No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

<p> The need for holistic solutions to diverse problems presents the church with an opportunity for a social witness shaped by the gospel. As a step toward accomplishing this end, this dissertation aspires to establish a refreshed approach for understanding Christian social engagement as fundamental expressions of the character of God through the virtuous witness of the church. To begin, chapter 1 contains the introduction to the dissertation, beginning with a statement of the thesis, namely, the church embodies a prophetic social ethic in the world through presence, possibility, and place as expressions of the theological virtues of faith, hope, and love. Following the articulation of this thesis will be definitions of &ldquo;faith,&rdquo; &ldquo;hope&rdquo;, and &ldquo;love.&rdquo; A proper understanding of these terms is crucial to the dissertation, and each will be elaborated further as the project progresses. This chapter closes with an overview of the project by explaining research methodology and brief chapter summaries. </p><p> Chapter 2 begins the explanation of the proposed virtuous social ethic: presence. Drawing together particular contributions from Ellul and Hauerwas to reveal how Christian faith enacted in social ethics requires the faithful ecclesial witness of God's people in the world. The goal of this chapter is to unpack, develop, and synthesizing particular emphases from the theological ethics developed by Ellul and Hauerwas. The resulting combination strengthens each respective position to encourage healthy Christian social presence from a disciplined theology of faithful presence. </p><p> Significantly, Ellul and Hauerwas encourage Christian social witness empowered by the revelational foundations of Scripture and biblical community. As well, the enduring witness of the church in the face of social instability, coercion, and injustice remains the peaceful paradigm of Jesus Christ. Only through genuine faith granted by the sovereign choice of God is the church able to maintain a prophetic and incarnational presence in the world. This chapter concludes by developing a theology of faithful presence revealed in the disciplined faithfulness of God's holy, redeemed people. </p><p> Chapter 3 moves from presence to possibility. The first part of this chapter explores how Ellul and Hauerwas see Christian hope driving and shaping the redeemed community. That is, joining Ellul's hopeful Christian freedom with Hauerwas' eschatological ethic encourages the church to embrace a broader vision for moral action. Such a living hope drives the Christian community to seek the substantive social good shaped by the dynamic awareness of God's lordship over all creation. </p><p> Chapter 4 moves to the third part of the proposed Christian social ethic: place. Through a loving relationship with the world, the church does not neglect cultural needs nor capitulate to social pressures but practices a dynamic commitment to Christ through enacting God's love. Christian social ethics are thwarted before they begin without an effort to know and understand context. </p><p> The first part of this section examines the way Ellul and Hauerwas describe the love exemplified by the church in relationship with God and the world. Specifically, Ellul's emphasis on living in relationship with the world complements Hauerwas' commitment to truthful community and Christian presence among the sick and suffering. The second part of this chapter further unpacks the lived significance of the loving God's world. Ellul's dialectic social ethic emphasizing man's need for divine intervention, Hauerwas points to the practiced presence of Jesus as the church's path to loving social witness. As a synthesis of the first two sections of this chapter, the final section explores how the Christian living in loving relationship with the world demands a rich theology of place emphasizing personal relationship, apologetic disposition, and temporary expressions. </p><p> Chapter 5 will wrap up this study by providing review, final analysis, and areas for further study. The church has a divine responsibility to embody the goodness and character of God in the world. Yet, the church often reacts in extremes by cultural capitulation or sectarianism. In light of this, the church must develop a balanced approach to the cultivation and practice of Christian virtues of faith, hope, and love. Even more, in the face of social marginalization, the church must maintain a creative yet distinctly Christian approach to social ethics. The hope of this study is to provide a constructive analysis of proposals made by Jacques Ellul and Stanley Hauerwas in order to empower the church to rightly embody the character of God for the glory of God and the good of the world. (Abstract shortened by ProQuest.) </p>

<p> This dissertation attempts to fill, in part, three lacunae in contemporary philosophical scholarship: first, the failure to identify the two distinct types of dialogism&mdash;psychological and interpersonal&mdash;that have been operative in discussions of the dialogical self; second, the lack of acknowledgement of the six most prominent features of interpersonal dialogism; and third, the unwillingness to recognize that interpersonal dialogism is a crucial feature of human ethical agency and identity. </p><p> In Chapter One, I explain why dialogism has been relatively neglected&mdash;and certainly underappreciated&mdash;in contemporary Western philosophy. In Chapter Two, I offer a picture of Mikhail Bakhtin&rsquo;s conception of dialogism. I explain why and how Bakhtin focuses on the novel in his account of dialogism. I then offer an account of Bakhtin&rsquo;s claim regarding the dialogism of the &lsquo;inner&rsquo; speech of thought. In the second part of Chapter Two, I offer an account of Gadamer&rsquo;s conception of dialogism. I begin my examination of Gadamer by discussing the event ontology that serves as the metaphysical framework for his account of &ldquo;play&rdquo; (Spiel) and dialogue. In doing so, I explain some of the most important ideas in this part of his thought, such as his notion of understanding, tradition, effective history, the fusion of horizons, and the text. I explain what Gadamer means by genuine conversation, or dialogue, and I then describe one of the most important ideas in Gadamer&rsquo;s thought&mdash;his notion of &ldquo;play.&rdquo; </p><p> In Chapter Three, I give a critical account of the most influential contemporary account of dialogism in psychology, offered by Hubert Hermans et al., specifically in terms of their establishment of dialogical self theory. My examination consists of several parts. First, I discuss the ways they conceptualize the self, temporally and spatially. Second, I offer a description of their account of I-positions within the dialogical self. Third, I examine their claims about the necessary features of the dialogical self, and argue against one of their claims, which says that dominance relations are intrinsic to dialogue. Fourth, I describe their account of the four kinds of relations that can emerge within the self (2010, 121). Fifth, I briefly discuss their view regarding the &ldquo;[t]hree models of self and identity, associated with different historical phases&rdquo; (4), that have predominated in Western history. Sixth, I consider their claim that there are &ldquo;positions&rdquo; within the self in addition to the &ldquo;I-positions&rdquo; noted above. And lastly, I evaluate their account of (what they call) the nine &ldquo;features of good dialogue&rdquo; (10). </p><p> In Chapter Four, I offer a critical evaluation of the account of dialogue and dialogism developed by Dmitri Nikulin, arguably the leading contemporary philosopher on the subjects. While I address the features of his account that I think are correct, I ultimately argue that it is problematic for three main reasons: first, it fails to recognize the proper relationship between dialogue and agency; second, its elucidation of the necessary and sufficient conditions for dialogue contains conceptual inconsistencies; and third, its conception of the relation between dialogue and personhood has potentially disastrous ethical implications. </p><p> In Chapter Five, I show how Heidegger&rsquo;s notions of Dasein&rsquo;s &ldquo;Being-with&rdquo; (Mitsein), &ldquo;discourse&rdquo; (Rede), and &ldquo;solicitude&rdquo; (Fursorge) help lay the groundwork for recognizing some important features of dialogism. I do three things in Chapter Six. First, I briefly discuss Charles Taylor&rsquo;s work on dialogism. Second, I offer my account of the seven most prominent features of dialogism. And third, I argue that dialogism is a crucial feature of ethical agency and identity. To do so, I offer an example of a personal (and social) virtue, namely, empathy, which illustrates the important role dialogism plays in ethical agency.</p>

<p>The following work explores two interrelated ideas of Stoic ethics. The first of these is oikeiosis, a process of identifying with alterity that enables human identity to become more inclusive and expansive. Oikeiosis is outwardly directed, bringing ever more complexity to identity by engaging with difference in the world. The second principle is homologia, the goal of establishing a harmonious life. Homologia is inwardly directed, ensuring the coherency and internal consistency of human experience. The two principles express polar aspects of identity, one centrifugal, the other centripetal. I seek to demonstrate that these are mutually supporting directions of moral development that, taken together, offer helpful resolutions to fundamental questions about ethical relationships: Why do (or should) people experience a moral commitment to others? How are commitments to others best balanced with responsibilities to oneself? Does a person have an equal moral obligation to all others, or is it morally legitimate to preference close friends and family?

No description available.

Submitted in partial fulfilment of the degree of MSc (Med) in Bioethics and Health Law, Steve Biko Centre for Bioethics, University of the Witwatersrand. Johannesburg, 25 January 2015 / Since his death at the hands of the South African security police on 12 September 1977, much has been written in medical, legal and other literature about Steve Biko. This dissertation explores the medical literature and finds that the vast majority of authors, when writing about Biko, refer primarily to his death, the role of the medical profession in the events leading up to his death, and the ethical issues regarding dual loyalties that arise from studying those issues. In my research question I ask: Does Steve Biko have more to offer medical ethics than his death? In exploring Steve Biko’s writings as collected together in I Write What I Like, I find an underlying thinking which guided Biko’s philosophy. I show that this underlying philosophy is nothing other than the philosophy which underlies ubuntu and I explore how ubuntu should influence our medical ethical thinking and suggest that this could be Biko’s real contribution to medical ethics, namely an ethic that takes seriously the contribution that African moral thinking has to make in the field of medical ethics, a contribution that does nothing less than give to medical ethics a more human face, a contribution which Biko himself believed was what Africa was still to give to the world, a more human face. I critically review the writings and philosophy of Steve Biko and identify key notions or conceptions that are of relevance to medical ethics and then explore the impact and relevance of these key notions and conceptions to the fundamental bioethical issues of autonomy, dignity and confidentiality. I defend the normative claim that integrating Biko’s and other salient African ethical conceptions into our predominantly Western bioethical thinking is a moral requirement.

A Research Report submitted to the Faculty of Humanities, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Master of Arts, Applied Ethics for Professionals Johannesburg, 2016 / Balance, in the broadest sense, can be taken to be a desirable intermediary point or state between two or more opposing points or states. This thesis demonstrates and argues that the idea of balance is ubiquitous — it appears in nature, the sciences, religions and common sense beliefs. Furthermore, it goes beyond this by attempting to extract this idea from prominent ethical theories — both those in the West and East, namely, Kantian Ethics, Aristotelian Virtue Ethics, Utilitarianism, Islam, Taoism, Hinduism, Confucianism and Buddhism. In the sciences and natural world, molecules, objects or plants are simply forced towards the trajectory of balance. This descriptively gives us some forms of balance. Ethically, many theories, as I show in the essay, strive towards balance and thus normatively prescribe balance as the index of choice, conduct and action. I draw some conclusion from this, which is that a balanced conduct and action lead to ethical action, whilst an imbalanced conduct and action result in an unethical action. Objections to this notion are discussed and addressed in various stages of the essay. At the end of the essay, I apply this reasoning to issues in applied ethics, namely, terrorism, wealth inequality and the environment

This research report tells the story of a doctor and a journalist who, at the height of Apartheid’s State of Emergency, placed themselves at risk for the sake of practicing their professions ethically. They chose to defy the law, and bring to the attention of the public, the plight of many detainees who suffered at the hands of the State. In the report, I set out to give an account of the events and to ethically reflect on the actions of the two professionals involved. In particular, I consider the role played by professional codes of conduct in the actions of the two professionals and I reflect on the notion of trust as a centrally important ethical conception with respect to the events described.