管理當局與利害關係人(stakeholders)之間，透過會計資訊的提供，可降低代理問題及資訊不對稱。惟會計資訊的提供，依管理當局介入的程度不同，會有層次上的差別。 本文即從層次開始，界定了盈餘管理(Earnings Management)與盈餘操縱(Earnings Manipulation)的不同，而透過營運政策中的營業活動(operational activities)來影響盈餘的方式地處兩者之間的灰色地帶，目前至今尚少討論。Roychowdhury(2006)則以美國市場為對象，首開先例發展了如何偵測公司透過營業活動的實質盈餘管理行為。 本文同樣選定避免報導損失為盈餘門檻，考量台灣市場的特性後，偵測台灣企業是否有真實營業活動的盈餘管行為。實證結果顯示，無論是透過銷貨操縱、降低裁決性支出還是過量生產以降低銷貨成本的實質交易操作，都得到顯著地支持。進一步分析那些特性的企業，較容易透過真實營業相關的活動來從事盈餘管理行為時發現，債務契約壓力高、成長性機會高及利害關係人緊密度高者符合預期，而製造業性質則與預期相反，盈餘管理彈性則未得到支持。另外在機構投資人持股方面，則發現高機構投資人持股可降低過量生產實質交易操作的可能，但未能有效防止降低裁決性支出的操作。 / Through providing accounting information for stakeholders , management could somewhat reduce agency problem and information asymmetry.But accounting information quality could be different depending on how management intervene in . This article begins from distinguishing between Earnings Management and Earnings Manipulation.To intervene in business policy through real operational activities is not only one way that is hard to categorize in Earnings Management or Earnings Manipulation but also receives little attention to date. Roychowdhury(2006), taking American market as observation values,was the first one who developed how to detect real operational activities earnings management. Following Roychowdhury(2006),I define avoiding reporting loss as earnings threshold to detect whether real operational activities earnings management exists in Taiwan business.There is obvious evidence suggesting sales manipulation、reduction of discretionary expenditures and overproduction to report lower cost of goods sold to improve reported margins.To go a step further,I test observation values of what characters are inclined to manipulate earnings through real operational activities. I find supporting evidence in observation values with higher debt stress、higher growth opportunity、higher connection with stakeholders and samples on non manufacturing industry.But I find no evidence in observation values with higer earnings management elasticity.In addition,I find observation values with higher instutional holding shares could abate the possibilities of overproduction to report lower cost of goods sold,but fail to avoid the manipulation of reduction of discretionary expenditures.