Thesis (PhD)--Stellenbosch University, 2013. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Multicultural conflicts pervade our world and have sparked considerable debate about their possible resolution. We argue that how culture is conceptualized is crucial to the continued dialogue about multicultural conflicts. Specifically, we argue that approaches that argue for the protection of cultures run into significant problems if they do not employ a conception of cultures as delineated entities. However, we also hold that the notion that cultures cannot be distinct in any way, does very little to contribute to dialogue. From the very beginning, it excludes the notion of a culture that is to be protected and thus stops the dialogue there and then. To be true to the principle of audi ad alteram partem, approaches to multicultural conflicts must conceive of an alternative model, provided that such a model is logically possible. This may provide the dialogue with a much needed point of common understanding from which to proceed. Accordingly, we develop a model of culture whereby it is possible to delineate cultures. In this model, a culture can be delineable in a manner analogous to how we delineate persons. Our model of personal delineation suggests a dual structure whereby a trivial personal boundary contains a unity of conflict within the person. In persons, this unity of conflict lies in the relationship between the “I” and repressed meanings. This relationship must be characterised by self-referential decisions and the capacity to make self-referential decisions is central to our definition of personal autonomy. In cultures, we argue that multicultural conflicts provide the necessary conditions that enable us to conceptualize trivial boundaries in cultures in terms of the communicative relationships between members of a particular culture. Multicultural conflicts prompt self-categorizations by individuals and such self-categorizations are made in terms of group membership. Though all members may not agree as to who belongs to the culture and who does not, the claims made about membership serve to differentiate the communicative relationships inside the culture from those outside it. Furthermore, we show that, inside this trivial boundary, a unity of conflict analogous to the one found in personal autonomy, can be exhibited by cultures. We show how a culture, through its institutions, particularly through an institutionalised exit possibility, 1) may exhibit self-reference and 2) relate to a source of authority in the same way as a person does when making selfreferential decisions. In this regard, we argue that institutionalised exit possibilities embody adherence to the consensus vs. power criterion, according to which the dominant account of a culture is achieved through consensus, as opposed to through the exertion of power. Furthermore, we argue that with a strong analogy between cultures’ and personal delineation, it becomes reasonable to extend concepts we usually apply to persons, such as fairness, attachment and viability, so that they can also apply to cultures. We show that the application of these concepts clarifies certain current multicultural issues. The application of theses concepts also leads to the development of a decision making process to deal with multicultural issues. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Multikulturele konflikte kom wêreldwyd voor en het reeds aansienlike debat oor die resolusie van sodanige konflik ontlok. Ons voer aan dat hoe kultuur gekonseptualiseer word, besonder belangrik is vir die voorgesette dialoog oor multikulturele konflikte. Meer spesifiek voer ons aan dat benaderings wat vir die beskerming van kulture argumenteer, beduidende probleme ondervind indien dit nie `n konsepsie van kulture as delinieerbare entiteite gebruik nie. Die gedagte dat kulture nie op enige manier afgebaken kan word nie, dra egter ook weinig by tot dialoog. Dit sluit van meet af die gedagte dat kulture beskerm moet word, uit en staak dus die dialoog daar en dan. Ten einde getrou te wees aan die beginsel van audi ad alteram partem, moet benaderings tot multikulturele konflik `n alternatiewe model van kultuur bedink, mits so `n model logies moontlik is. So `n model kan die dialoog van `n broodnodige gemeenskaplike uitgangspunt voorsien. Ons ontwikkel dienooreenkomstig `n model van kultuur waarvolgens dit moontlik is om kulture te delinieer. Volgens hierdie model kan `n kultuur delinieer word in analogie met hoe persone delinieer word. Ons model van persoonlike deliniëring stel `n tweeledige struktuur voor, waarvolgens `n triviale persoonlike grens `n eenheid van konflik binne die persoon omspan. In persone lê hierdie eenheid van konflik in die verhouding tussen die “ek” en onderdrukte betekenisse. Hierdie verhouding moet deur self-referensiële besluite gekenmerk word. Die vermoë tot self-referensiële besluite, so voer ons aan, is ook die sentrale kenmerk van persoonlike outonomie. Ons voer aan dat multikulturele konflikte die noodsaaklike toestande skep wat ons in staat stel om triviale grense in kulture te definieer in terme van die kommunikatiewe verhoudings tussen lede van `n spesifieke kultuur. Multikulturele konflikte ontlok self-kategorisering deur individue en sodanige kategorisering word in terme van groeplidmaatskap gedoen. Hoewel alle lede van die kultuur nie noodwendig saamstem oor wie aan die kultuur behoort en wie nie, maak die bewerings wat oor lidmaatskap gemaak word dit moontlik om die kommunikatiewe verhoudings binne die kultuur te onderskei van dié buite die kultuur. Verder demonstreer ons dat, binne hierdie triviale grens, kulture `n eenheid van konflik ten toon kan stel wat soortgelyk aan die eenheid van konflik by persoonlike outonomie is. Ons wys hoe `n kultuur, deur sy instellings, en vernaam deur `n geïnstitusionaliseerde uitgangsmoontlikheid (‘exit possibility’) 1) self-referensie ten toon kan stel en 2) in verhouding met `n bron van gesag kan staan soos `n persoon wanneer s/hy self-referensiële besluite maak. In dié verband voer ons aan dat geïnstitusionaliseerde uitgangsmoontlikhede die beliggaming is van die nakoming van die konsensus vs. mag-kriterium, waarvolgens die dominante weergawe van `n kultuur bereik word deur konsensus, teenoor deur die uitoefen van mag. Verder voer ons aan dat `n sterk analogie tussen kulture en persone se deliniëring dit moontlik maak om begrippe soos regverdigheid, binding en lewensvatbaarheid, wat gewoonlik op persone toegepas word, op kulture toe te pas. Die toepassing van hierdie begrippe verbeter ons begrip van sekere huidige multikulturele kwessies en lei ook tot die ontwikkeling van `n besluitnemingsproses vir multikulturele kwessies.

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Thesis (MPhil)--University of Stellenbosch, 2000. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The Church is facing a dilemma in how to apply and live out its message in a postmodern world. For many in the Church an understanding and application of morals and ethics has become bewildering. This assignment attempts to develop a Christian vocabulary and conceptual framework for morality. This is done by firstly elucidating the milieu out of which postmodernism arose. Modernism, through universal claims of reason and instrumental rationality, believed in the ultimate mastery of the world. The failure of the Enlightenment project to develop universal morality and law led to a new perspective on reason and reality and new reflection on life, morality and meaning. Thus, I reflect on' the parturition and value of postmodernism through offering an evaluation and critique of the ideology of postmodernism. Next, I propose the need for Christian ideology to be firstly separated from cultural interpretations so as to avoid ethnocentrism and cultural imperialism. After exploring the development and purpose of worldviews I argue for the building of cultural bridges and for the Gospel and Biblical worldview to be suitably encoded. Finally, I posit an understanding of what postmodern ethics entails and how then to define and respond to ethical issues. Through case studies I apply the key principles identified in the study. These are that moderation is a virtue; that many timeless truths are customary truths that arise in a specific historical/cultural situations; that many problems are not ethical issues but are rather a comprehension and/or a misinterpretation of the Scriptures regarding what it means to be a Christian and how we are to live our Christian profession to mention a few. I reason and plead for a Christian ethical system of incarnational engaged compassion in a postmodern world. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: geen opsomming

On t.p.: Werkstuk vir die graad van Magister in Lettere en Wysbegeerte (Voorligtingsielkunde) / Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2003. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Adolescence is viewed as the transitional stage between childhood and adulthood. Development during this stage centres on identity, sexuality, cognition and morality. Abortion during adolescence demands a careful decision-making process. Research has shown that the adolescent's reaction to abortion is determined by the decision-making process that was adopted. This paper provides a literature review of developmental issues and the capacity of adolescents to make decisions about reproduction and motherhood. The conclusion is reached that age is not the determinant of the emotional state following abortion, but rather the nature of the decision-making process that was followed. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Adolessensie word beskou as die oorgangsfase tussen die kinderjare en volwassenheid. Ontwikkeling tydens hierdie fase sentreer rondom identiteit, seksualiteit, kognisie en moraliteit. Aborsie tydens adolessensie vereis 'n indringende besluitnemingsproses. Navorsing het bewys dat die adolessent se reaksie op aborsie deur die besluitnemingsproses bëinvloed word. Hierdie werkstuk verskaf 'n literatuuroorsig van ontwikkelingsaspekte en die kapasiteit van adolessente om besluite oor voortplanting en moederskap te neem. Die gevolgtrekking word gemaak dat die emosionele toestand na 'n aborsie nie bepaal word deur ouderdom nie, maar wel deur die aard van die besluitnemingsproses wat gevolg is

Thesis (PhD)--University of Stellenbosch, 2005. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Problem statement For utilitarians, human beings have intrinsic moral significance based on only two acquired characteristics: sentience, or the ability to suffer, and psychological personhood. Sentience is the entrance-requirement for moral significance, but does not justify a "right to life" claim; at most a "right" not to suffer. Personhood, described as some sort of self-conscious awareness with a concept of the future, may justify a "right to life" claim. However, since personhood is absent in prenatal beings, and only develops some time after birth, the implication is that such beings have little moral significance and may, for instance, be killed "at will". The moral problem that I address in this dissertation is to investigate, assess and evaluate the utilitarian position on the moral status or value of prenatal life. Methodology and results I firstly, on the basis of an extensive literature study, make a detailed analysis of the utilitarian position with reference to a number of themes that I have identified in their argument. This is followed by a critical philosophical evaluation of the utilitarian position, based on six particular arguments: • Utilitarianism is philosophically incoherent. It over-simplifies the moral argument in claiming that consequences are all that matter morally. Its underlying moral theory is at odds with moral claims contained in contemporary notions of human rights and individual justice. It ignores the moral significance of special obligations to special groups. • Utilitarianism potentially has unacceptable consequences. It IS inherently discriminatory and may lead to legitimate "slippery slope" fears. • Utilitarianism clashes with our fundamental moral intuitions on the value of prenatal life. These intuitions are cherished in most world religions. • Contrary to the utilitarian position, speciesism is inevitable to the human condition, especially argued from a position of existential phenomenology. Self- constitution, simultaneous constitution of the world as we know it, and the very possibility of morality are possible only within a particular notion of speciesism. • The potentiality of pre-persons to develop into persons cannot be as convincingly ignored as is done by the utilitarian. • There is a basic and underlying need and intuition to protect vulnerable human beings, of which pre-persons are exemplars. These notions clash with utilitarian theory. As an alternative, I introduce, set out and evaluate a two-phased position on the moral significance of pre-personal human life, a position of respectfulness of prenatal and pre-personal human life based upon its humanity, potentiality and separation-viability. This leads, firstly, to the conclusion of a graded, sliding scale conception of human prepersonal moral significance in line with the level of development and with the actuation of potentiality. Secondly, it leads to the conclusion that the advent of separationsurvivability (viability) is a morally significant cut-off point beyond which the human fetus may "normally" have a justifiable right to the continuation of its life. In as far as the application of my argument is concerned, I develop a "moderate" position with reference to the abortion debate. Whilst I recognize that all human prenatal beings of which it can be argued that they have a reasonable chance to develop their intrinsic potentiality, i.e., to become full-fledged persons, should have the opportunity to do so, I also recognize that neither this position, nor the complexities of life make it possible to hold "absolute" positions on the justifiability of abortion. I explore this extremely problematic notion in the text. That having been said, the advent of separation-survivability may imply a "moral cut-off point", beyond which termination is only rarely justified. I argue that I find no moral hindrance to wellmotivated research on human pre-embryos and stem cells. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Probleemstelling Utilitariste huldig sterk omlynde standpunte oor die waarde van lewe. Hulle redeneer dat menslike (inderwaarheid, alle lewende) wesens slegs op grond van twee eienskappe intrinsieke morele waarde kan verwerf: sentiëntisme, d.i. die vermoë om lyding te ervaar, en persoonstatus. Sentiëntisme is 'n bepalende vereiste vir morele status, maar regverdig nie 'n "reg op lewe"-aanspraak nie. Persoonsyn, verstaan as 'n vorm van selfbewustheid tesame met 'n bewuste belang by die voortsetting van eie bestaan, mag wel so 'n aanspraak regverdig. Voorgeboortelike (en "voorpersoonlike") wesens is egter nie persone nie; hulle word eers (aansienlik) ná geboorte volwaardige persone. Die implikasie is dat sulke wesens weinig morele status het, en byvoorbeeld, na willekeur gedood mag word. Die morele probleem wat ek in hierdie dissertasie aanspreek is om die utilitaristiese beskouing ten opsigte van die morale status of waarde van voorgeboortelike lewe krities-filosofies te ondersoek en te evalueer. Metodologie en gevolgtrekkings Eerstens maak ek na aanleiding van 'n gedetaileerde literatuurstudie 'n in-diepte analise van van die utilitaristiese posisie aan die hand van 'n aantal temas wat ek in hul argument geïdentifiseer het. Daarna volg 'n krities-filosofiese evaluasie van die utilitaristiese posisie, aan die hand van ses argumente: • Utilitarisme is filosofies onsamehangend. Dit oorvereenvoudig die morele argument deur voor te gee dat gevolge al is wat moreel saakmaak. Die onderliggende utilitaristiese teorie bots met die morele eise vervat in kontemporêre sienings van menseregte en geregtigheid. Dit negeer die morele belangrikheid van spesiale verpligtinge teenoor spesiale belangegroepe. • Utilitarisme het potensieelonaanvaarbare gevolge. Dit IS inherent diskriminerend en kan lei tot onkeerbare glybaan ("slippery slope")-argumente. Utilitarisme bots met ons fundamentele morele intuïsies betreffende die waarde van voorgeboortelike lewe. Hierdie intuïsies word onder meer ondersteun deur die meeste hoofstroom godsdienste. • Spesiësisme is, in kontras met die utilitaristiese beskouing, onafwendbaar vir ons selfverstaan as mense, soos aangetoon kan word met 'n beroep op die eksistensiële fenomenologie. Self-konstituering, gelyktydige konstituering van die wêreld van die mens, en selfs die moontlikheid van moraliteit is slegs moontlik vanuit' n bepaalde spesiësistiese beskouing. • Die potensialiteit van "pre-persone" om tot volwaardige persone te ontwikkel kan nie, soos die utilitaris doen, sonder meer geïgnoreer word nie. • Daar is 'n basiese en onderliggende morele eis om swak en weerlose menslike wesens te beskerm. Hierdie idees bots lynreg met utilitaristiese teorie. As 'n alternatief tot die utilitaristiese beskouing, ontwikkel ek 'n twee-fase posisie betreffende die morele waarde van voorgeboortelike menslike lewe. Ek noem hierdie posisie agting vir voorgeboortelike en voor-persoonlike menslike lewe gebaseer op die menslikheid, potensialiteit en oorleefbaarheid van prenatale mense. Dit lei, eerstens, tot die gevolgtrekking van 'n gegradeerde glyskaal konsepsie van voor-persoonlike menslike morele waarde, min of meer parallel aan die vlak van ontwikkeling en die ontwikkeling van potensialiteit. Tweedens lei dit tot die gevolgtrekking dat die ontwikkeling van lewensvatbaarheid 'n moreel-beduidende afsnypunt is waarna die menslike fetus "normaalweg" aanspraak kan maak op 'n reg dat sy lewe voortgesit moet word. In soverre dit die toepassing van my argument betref, ontwikkel ek 'n "gematigde" posisie vis-á-vis aborsie. Ek redeneer dat alle menslike voorgeboortelike wesens wat 'n redelike kans het dat hul intrinsieke potensialiteit verder sal ontwikkel, die geleentheid daartoe gegun behoort te word. Ek aanvaar ook dat nog hierdie beskouing, nog die kompleksiteit van die menslike bestaan "absolute" posisies moreel regverdig. Die problematiek en inherente spanning tussen hierdie oënskynlik-opponerende posisies word in die teks bespreek. Nogtans beskou ek die ontwikkeling van lewensvatbaarheid as 'n moreel insiggewende afsnypunt waarna terminasie net in buitengewone omstandighede moreel regverdigbaar is.

published_or_final_version / abstract / Chinese Historical Studies / Master / Master of Arts

published_or_final_version / Community Medicine / Master / Master of Public Health

'Community' has long proved an integral element in commonsense thinking about a range of social problems and experiences, and with respect to crime the general conclusion is that more community will mean less crime. This study comprises a critical exploration of the resonance of community to New Labour's youth justice policy and to the lives of young offenders. The concept of community is of particular interest, as since its election in 1997 New Labour has been committed to forge a new political ideology of the 'Third Way', wherein communitarian ideas have proved central to the government's ambitions to revive and emphasise individual's responsibilities and obligations to civil society. Thus evident in the array of civil and criminal orders, which constitute the youth justice system in England and Wales, are constructions of community as both a 'moral resource' and as a 4moral claimant'. The former assumes that communities have inherent capacities in preventing and controlling youth crime, while the latter prioritises the community's right to demand the punishment and exclusion of those young people who fail to live up to their communal responsibilities. Given that communitarian responses are but the latest manifestation of the constant search for solutions t o youth crime, consideration is initially accorded to the historical shifts and continuities in both youth justice and community safety policy and practices. It is argued that a movement towards increasingly punitive, exclusionary and defensive responses to crime and young offenders has prevailed in recent years, and it is within this context that New Labour's prioritisation of communitarian thought has occurred. Attention then turns to the specificities of the government's commitment to communitarianism,within youth justice. Not only do New Labour emphasise young people's responsibilities to the community - rather than the community's, or indeed, the state's responsibilities to the young person- but it has also demonstrated its willingness to define. legislate and sanction with respect to those responsibilities it considers essential to the membership rights of the 'law-abiding' community. As such it is contended that the government's vision of community is essentially narrow, defensive and divisive. The analysis then draws upon semi-structured qualitative interviews with a sample of young offenders and Youth Offending Team practitioners to explore the resonance of community to the lives of young offenders and to their experiences of youth justice supervision. It is argued that community is a salient feature of the lives of young offenders which often provides for inclusionary experiences. However, the government's faith in the community to act as a 'moral resource' in preventing and controlling crime does not adequately account for the complex, transitory and ambiguous nature of young offenders' experiences of communal life. Furthermore, the punitive repercussions of the government's commitment to honouring the community's role as a 'moral claimant' serve to undermine the practitioner's ability to exploit the resources the community may have to offer to with regard to encouraging and motivating young people to desist from offending. Additionally, the emphasis on intolerance is likely to promote the community's disapproval and hostility towards young offenders. It is concluded that New Labour's commitment to communitarianism, and its particular envisaging of community, conjures a powerful exclusionary potential which is unlikely to engender positive outcomes for either the young offender or the 'law abiding' community.

M.Com. / Assessment Centers (ACs) are a commonly used method for selection and development of employees in South Africa (SA) and elsewhere. Despite this, little is known regarding ethical challenges in ACs in SA. The objective of this study was thus to explore ethical challenges in ACs in SA, with the intention of providing recommendations on how to minimize such challenges. Data was gathered using a qualitative survey and a focus group method respectively. A total of 98 participants who were attendees at an AC conference completed the qualitative survey and 14 purposely selected individuals participated in the focus group. Content analysis was then used to interpret the data. The findings of the study revealed many ethical challenges that could not be understood in isolation. For this reason, a conceptual framework was developed to provide a broader lens through which ethical challenges in ACs in SA could be understood...

On the 14th March 2013 the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA) held a hearing to consider an application by Top TV and their parent company ODM to broadcast three adult-content channels. This application and hearing have again brought the debate surrounding pornography to the fore in South Africa. While research in the field of pornography studies has historically been centred around whether pornography is harmful to women specifically and society in general, the current research aims to move away from this framework and examine issues of subjectivity, discourse, and power within the debate. This will be achieved through the use of moral panic theory, and Foucauldian critical discourse analysis (FCDA) to analyse the transcript of the hearing held at ICASA as well as newspaper reports regarding the hearing and its outcome