dept. of Politics, 1991. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 334-376).

Thesis (M.A.)--Eastern Illinois University, 1990. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 69-73).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hong Kong, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 287-299). Also available in print.