Thesis (Ph.D.)--Boston University

This dissertation examines the political nature and impact of nationalism within political systems. The dissertation does this through two distinct contributions: 1) establishing a clear conceptual definition of nationalist political parties (NPPs) and 2) developing a typology of NPPs that explains their development. Attention to NPPs has been mixed as some scholars have dismissed their relevance and/or merely grouped them with right-wing political parties. This points to a particular problem within the study of NPPs, namely that they are both under-theorized and over-simplified. In the dissertation, I argue that a more systematic approach is necessary for analyzing the distinct features of NPPs so that scholars can discern the similarities and qualities that make NPPs unique. NPPs are defined as parties that prioritize a singular nation or national identity, expressing a belief that this nation or national identity is unique, and as such requires political action to ensure its protection and survival. Unlike traditional political parties, NPPs are unique in their often-disjointed policy proposals and lack of definitive policy positions along the traditional left-right spectrum. The rhetorical tools employed by NPPs provide a basis for how they can be identified as different from other political parties within their system. Using small-N comparative historical analysis of political parties in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe, a typology of NPPs is proposed across three distinct policy frameworks. Specifically, the Fidesz and Jobbik parties of Hungary and the UDMR of Romania are examined as respective ideal types of each of the frameworks discussed. The theory presented in the dissertation states that the type of policy framework chosen by the party depends on the timing of its development and more importantly on the structure and membership of the party organization. / Political Science

The foundations of democracy is a very popular subject in our time period because there are many states seeking to establish democratic governments but are unsure of what exactly a democratic government is or how to build one. A democracy does not spring out of the ground overnight; it takes many years of painstakingly slow evolution in the direction of democracy. The main push for democracy comes from the people themselves by means of a gradual expansion of rights. The point of this study is to discover underlying determinants of a strong democracy. For this study, three states will be looked at. The three states are Bulgaria, Poland and the Czech Republic, and they are vital components to understanding the patterns of democratic development in Eastern Europe. Although as a whole the states within this region share many traits, there are sub-regional differences setting them apart that affect their chances of creating democracy. Of the three cases the Czech Republic stands out as the most likely to establish a viable democracy, and part of that has to do with its geographic proximity to Western Europe. Because the Czechs have always been closer to Western Europe they have imbibed more successful practices.

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Between 1963 and 1968, Lyndon B. Johnson struggled to take advantage of increasing instability in Eastern Europe. By negotiating Most Favored Nation trade treaties and using the Import-Export Bank of America to finance "deferred payment" trade arrangements, Johnson hoped to strengthen American and Eastern European relations. Where Johnson failed to arrange new trade agreements he opted for broadening diplomatic ties. Johnson believed advantages to this strategy included weakening Soviet hegemony in the Warsaw nations, generating a new influx of trade to stabilize the American balance of payments, and preventing Soviet expansion into third world nations. I argue that President Johnson was unsuccessful in Eastern Europe because certain segments of Congress would not support deeper ties with Communist nations. Congress' refusal to treat with the Warsaw Nations stemmed from two sources: a refusal to validate the Communist system and increasing American involvement in the Vietnam War. President Johnson promoted improved interactions, desiring stronger East- West ties and weaker Soviet control in the region. Congress endorsed the international isolation of Communist nations, aiming to cause economic collapse in the Communist governments. / History

Yes / This paper examines stock market reaction to cross-border acquisition announcements that involve Eastern European emerging-market targets. Using a unique and a manually collected dataset, we identify 125 cross-border acquisitions in which developed-market firms from France, Germany, Netherlands, and the United Kingdom acquire ownership stakes in emerging as well as developed-markets in Europe during the period January 2000 through December 2011. In line with previous findings on foreign cross-border merger and acquisitions (M&As) in emerging- markets, evidence suggests that when the target firm is located in either the Czech- Republic, Hungary, Poland, or Russia, cumulative abnormal return (CAR) to the acquiring developed-market firm shows a statistically significant increase of 1.26% over a three day event window, following the announcement. Thereby, the relative size of the acquirer to the target appears to be the only significant factor that contributes to positive acquirer returns. The result is robust to the inclusion of controls for country, industry, as well as acquirer, target, and firm specific characteristics. Moreover, cross-border M&As involving an emerging-market target result in higher value creation for the acquiring shareholders than cross-border transactions into developed-markets.

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This thesis is a general examination of the Soviet and East European crisis which followed the death of Joseph Stalin in March, 1953. Stalin's character, position, and power were such that the methods he employed in the government of the vast multi-national and multi-state empire bequeathed to his successors could not be made to function in his absence without reform and redefinition. The post-Stalin leadership realized that in order to consolidate its position at the head of the empire a careful program of "de-Stalinization" was mandatory. The prosecution of that program from the announcement of collective leadership in April, 1953, to the 1957 Moscow celebration of the fortieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution and the upheavals associated ·with the period comprise the four year long Soviet and East European crisis of de-Stalinization.