No description available.

We investigate whether dividend changes signal firms’ future profitability by considering firms’ earnings volatility and examining how earnings volatility affects dividend signaling. In general, we find a positive relation between dividend increases on firms’ future earnings. In other words, dividend increases tend to signal positive changes in future earnings. However, the effect largely depends on the firms’ earnings volatility such that higher earnings volatility tends to miti-gate the signaling effect of dividend increases on future earnings. Specifically, for firms that have high earnings volatility, dividend increases seem to signal a reduction in future earnings vol-atility rather than an increase in future earnings. On the other hand, we find no consistent results for dividend decreases. Our findings have three main implications: 1) The traditional dividend signaling theory is valid; 2) the effect of signaling depends on a firm’s earnings volatility; 3) for high-volatility firms, positive dividend changes signal earnings volatility reductions rather than earnings increases.

Det finns en mängd forskning kring hur Earnings Management uppstår och hur incitament till Earnings Management kan uppkomma. Gemensamt för denna forskning är att företagsledningen försöker möta utomstående krav och förväntningar på företagets finansiella prestation. Dessa krav och förväntningar resulterar i incitament för företagsledningen att göra subjektiva bedömningar av intäkter, kostnader och periodiseringar för att på så sätt manipulera resultatet. För att kontrollera bokföringen och redovisningskvaliteten anlitas en revisor som kontrollerar, rådgör och hjälper företaget och dess intressenter att säkerställa att redovisningen är korrekt och ger ett tillräckligt underlag för att fatta ekonomiska beslut. EU har sedan sommaren 2016 en ny standard som kräver revisorsrotation var tionde år för alla företag registrerade i dess medlemsländer. Studier har gjorts i hur detta påverkar revisionskvaliteten hos företag i USA och övriga Europa, något som inte gjorts i samma utsträckning i Sverige. Den här studien ämnar att ge en bredare kunskapsbild i hur en sådan standard kan komma att påverka den ekonomiska redovisningen. Tidigare forskning visar att Earnings Management förekommer, även om forskningen koncentrerat sig på USA och de stora ekonomierna i Europa. Genom en kvalitativ studie av 154 företag med insamlad data för åren 2011-2015 har graden av Earnings Management undersökts genom att separera icke-diskretionära, godtyckliga, periodiseringar från totala periodiseringar. För att beräkna detta har The Modified Jones Model använts och förekomsten av Earnings Management undersöks under åren 2013-2015. Studiens resultat visar att Earnings Management förekommer i svenska börsnoterade bolag. Vidare visar studien att det förekommer skillnader i förekomst av Earnings Management beroende på vilket revisionsbolag som anlitats. Förslag till vidare forskning lämnas för att vidare undersöka hur införandet av den nya standarden i EU kan komma att påverka Earnings Management, redovisnings,- och revisionskvaliteten i Sverige.

No description available.

Thesis (M.B.A.)--Boston University / PLEASE NOTE: Boston University Libraries did not receive an Authorization To Manage form for this thesis or dissertation. It is therefore not openly accessible, though it may be available by request. If you are the author or principal advisor of this work and would like to request open access for it, please contact us at open-help@bu.edu. Thank you. / 2031-01-01

This thesis investigates issues related to gender inequalities and scarring effects in school to work transitions. The first chapter analyses the gender earnings gap among Italian college graduates at the beginning of their careers. Thanks to the richness of the dataset used I am able to control for a large set of variables related to individuals' educational and family background, as well as personality traits. The main finding is that the content of the college degree course is the most signicant variable in explaining the earnings gender differentials of young workers. In particular I show that female sorting in college majors characterised by a low maths content explains between 13 and 16% of the earnings gender gap. Motivated by this result, in Chapter 2 I investigate the determinants of gender gaps in STEM (science, technology, engineering and mathematics) graduation rates, with an emphasis on family, cultural and school influences. I show that half of the gap is attributed to the gender difference in maths and science content of the high school curriculum. The results indicate that in Italy the issue of the gender gap in STEM graduation has its roots in a gendered choice that originates many years before. The final chapter analyses the extent to which the mismatch of demand and supply of skills that young workers face when they enter the labour market upon completing education affects their careers. Regression results show that there is a long lasting negative effect of these initial conditions on labour market outcomes. The evidence is suggestive of a `trickle down unemployment' phenomenon, namely that high-skill workers try to escape strong competition from their high-skill peers by taking jobs for which a lower level of education is required, moving down the occupational ladder.

This research aims to explore and identify empirically the perceptions of Libyan Commercial Banks’ (LCBs) stakeholders about earnings management and its impact on the quality of financial reporting. The study examines the occurrence of earnings management and the techniques that are used to manage LCBs’ earnings by first investigating the understanding of LCBs’ stakeholders about the term earnings management. The study also examines perceptions of the motivations behind LCBs’ managers being engaged in earnings management, as well as the perceived conditions that enable LCBs’ managers to manage their earnings. Finally the study examines stakeholders’ perceptions about the controls by which earnings management may be mitigated. The results of the study are interpreted through an accountability perspective. The study uses semi-structured interviews and a questionnaire survey with wide groups of stakeholders’ LCBs. The findings of this study reveal a range of views regarding the quality of financial reporting between different stakeholders groups, and also within the individual groups. This finding may refer to a serious problem within the accountability relationship of the LCBs. The results findings also reveal that the term ‘earnings management’ is not understood consistently by different stakeholders in Libya. The findings also suggest the existence of earnings management in LCBs’ financial reporting using various techniques e.g. especially the loan loss provision. The motivations of earnings management practices as revealed by the study findings are consistent with those reported in the literature. Earnings management is perceived as an unethical practice by most of the LCBs’ stakeholders but there are exceptions to this view. Earnings management could be reduced, according to the perceptions of LCBs’ stakeholders, by adopting IFRS, applying better corporate governance, and enhancing the role of the external auditor.

We investigate if firms close to entering, or exiting, a market capitalization list is more prone to manage their earnings upwards than other firms, due to the benefits of the extra liquidity and media coverage gained from being listed on a ‘larger’ list. In order to measure the level of earnings management in our focal firms we use the discretionary accruals as proxy with the Jones Model (1991) as base. Overall, the focal firms had higher discretionary accrual values. When correcting for size- and performance effect, we obtained significant results at a 10 % level that our focal firms manage their earnings in a wider extent. Also, firms close to the Small/Midcap border manage their earnings in a wider extent than the other firms listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange.

There is international trend for the enterprises to develop to business groups. There are more and more large-sized or medium-sized business groups in Taiwan. However, the groups¡¦ diversification strategies often result in high risks. Especially the unrelated diversification. The Management has a motivation to do the earnings management when dealing with the non-core business. If the earnings quality is manipulated by the management, it will cause the investors to ignore the risk which diversification strategy will bring. So far, there is no research about the the impact of earnings management on medium-sized business group. The purpose of this research is to examine whether medium-sized business groups¡¦ management has a motivation to make earnings management. The results show that¡G 1. There are no direct relationships between related diversification, unrelated diversification and earnings management. It is considered that medium-sized group business probably be family enterprises with centralized shareholding. The management doesn¡¦t have strong intention to make earnings management. 2. Debt/Equity has positive correlation on earnings management. The creditor often has restriction to minimum working capital and highest-level liability ratio of the borrower. The management has a motivation to choose appropriate accounting principle to correspond with the each given financial ratio.

This study examines whether board independence is an effective corporate governance mechanism in reducing earnings management in China, a country with significantly different institutional and legal characteristics from the Anglo-Saxon countries. I investigate: (i) whether voluntary adoption of board independence prior to the China Regulatory Securities Commission (CSRC) regulation on board independence is associated with lower earnings management; and (ii) the extent to which the CSRC regulation is effective in achieving the aim of inhibiting earnings management. I employ two stage least squares techniques to control for potential simultaneity problems between earnings management and board independence and documents that failing to control for such problems will lead to biased and inconsistent estimates. Using three different measures of earnings management, I show that firms that voluntarily move towards board independence (i) have lower levels of discretionary accruals; (ii) employ less severe income smoothing strategies; and (iii) are less likely to manage return on equity to meet regulatory thresholds. In contrast, firms adopting board independence following the CSRC regulation in 2002 do not experience any changes in the levels of earnings management before and after the regulation. These results suggest that regulation alone is not a sufficient solution to motivate effective independent boards.