This thesis addresses the complicated relationship between sovereign debt and the realisation of economic and social rights (ESR) and applicable international human rights law (IHRL). The central research questions to be addressed by this work include the following: How can sovereign debt threaten the realisation of ESR? What guidance does IHRL provide in relation to the sovereign debt issue? Why have human rights and IHRL been so irrelevant in the design and implementation of responses to the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, as the Greek case has dramatically revealed? This thesis advances two main arguments. Firstly, the ‘marketisation’ of sovereign financing can be problematic for the realisation of ESR for reasons that go beyond the negative social impacts of austerity or other fiscal consolidation measures. Secondly, this thesis will argue that IHRL has been ineffective in preventing or mitigating the negative ESR impacts of responses to the crisis, not only because of the normative shortcomings of the existing legal framework, but also, and more fundamentally, because of the hegemony of neoliberal morality and its influence upon international law. The ascendancy of neoliberal assumptions, also in legal and human rights reasoning—which, as I will argue, appears to have been confirmed and reinforced rather than reversed, by some of the legal developments that have occurred since the crisis—limits the possibility of international law to constitute an instrument for the affirmation and protection of ESR. This thesis has two main theoretical objectives. Firstly, to provide a more holistic picture of the relationship between sovereign debt (and sovereign financing more generally) and ESR, that is not limited to the ESR impacts of austerity. Secondly, to review and critically analyse the existing international law on ESR—particularly relating to the use of State resources—and on sovereign debt and ESR, in order to assess its current status and post-crisis developments, explore the possible reasons of its irrelevance in the context of the Eurozone debt crisis, and speculate on its future directions.

The British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) remains one of the most obscure and elusive government agencies. Despite its rich and often tangled past, the SIS withstood various challenges in the twentieth century to become a vital instrument in Britain’s foreign policy, offering both traditional intelligence gathering, and a covert action capability. Despite recent revelations about its Cold War history, knowledge about this organisation is uneven at best, and this is particularly so in Asia. Despite Britain’s imperial history, which anchored informal intelligence gathering networks on a global scale, SIS’s presence in Asia is largely undiscovered. This thesis asks why this lacuna exists in SIS’s history; what was SIS activity in this region during the Cold War? Moreover, what was the value of this activity? Utilising a primarily archival methodology, this thesis sheds light on British intelligence activity in Hong Kong, Beijing, and Hanoi in the late 1960s. The strategic aims are twofold. Firstly, it explores the kinds of intelligence gathered, and the difficulties encountered from operating within the heart of a secure communist state in order to gauge an ‘enemy society’. In doing so, it challenges conventional definitions of intelligence, pointing to the notion of a dual identity diplomat-intelligence officer, that provided alternative means of acquiring intelligence within denied areas. In this way, it opens a window into a new dimension of SIS history, and, by extension, GCHQ, both of whom operated from the grey space between diplomacy and intelligence. Secondly, it examines this intelligence through the broader framework of the Anglo-American Special Relationship, given that these three case study countries were areas where the SIS operated, but where the CIA encountered real hindrances due to a lack of diplomatic premises. By tracing the path of British intelligence material, and analysing its reception by its American audience, it ultimately assesses the value of such intelligence. It argues that the granular detail afforded, and the insight on broader strategic relationships it provided, inverted the Special Relationship, rendering Britain a valued partner when it came to intelligence collection in this region and off-setting imbalances elsewhere.

The degree to which European Union (EU) policy-making is representative of citizens’ preferences is a central contested issue in the debate over the EU’s ‘democratic deficit’. Previous studies have demonstrated that in many cases political representatives share their voters’ attitudes to the EU. However, this research has rarely considered the substance of actual legislative policy-making in the EU institutions. Scrutinising the popular image that EU policy-making is unresponsive to public demands, the thesis investigates EU-level representation along the ‘domestic route’, on which citizens’ preferences intrude policymaking through their national governments in the Council of the EU. Using a range of original and existing datasets, the four papers investigate three classic assessment criteria of representation (mandate fulfilment, responsiveness, congruence) with methods ranging from mixed effects regressions to quantitative text analysis. Three central findings emerge: first, national governments are responsive to their domestic public opinion when negotiating and voting on legislative acts in the EU. Regarding legislative conflicts over left-right issues, responsiveness is stronger with majoritarian than proportional electoral systems and peaks when national elections are imminent. When it comes to pro-anti integration conflicts, responsiveness is conditional on the salience of EU issues in national political arenas. Second, executive coordination and parliamentary oversight in EU affairs limit the discretion of national ministers in EU negotiations and help governments to deliver their electoral mandates. Third, final EU policy output is most responsive to and congruent with the views of those national publics that have clear-cut opinions on a policy issue and care intensely about it. These findings are evidence of surprising patterns of citizen representation in EU policy-making. They suggest that politicisation of the EU and the diffusion of executive coordination and parliamentary oversight in EU affairs could strengthen representation. Yet, evidence remains scarce that better representation will end the EU’s legitimacy crisis.

This thesis investigates the promotion of intercultural dialogue (ICD) in the framework of EU external action on the Mediterranean between 1990 and 2014. ICD is understood as a cultural foreign policy instrument that the EU has promoted in a changing, vague and contradictory manner to engage the civil societies of Europe and of the Mediterranean into a common effort to attenuate the tensions that derive from the socio-cultural divergences among the people and governments of this whole area. With the goal of shedding light on this obscure aspect of EU policy-making in the Mediterranean, this thesis aims primarily to analyse why the approach of the EU to ICD has changed during the time frame in reference, and how the EU has modified the formulation, implementation and role of this policy instrument. Guided by the conceptual lens of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), the research examines ICD within a broader analysis of the evolution of EU foreign policy in the area. It argues that the EU commitment to advance ICD within its Mediterranean policies can be divided into three distinct phases: a ‘phase of emergence’ (1990-2001), a ‘phase of consolidation’ (2001-2010) and a ‘phase of professionalisation’ (2010-2014). The main factor that shaped this three-phase evolution is identified in how EU policy-makers assessed the potential contribution of ICD to address the changing socio-cultural divide in the Euro-Mediterranean space following three major events: a) the conclusion of the Cold War in 1990; b) the terror attacks of 9/11 2001; and c) the outbreak of the Arab uprisings in December 2010.

No description available.

The aim of my thesis is to investigate the reasons for the appointment of technocratic governments in Europe. In order to do this, I conceptualise what technocratic governments are, both in terms of their own characteristics and in comparison with party governments. I problematize classic elements, such as independence, neutrality and expertise of ministers, and add further ones including the relation to electoral outcomes, their particular type of agenda, and the echo they have in the media. Having established that technocratic governments require a shift in politicians’ preferences away from typical office-seeking behaviour, I proceed to enquire as to the situations that make their appointment more likely. Through a statistical analysis on all European cabinets from 1977 to 2013, I identify situations of economic and political crises – in particular scandals - as the main variables influencing the likelihood of technocratic government appointments. I further examine how these crises have lead to these appointments by exploring cases of over 25 technocratic governments in a range of countries and years. The qualitative illustrative evidence highlights the importance of institutional characteristics of the given political system in which such governments were appointed. The status of the party system, the role of the Head of State and external pressures coming from international or supranational institutionas are thus shown to be important in technocratic cabinet appointments. Finally, I assess whether technocratic governments fit within the European democratic standards and conclude that technocratic governments are symptoms of the decline of party democracy, identifiable in the loosening of delegation and accountability ties between parties and cabinets, increasing external pressures on domestic political actors, and the weakening of partisan ideology-based politics. The thesis adds further elements to reinforce the already vast literature on the crisis of – especially party – democracy in Europe.

Doctorat en sciences sociales, politiques et économiques / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Doctorat en sciences sociales, politiques et économiques / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Pas de résumé / Doctorat en droit / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

This study analyses the nature of Germany's role in the EU after unification. The thesis posits a two tier approach, first examining Germany's relationship in the EU at a 'high' politics, and then utilising a sectoral approach to Germany's role in the EU, focusing on two key policy areas: migration and agriculture. The thesis reviews theories of European integration assessing their applicability to Germany's specific case. It is argued that it is an oversimplification to characterise Germany as either an 'assertive' or 'compliant' actor. In the broader context, the thesis notes a continuity in Germany's pro-European position after unification. However, the thesis also concludes that Germany has acquired a stronger role. Unification has presented Germany with a number of challenges in the domestic arena. Borrowing from the ideas of Lowi, the thesis argues that Germany's role in the EU is policy specific and differs in contrasting policy sectors. The thesis also specifies the characteristics within the policy sector that shape Germany's actions in the EU. Furthermore, it is argued that the EU serves as an important arena for solving important domestic concerns. The thesis attempts to develop a taxonomic model comprising three characteristics: dynamics of the policy sector, policy circumstance and policy-making structures to test these hypotheses. The two policy sectors analysed illustrate how Germany's role can vary according to the issue in question. Germany's attitude towards migration gravitated towards an attempt to seek European solutions and Europeanise policy in an issue which represented a major domestic challenge after unification. Conversely, agriculture continued to be dominated by the Germans seeking wholly 'German' outcomes in the EU institutions. The thesis highlights the utility of European frameworks in particular policy sectors. In the case of migration, domestic and European policy making structures acted as a formidable constraint for policy solutions. On the contrary, in agriculture the nature of policy making at the domestic and European level enhanced the position of farmers and the agricultural sector in general.