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This dissertation consists of three essays that explore economic issues on information security and risk management. In the first essay, we develop an economic mechanism which coordinates security strategies of Service Providers (SPs). SPs are best positioned to safeguard the Internet. However, they generally do not have incentives to take such a responsibility in the distributed computing environment. The proposed certification mechanism induces SPs to voluntarily accept the liability of Internet security. SPs who take the liability signal their capability in conducting secure computing and benefit from such recognition. We use a game-theoretic model to examine SPs' incentives and the social welfare. Our results show that the certification mechanism can generate a more secure Internet communication environment. The second essay studies the impact of cyberinsurance and alternative risk management solutions on firms' information security strategies. In the existing literature, cyberinsurance has been proposed as a solution to transfer information risks and reduce security spending. However, we show that cyberinsurance by itself is deficient in addressing the overinvestment issue. We find that the joint use of cyberinsurance and risk pooling arrangement optimizes firms' security investment. In the case with a large number of firms, we show that firms will invest at the socially optimal level. The third essay examines the information role of vendors' patching strategies. Patching after software release has become an important stage in the software development cycle. In the presence of quality uncertainty, we show that vendors can leverage the patch release times to signal the quality of their software products. We define a new belief profile and identify two types of separating equilibria in a dynamic setting.

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published_or_final_version / Economics and Finance / Master / Master of Philosophy

In 2003, the Centre for Operations Excellence at the University of British Columbia's Sauder School of Business worked on a project for a company in the resort industry. The project was an initial attempt to develop and implement a pricing management practice for the ski lift ticket business of that company. Our main deliverable was the development of an Excel-based tool with a user-friendly interface that could help the company in their budgeting of the ski lift ticket business. After completing the project, we did some further investigation relative to pricing management techniques that could be applied to this sort of business, namely a congestible service industry. In this thesis we argue that a revenue management system could bring substantial benefits if implemented in this industry. We also identify the requirements and main features of a revenue management system applied to congestible service industries. Although revenue management is a very popular system in fields such as the airline, hotel and car rental industry, none of them can be classified as congestible industries. The ski lift ticket industry and similar industries possess one characteristic that differentiates them from the ones previously mentioned, there is no fixed capacity. This is the reason why we considered important to study the application of revenue management in congestible service industries.

The present thesis provides a definite answer to the question of how comparisons of certain aggregate quantities and price levels should be made across two or more geographic regions. It does so from the viewpoint of both economic theory and the “test” (or “axiomatic”) approach to index-number theory. Chapter 1 gives an overview of the problem of multilateral interspatial comparisons and introduces the rest of the thesis. Chapter 2 focuses on a particular domain of comparison involving consumer goods and services, countries and households in developing a theory of international comparisons in terms of the the (Kontis-type) cost-of-living index. To this end, two new classes of purchasing power parity measures are set out and the relationship between them is explored. The first is the many-household analogue of the (single-household) cost-of-living index and, as such, is rooted in the theory of group cost-of-living indexes. The second Consists of sets of (nominal) expenditure-share deflators, each corresponding to a system of (real) consumption shares for a group of countries. Using this framework, a rigorous exact index- number interpretation for Diewert’s “own-share” system of multilateral quantity indexes is provided. Chapter 3 develops a novel multilateral test approach to the problem at hand by generalizing Eichhorn and Voeller’s bilateral counterpart in a sensible manner. The equivalence of this approach to an extended version of Diewert’s multilateral test approach is exploited in an assessment of the relative merits of several alternative multilateral comparison formulae motivated outside the test-approach framework. Chapter 4 undertakes an empirical comparison of the formulae examined on theoretical grounds in Chapter 3 using an appropriate cross-sectional data set constructed by the Eurostat—OECD Purchasing Power Parity Programme. The principal aim of this comparison is to ascertain the magnitude of the effect of choosing one formula over another. In aid of this, a new indicator is proposed which facilitates the measurement of the difference between two sets of purchasing power parities, each computed using a different multilateral index-number formula.

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Professors Bela Balassa and Paul Samuelson (1964) have made a significant contribution to the theories of exchange rate by bringing a new thinking to the most popular exchange rate model, Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). They have elucidated the contribution of productivity in the determination of PPP. Accordingly, the emphasis of this thesis is Balassa and Samuelson’s Productivity Bias Hypothesis (PBH) in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) and the application thereof to South Africa and Switzerland for the period 1994Q1 -2003Q4. The productivity bias hypothesis that explains real exchange rate movements in terms of sectoral productivities rests on two components: firstly, it implies that the relative price of non-traded goods in each country should reflect the relative productivity of labour in the traded and non-traded goods sectors. Secondly, it assumes that purchasing power parity holds for traded goods. The deviation of PPP from the equilibrium exchange rate or the real exchange rate is directly related to the ratio of productivity in a counter country over that of the base country. With inter-country productivity differences believed to be smaller in the service sector than in the sectors producing goods and with the prices of traded goods equalised through arbitrage, the relative prices of non-traded goods (services) would be directly correlated with productivity levels in individual countries. The thesis employs stationarity and cointegration tests in order to determine the presence of long-term, equilibrium, relationship between PPP and productivity variables of the above-mentioned two countries. The overall finding of this thesis is supportive of the productivity bias hypothesis in purchasing power parity concerning the two countries, South Africa and Switzerland. Accordingly, it has been found out that the deviation from equilibrium exchange rate can be explained by differences in productivity. Though currently being challenged by the service sector, South Africa’s manufacturing sector is assuming an important place in the economy. Given the need for improved competitiveness in the manufacturing sector, it is imperative that policy analysis and formulation render increased emphasis on efficiency and costeffectiveness. Such an integrated approach may aid not only in raising productivity but also in managing the intertwined socio-economic challenges of unemployment, poverty and inequality. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2005.

This thesis is a theoretical study of relationships between patent races and market structure. The outcome of a patent race can be an important determinant of market structure. For example, whether or not a new firm enters a market may depend upon its winning a patent race against an incumbent firm already in that market. Moreover, market structure can be a major influence upon competition in a patent race. In the example, the asymmetry between incumbent and potential entrant has an effect upon their respective incentives in the patent race. Chapter I discusses models of R and D with uncertainty. We show that, as the degree of correlation between the uncertainties facing rival firms increases, R and D efforts increase under some, but not all, conditions, and the number of active competitors falls. Chapter II discusses the approach of representing patent races as bidding games. We examine a model in which several incumbent firms compete with a number of potential entrants in a patent race, and ask whether the incumbents have an incentive to form a joint venture to deter entry. They do so if and only if the patent does not offer a major cost improvement. In Chapter III we examine the strategic interactions between competitors during the course of a race, in an attempt to clarify (for different types of race) the idea that a race degenerates when one player becomes 'far enough ahead' of his rivals, in a sense made precise. In Chapter IV we examine the evolution of market structure in a duopoly model when there is a sequence of patent races. The nature of competition in the product market is shown to determine whether one firm becomes increasingly dominant as industry leader, or whether there is 'action - reaction' between firms.