IIn this thesis the specialization patterns of a group of countries are studied in order to check whether they are compatible with Comparative Advantages or whether there is scope to diminish CO2 emissions through alternative specialization patterns. The main focus is on European countries. A set of Input-Output Tables during the period 1995-2011 is used to perform the analysis, which is based on the Sraffian notion of subsystems. The results suggest that Comparative Advantages did not work well in Europe during the period considered. Alternative specialization patterns may allow to exploit better Comparative Advantages and, moreover, to decrease the CO2 emissions related to economic activities.

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One of the ways by which the legal system has responded to different sets of problems is the blurring of the traditional boundaries of criminal law, both procedural and substantive. This study aims to explore under what conditions does this trend lead to the improvement of society's welfare by focusing on two distinguishing sanctions in criminal law, incarceration and social stigma. In analyzing how incarceration affects the incentive to an individual to violate a legal standard, we considered the crucial role of the time constraint. This aspect has not been fully explored in the literature on law and economics, especially with respect to the analysis of the beneficiality of imposing either a fine or a prison term. We observed that that when individuals are heterogeneous with respect to wealth and wage income, and when the level of activity can be considered a normal good, only the middle wage and middle income groups can be adequately deterred by a fixed fines alone regime. The existing literature only considers the case of the very poor, deemed as judgment proof. However, since imprisonment is a socially costly way to deprive individuals of their time, other alternatives may be sought such as the imposition of discriminatory monetary fine, partial incapacitation and other alternative sanctions. According to traditional legal theory, the reason why criminal law is obeyed is not mainly due to the monetary sanctions but to the stigma arising from the community’s moral condemnation that accompanies conviction or merely suspicion. However, it is not sufficiently clear whether social stigma always accompanies a criminal conviction. We addressed this issue by identifying the circumstances wherein a criminal conviction carries an additional social stigma. Our results show that social stigma is seen to accompany a conviction under the following conditions: first, when the law coincides with the society's social norms; and second, when the prohibited act provides information on an unobservable attribute or trait of an individual -- crucial in establishing or maintaining social relationships beyond mere economic relationships. Thus, even if the social planner does not impose the social sanction directly, the impact of social stigma can still be influenced by the probability of conviction and the level of the monetary fine imposed as well as the varying degree of correlation between the legal standard violated and the social traits or attributes of the individual. In this respect, criminal law serves as an institution that facilitates cognitive efficiency in the process of imposing the social sanction to the extent that the rest of society is boundedly rational and use judgment heuristics. Paradoxically, using criminal law in order to invoke stigma for the violation of a legal standard may also serve to undermine its strength. To sum, the results of our analysis reveal that the scope of criminal law is narrow both for the purposes of deterrence and cognitive efficiency. While there are certain conditions where the enforcement of criminal law may lead to an increase in social welfare, particularly with respect to incarceration and stigma, we have also identified the channels through which they could affect behavior. Since such mechanisms can be replicated in less costly ways, society should first try or seek to employ these legal institutions before turning to criminal law as a last resort.

Questa tesi contribuisce alla letteratura di economia politica attraverso l’analisi degli effetti di una crisi economica sulla tipologia di governo. In particolare, ci si concentra su due tipologie di governo che possono essere viste come anomalie empiricamente correlate a fenomeni di crisi economica e finanziaria: il populismo e la tecnocrazia. Dopo una rassegna critica della letteratura esistente, si sviluppano due distinti modelli di teoria dei giochi. Il primo analizza il populismo nel contesto di una relazione principale-agente tra l’elettore e il politico. Concentrandosi su come la probabilità che si affermi un governo populista è influenzata dai parametri che catturano la situazione economica del Paese, si dimostra che, in un contesto di crisi economica, è più probabile che il governo attui provvedimenti populisti. Il secondo modello spiega la comparsa di un governo tecnocratico (e in parte anche la sua stabilità) in un sistema politico in cui gli agenti principali sono due partiti e, in alcuni casi, un gruppo di tecnocrati. Qui si prova che il governo tecnocratico ha più probabilità di emergere in un contesto di crisi economica, quando il parlamento è equamente diviso e quando la distanza ideologica tra i due partiti è sufficientemente grande. / This thesis contributes to the literature on theoretical political economy analyzing the effects of economic crisis on the types of government. In particular, we focus on two types of government that can be seen as anomalies empirically related with the emergence of financial and economic crisis: populism and technocracy. After a critical survey of the existing literature on those topics, we develop two different game-theoretical models. The first one studies populism in the context of a standard political-agency relationship between a voter and a politician. We see how the likelihood of the emergence of a populist government is affected by parameters representing the economic conditions of a country, and we find that, in a context of economic crisis, the government is more likely to make populist decisions. The second model explains the emergence of a technocratic government (and captures some issues related to its stability) in a post-election partisan politics setting where the main players are two parties and possibly a group of technocrats. We prove that the technocratic government is more likely to emerge in a context of economic crisis, when the parliament is evenly split and the ideological distance between the two parties is big enough.

La tesi si compone di tre saggi. nel primo saggio si sviluppa un modello teorico che analizza i possibili effetti macroeconomici, controintuitivi e redistributivi, di politiche di deregolamentazione nel mercato dei prodotti in un contesto di eterogeneità tra le imprese produttrici, nel breve e nel lungo periodo. Il secondo saggio presenta la struttura, la metodologia, e alcuni fatti stilizzati relativi al nuovo indice di regulation nei mercati dei prodotti; nel terzo saggio si usa l'indice di regulation nei mercati agricoli, per esplorare econometricamente le cause sottostanti al processo di riforma in tali mercati, in un'ottica di political economy. / The dissertation includes three papers. The first paper develops a theoretical model of deregulation in product market with heterogeneous firms. The second paper presents the methodology and the construction of the new index of regulation in product market; also, some stylized facts are presented. The third paper uses the new index to econometrically explore drivers and phases of market reforms in the agricultural sector.

Human capital accumulation and its effect on labour market outcomes have been in the focus of economic research for decades. Traditionally the economic literature suggests that there might exist several forms of human capital, where human capital represents the knowledge, skills and health embodied in individuals. Skills and knowledge are largely acquired through education and experience but may also reflect, in part, innate abilities. In addition, some aspects of motivation and behaviour, as well as attributes such as the physical, emotional and mental health of individuals are also considered as human capital. These activities are referred to as human capital because people cannot be separated from their knowledge, skills and health, in the way they are separated from their physical and capital assets. Human capital accumulation is an important determinant of individuals' earning capacity and employment prospects, therefore plays an important role in determining the level and distribution of income in society. Moreover, the costs of these investments include direct outlays on market goods and the opportunity cost of the time that must be withdrawn from competing uses. Apart from direct investments in human capital people could also invest in constructing a network of relationships for example to find a job. Until now all these aspects have been studied separately, in this thesis I try to reconcile them.

Questa tesi studia la possibilità di costruire diversi indicatori di benessere socio-economico della famiglia, indicatori che possano tenere conto delle dimensioni del rischio e dell'incertezza. Indicatori che, in qualche modo, catturino la capacità di far fronte ad un eventuale shock negativo. La costruzione di indicatori basati sulla proprietà di beni durevoli è applicata al contesto albanese. / This thesis aims at investigating the different possibilities of measuring indicators of socio-economic status at the household's level. These indicators should be able to take account of the dimensions of uncertainty and risk, thus catching the ability of people of coping with negative economic shocks. The construction of such indicators asset-based is focused on the Albanian context.

Il presente lavoro raccoglie 4 contributi sul tema dei differenziali sui tassi di interesse esistenti tra i membri dell'unione monetaria europea. / I investigate the determinants of sovereign yield spreads in EMU.