La déposition du dernier empereur d’Occident en 476 a longtemps marqué le tournant entre Antiquité et Moyen Age. Depuis quelques décennies, les études sur l’Antiquité tardive ont relativisé la portée de cet épisode. La continuité aurait largement prévalu, d’où la promotion d’une large Antiquité tardive, du IIIe au VIIIe siècle : une période d’évolution lente, non de rupture brutale. L’Empire romain a pourtant bien traversé une crise profonde dans la seconde moitié du Ve siècle, en Orient comme en Occident. Cette étude se propose d’examiner en particulier la façon dont l’empereur Zénon (474-491) a fait face à cette crise générale de l’autorité impériale et à la déposition des derniers empereurs d’Occident. Avec pragmatisme et opportunisme, Zénon a engagé la fonction impériale dans un nouveau monde, sans renoncer à la prétention des empereurs à incarner une autorité universelle. Une méthode de gouvernement originale se dessine, notamment après l’usurpation de Basiliskos (475-476), qui l’oblige à revoir en profondeur sa politique dans les domaines intérieur, extérieur et religieux. Les choix de Zénon dans son second règne ont engagé ses successeurs, quelle qu’ait été leur volonté de revenir aux traditionnelles ambitions impériales. Sans renier les avancées des études tardo-antiques sur le temps long, cette étude se propose donc de mettre en lumière l’accélération politique des années 475-476, notamment du point de vue oriental. Tout en défendant la fonction impériale pluriséculaire dont il venait d’hériter, le rôle historique de l’empereur Zénon a été d’accepter un nouveau monde, et d’accompagner l’entrée de l’Empire romain dans le Moyen Age. / For a long time, scholars identified the deposing of the last Western Emperor in 476 CE as the transition point between Antiquity and the Middle Ages. Over the past few decades, Late Antiquity scholars have reconsidered the importance of this event: continuity would have definitely prevailed, which opened up the path to the promotion of an extended Late Antiquity, from third Century to eighth Century AD. A period of slow evolution, without brutal rupture. However, this argument fails to account for the profound crisis the Roman Empire experienced during the second half of the 5th century CE, in both the East and West. Accordingly, this study examines Emperor Zeno’s (474-491 CE) approach to this widespread crisis of imperial authority, and the dethroning of the last Western emperors. With pragmatism and opportunism, Zeno refashioned the role of emperors for a new world, without renouncing the emperor’s claim to universal authority. A new method of governance appeared, particularly after Basiliskos’ usurpation of the throne (475-476 CE), which forced Zeno to radically revise his internal, external and ecclesiastical policies. Zeno’s moves during his second reign restricted the options of his successors, no matter how strong was their willingness to return to traditional imperial ambitions. Without denying the advances of Late Antiquity studies over the long term, this study illuminates the rapid political events of the years 475-6 CE, particularly in the Eastern half of the Empire. While defending the long historical tradition of imperial power he inherited, Zeno’s historical role was to accept a new world and help usher the Roman Empire into the Middle Ages.

According to the orthodox priest John Meyendorff, the Byzantine dream consisted of the establishment of a universal Christian empire spiritually and politically governed by the emperor of Constantinople. This essay intends to shed light on the topic of Byzantine religious and political expansion in the context of Byzantine view on Barbaricum and the barbarians inhabiting it. The fundamental question asked is: how do the Byzantines view the barbarians outside the Byzantine Empire and in what sense, if any, does this view have implications for the Byzantine dream? To answer the question the essay examines four 6th century historians, namely: Procopius of Caesarea, Johannes Malalas, Menander Protector and Agathias of Myrina. The method being used is a hermeneutical method and the theoretical framework is made up of Edward Said’s Orientalism. The results indicate that the barbarians in Barbaricum were viewed upon with great distrust. The Byzantines considered the barbarians to be ontologically different from themselves. Furthermore, the Byzantines regarded the barbarians behaviour as uncivilized. The typical barbarian was deemed to be wild, cruel, irrational, mostly religiously backwards, lacking in education and, more often than not, displaying arrogance and boasting. At the same time they were mystified, and thought of as physically impressive beings capable of unnatural strength. Consequently, the barbarians were viewed upon as creatures of lust and physicality rather than, like the Byzantines, beings of rationality and sense. The conclusion can be made that the Byzantines regarded Barbaricum in much the same manner as the postcolonial powers regarded the Orient – through the construction of a dichotomy between the self and the other. Concerning the Byzantine adherence to the Byzantine dream as expressed by John Meyendorff, to spread the Byzantine Empire beyond its borders and consume Barbaricum by political and religious means, the results indicate that there are reasons to question Meyendorff’s assumption. It’s plausible that there indeed were Byzantine inclinations to transform Barbaricum. Furthermore, the results indicate that the Byzantine view of the barbarians played some part in shaping that inclination. It’s, however, also plausible that while the Byzantines may have strived to transform Barbaricum, it doesn’t neccessarily follow that it had to succumb to Byzantine imperial authority. The investigated sources seem to suggest that the primary Byzantine goal was solely to transform Barbaricum religiously and politically into something that resembled the Byzantine Empire but wasn’t necessarily a full fledged part of it.

Submitted by Daniel de Figueiredo null (dd66fig@gmail.com) on 2018-03-24T10:55:18Z No. of bitstreams: 1 TESE_DANIEL_DE_FIGUEIREDO.pdf: 17866175 bytes, checksum: 6674e2b4c6e440c8bfb103848fcc4347 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Jacqueline de Almeida null (jacquie@franca.unesp.br) on 2018-03-26T13:36:43Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Figueiredo_D_te_fran.pdf: 17866175 bytes, checksum: 6674e2b4c6e440c8bfb103848fcc4347 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-03-26T13:36:43Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Figueiredo_D_te_fran.pdf: 17866175 bytes, checksum: 6674e2b4c6e440c8bfb103848fcc4347 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-03-16 / Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP) / Cette recherche a pour but d’analyser le rôle politique, religieux et administratif de l’empereur Théodose II (401-450 ap. J.-C.) dans la gestion de la Controverse nestorienne, conflit qui est apparu dans la hiérarchie ecclésiastique de l’Empire romain d’Orient pendant la seconde moitié de son gouvernement (428-450 ap. J.-C.). Dans le domaine théologique, cette controverse était liée aux divergences entretenues par les évêques Cyrille d’Alexandrie et Nestorius de Constantinople à propos de la compréhension de l’interaction entre les natures humaine et divine dans le Christ incarné. Conformément à leurs respectifs imaginaires politiques et religieux, Cyrille, originaire de la région d’Egypte, défendait une union (ἕνωσις) entre ces natures, alors que Nestorius, originaire d’Antioche, dans la province de Syrie I, défendait une conjonction (συνάφεια) entre elles. Telles divergences ont abouti à une polarisation de la société romaine orientale autour de ces idées, parce qu’il y avait un étroit entrelacement des questions religieuses et politiques dans l’Antiquité tardive. L’étendue du conflit peut être vérifiée par la participation de différents segments de fonctionnaires de l’administration impériale qui s’alignaient aux factions formées, puisque les conflits de cette nature dans ce contexte étaient aussi liés à des constructions idéologiques qui ont contribué pour soutenir et donner de l’unité au pouvoir impérial. Cette adhésion des fonctionnaires nous indique que Théodose II n’a pas arbitré seulement un conflit théologique entre les membres de la hiérarchie ecclésiastique, mais que son intervention a nécessité qu’il négocie sa propre position dans la topographie du pouvoir avec des segments des aristocraties qui ont formé ces cadres de personnel. À partir de là, nous caractérisons le conflit non seulement comme théologique, mais aussi comme politique et administratif. Cette perception a été possible à travers notre catalogage des lettres impériales et épiscopales consultées, ce qui nous a permis de visualiser la formation de réseaux de sociabilité entretenues entre les évêques et les fonctionnaires impériaux. Les informations recueillies dans ces documents, en particulier en ce qui concerne les données prosopographiques des auteurs ou des personnes mentionnées dans les lettres, ont été comparées aux oeuvres Livre d’Heraclide, de Nestorius, et Contre Nestorius, de Cyrille, afin de renforcer la perception de la synergie entre les évêques et les fonctionnaires pour la défense de leurs intérêts politico-religieux communs. Ainsi, nous avons travaillé sur l’hypothèse que Théodose II et les auxiliaires qui ont contribué à l’élaboration de ses stratégies d’action n’ont pas négocié seulement l’unité doctrinale autour d’une orthodoxie religieuse avec les membres de la hiérarchie ecclésiastique. Telles négociations visaient également à maintenir l’unité impériale autour de la diversité des éléments culturels, politiques, administratifs et territoriaux avec d’autres groupes détenteurs du pouvoir, c’est-à-dire, les fonctionnaires impériaux qui contribuaient à légitimer la position centrale de Théodose II en tant que gouverneur. Le jeu de concessions établi par l’empereur à travers l’alternance de soutien entre les factions cyrillienne et nestorienne, qui peut être perçu à l’occasion du Concile d’Éphèse I (431), de la Formule de Réunion (433), au Synode de Constantinople (448) et du Concile d’Éphèse II (449), ne nous indique pas l’incapacité politique de Théodose de conduire le conflit, comme l’historiographie a fréquemment signalé à ce sujet. Dans notre perspective analytique, les mouvements impériaux comprenaient des négociations stratégiques visant à accommoder les intérêts et à contrebalancer des pouvoirs avec les aristocraties de fonctionnaires issus de différentes régions de l’Empire qui s’associaient aux évêques dans le conflit théologique. / Essa pesquisa tem por objetivo analisar a atuação político-religiosa e administrativa do imperador Teodósio II (401-450 d.C.) no gerenciamento da Controvérsia Nestoriana, conflito que emergiu na hierarquia eclesiástica do Império Romano do Oriente, durante a segunda metade do seu governo, de 428 a 450 d.C. Na esfera teológica, tal controvérsia esteve relacionada às divergências mantidas pelos bispos Cirilo de Alexandria e Nestório de Constantinopla no que se refere ao entendimento da interação entre as naturezas humana e divina no Cristo encarnado. Consoantes aos respectivos imaginários político-religiosos em que se inseriam, Cirilo, originário da região do Egito, advogava uma união (ἕνωσις) entre aquelas naturezas, ao passo que Nestório, oriundo de Antioquia, na província da Síria I, defendia apenas uma conjunção (συνάφεια) entre elas. Tais divergências resultaram em uma polarização da sociedade romana oriental em torno daquelas ideias, tendo em vista o estreito entrelaçamento que as questões religiosas e políticas eram percebidas na Antiguidade Tardia. A amplitude do conflito pode ser verificada pela participação de diferentes segmentos de funcionários da administração imperial que se alinharam às facções formadas, pois os conflitos dessa natureza, naquele contexto, estavam, também, relacionados a construções ideológicas que contribuíam para dar sustentação e unidade ao poder imperial. Essa adesão dos funcionários nos indica que Teodósio II não arbitrou apenas um conflito teológico entre membros da hierarquia eclesiástica, mas que sua intervenção necessitou que ele negociasse a sua própria posição na topografia do poder com segmentos das aristocracias que formavam esses quadros de funcionários. A partir daí, caracterizamos o conflito não somente como teológico, mas, também, como político-administrativo. Essa percepção foi possível por meio da catalogação e mapeamento das cartas imperiais e episcopais consultadas, que nos permitiram visualizar a formação das redes de sociabilidade mantidas entre bispos e funcionários imperiais. As informações colhidas nesses documentos, sobretudo no que se refere aos dados prosopográficos dos missivistas, ou daqueles indivíduos citados nas cartas, foram cotejadas com as obras Livro de Heraclides, de Nestório, e Contra Nestório, de Cirilo, no sentido de reforçar a percepção de sinergia entre bispos e funcionários na defesa dos seus interesses político-religiosos comuns. Assim, trabalhamos a hipótese de que Teodósio II, e aqueles auxiliares que contribuíam na elaboração das suas estratégias de atuação, não estavam negociando somente a unidade doutrinal em torno de uma ortodoxia religiosa com membros da hierarquia eclesiástica. Tais negociações também visavam a manutenção da unidade imperial em torno da diversidade de elementos culturais, políticos, administrativos e territoriais, com outros grupos detentores de poder, ou seja, os funcionários imperiais que contribuíam para legitimar a posição de centralidade de Teodósio II como governante. O jogo de concessões estabelecido pelo imperador por meio da alternância de apoio entre as facções ciriliana e nestoriana, que pode ser percebido por ocasião do Concílio de Éfeso I (431), da Fórmula da Reunião (433), do Sínodo de Constantinopla (448) e do Concílio de Éfeso II (449), não nos indica uma inabilidade política de Teodósio II em conduzir o conflito, conforme frequentemente registrou a historiografia sobre o assunto. Em nossa perspectiva de análise, tais movimentos abarcavam negociações estratégicas que visavam acomodar interesses e contrabalancear poderes com as aristocracias de funcionários oriundas de diferentes regiões do Império e que se associavam aos bispos na disputa teológica. / This research aims to analyze the political-religious and administrative performance of the emperor Theodosius II (401–450 A. D.) related to the management of the Nestorian Controversy, conflict that emerged in the ecclesiastical hierarchy of the Eastern Roman Empire during the second half of his rule, from 428 to 450 A. D. In the theological sphere, this controversy was related to the disagreements maintained by the bishops Cyril of Alexandria and Nestorius of Constantinople regarding the understanding of the interaction between the human and the divine nature of Christ incarnate. Consistent with the respective political-religious imaginary to which each one belonged, Cyril, a native of that region in Egypt, advocated a union (ἕνωσις) between those two natures, whereas Nestorius, a native of Antioch, in the province of Syria I, defended only a conjunction (συνάφεια) between them. Such divergent opinions resulted in a polarization of the Eastern Roman society regarding those ideas, considering that religious and political aspects used to be perceived as being narrowly interlaced in Late Antiquity. The extent of the conflict can be verified by the participation of officials from various segments of the imperial administration who aligned with the formed factions, as such conflicts, in that context, were also related to ideological constructions that contributed to provide support and unity to the imperial power. The adherence of the officials indicates that Theodosius II not only did manage a theological conflict between members of the ecclesiastic hierarchy but also that his intervening in the conflict demanded him to negotiate his own position on the topography of power with segments of the aristocracy that composed these groups of officials. Therefore, we characterize the conflict not only as a theological one, but also as a political-administrative one. This perception was made possible through the cataloging and mapping of the imperial and episcopal letters analyzed, which allowed us to visualize the formation of the sociability networks kept between imperial officials and bishops. Data extracted from those documents, particularly those referring to the prosopographical data of the letters’ authors, or from those individuals mentioned in the letters, were analyzed in contrast with Nestorius’s work entitled Book of Heraclides, and Cyril’s work entitled Against Nestorius, in order to reinforce the perception of synergy between the bishops and officials in the defense of their common political-religious interests. Thus, we study the hypothesis that Theodosius II and those who assisted him in elaborating his strategies of action, were not only negotiating the doctrinal unity around a religious orthodoxy with members of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. Such negotiations also aimed at keeping the imperial unity regarding cultural, political, administrative, and territorial elements, with other groups that had the power, i.e. imperial officials that used to contribute to legitimate the position of centrality of Theodosius II as a ruler. The concessions game established by the emperor by alternating support between cyrillian and nestorian groups, which can be observed during the Council of Ephesus I (431), the Formula of the Reunion (433), the Synod of Constantinople (448), and the Council of Ephesus II (449) do not indicate a political inability of Theodosius II to conduct the conflict, as frequently recorded in the historiography on the subject. From our standpoint, such moves included strategic negotiations that aimed at accommodating interests and balancing powers with the aristocracies of officials from various regions of the empire and that joined the bishops in the theological dispute. / 13/24320-4