Cette thèse est articulée autour de deux questions centrales visant à expliquer pourquoi et comment devrait être organisée la Complémentarité entre les Banques et les institutions spécialisées dans la Microfinance (CBM), afin de financer efficacement le développement dans les pays de l’UEMOA : l’Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine. Les aspects bancaires de la théorie de rattrapage économique de Gerschenkron sont adaptés au contexte de la prépondérance de l’économie informelle dans l’UEMOA. L’analyse empirique montre, quant à elle, que les secteurs bancaires et microfinanciers de l’UEMOA sont respectivement réfractaires et peu performants - en termes de rentabilité et d’impact social - pour l’autonomisation du processus de CBM. Relativement à la mise en oeuvre de la CBM, le cadre néoinstitutionnaliste de l’hybridité de la firme est mobilisé en vue d’intégrer et d’expliciter le rôle de l’autorité publique vis-à-vis des acteurs financiers privés, dont ceux du « mobile banking ». Par ailleurs, les « best practices » internationales dans la microfinance servent également de références empiriques et typologiques aux pays de l’UEMOA, en vue d’une coordination publique indirecte ou directe de la CBM. / This thesis is based on two central questions whose purpose is to explain why and how the institutional complementarity should be organized between banks and microfinance institutions (MFIs) to effectively finance the development process of WAEMU (West African Economic and Monetary Union) countries. The banking aspects of Gerschenkron’s catch-up theory are adapted to the large informal context of the WAEMU economies. At empirical level, the independent and private processes of Complementarity between Banks and Microfinance institutions (CBM) are scarce in WAEMU as long as banks avoid risks associated with adaptation to microfinance customers, and MFIs are not efficient for infrastructure modernization and expansion. Thus, to implement CBM processes, the neo-institutionalist framework of hybridity of the firm and the international best practices in microfinance are mobilized in order to clarify the role of public authorities towards private financial actors, including the mobile banking operators.

《穩定暨成長協定》（Stability and Growth Pact, SGP）作為歐洲經濟暨貨幣同盟（Economic and Monetary Union, EMU）財政紀律框架之核心規範，其有效實行是確保EMU會員國財政穩定並使EMU穩健運作之重要關鍵。本研究之研究目的，即在於透過對SGP的立法背景、實行成效與SGP在2005年及2010年經歷的兩次改革內容進行分析，以了解EMU財政紀律發展趨勢及政策啟示。 本研究之研究成果顯示，自1997年SGP制定至今，EMU財政規範始終是以「補漏洞」的方式進行。歐盟非中央化的財政政策是EMU財政規範的有效實行必須期待各會員國善意遵守的根本原因。這項缺陷也使得部分EMU會員國重新思考建立財政同盟的可能。然由於財政同盟代表的是要求EMU各會員國進一步放棄國家主權中的財政自主權，在仍有會員國對此表示疑慮的前提下，歐盟財政治理未來的發展趨勢仍值得吾人持續觀察。 / As a key rule of the fiscal governance frameworks of European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the effective implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) is a guarantee of both the fiscal stability of the EMU Member States and the well-function of the EMU. The main purpose of this thesis is to explore the trends of the EMU fiscal disciplines and the messages the EMU fiscal policies deliver through analysis of the background of the SGP, the practice of the SGP and the two modifications to SGP in 2005 and 2010 respectively. The result of this thesis shows that the EMU fiscal governance has been keeping fixing problems ex post facto since the SGP entered into force. And the decentralised fiscal policies explain why the effective implementation of SGP is relying on the willingness of the EMU Member States to follow the rules. This defect makes some of the EMU Member States to reconsider to build a fiscal union, which means to yield the fiscal sovereignty to the EU. Since there are still some EMU Member States concerning over the idea, the future of the EMU fiscal governance is still developing.

Why has not Britain joined euro until now? This is an attractive issue. The purpose of this paper is to realize the real reasons. Hence, this paper analyzes the euro policies of Thatcher Government, Major Government and Blair Government. Before interpreting British euro policies, this paper explains the process of British EU membership. In addition, this paper introduces the story of EMU which is relative to euro. Most importantly, here this paper takes ¡§Europeanization¡¨ framework as a study tool to examine British euro policies. Through ¡§Europeanization¡¨ framework, this paper proposes many factors affecting British euro policies, including ¡§goodness of fit,¡¨ ¡¨veto players,¡¨ ¡§timing,¡¨ ¡¨political beliefs and organizational cultures,¡¨ ¡§the costs of institution changing¡¨ and so on. Thus, this paper concludes that Britain hasn¡¦t joined euro until now owing to many factors.

Bremen, Universität, Thesis (doctoral), 2002.

Throughout the Eurozone’s economic crisis, little attention has been given to wage-setting practices. This lack of attention is surprising given that wages have been considered an important instrument for managing the economy in a currency union since the 1960s and have even been emphasized in successive blueprints for Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Recent scholarship has found differences in wage-setting practices a key feature distinguishing healthy and crisis-stricken Eurozone countries. Indeed, in this emerging literature, countries that coordinate wages effectively have remained competitive under EMU and had fewer troubles in responding to the crisis, while those with weakly-coordinated wages have struggled mightily. In effect, this literature finds differences in EMU members’ wage-setting regimes at the heart of the economic crisis now facing the Eurozone and the trade imbalances between its Northern and Southern members. However, very little work has examined the specifics of individual labour market models under EMU. Indeed, while this new literature on wage setting and the crisis places wage setting models at its centre, it does not delve into the differences among highly coordinated systems. This oversight is problematic given that scholars of monetary union have suggested that the single currency may amplify the effects of subtle differences in national socioeconomic models, while others have suggested that EMU may be corrosive to some labour market models that coordinate wage setting. This study addresses this gap in the literature, dissecting labour market models by the mechanisms that deliver horizontal and vertical coordination, as well as the indicators to which they are calibrated. Using this framework, it then traces the experiences of Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands under EMU, who use very different mechanisms to coordinate wages. It argues that while EMU has exacerbated longstanding problems in the Belgian wage-bargaining system, it has had little impact upon the German and Dutch systems. Rather, underlying changes in the institutions that manage wage setting in these countries, and changes in social partner organizations – particularly the trade unions – are far more consequential for their continued functioning under EMU. More broadly, these findings suggest that in fact, many designs of highly coordinated wage setting are capable of managing pressures from the single currency. For those Eurozone countries currently refashioning their labour market models, tighter coordination may be just as viable an option as dismantling their wage-bargaining institutions. / Graduate / 0615 / ifdumka@gmail.com

Asian efforts towards bond market development are driven by the 1997-98 financial crises; Central and Eastern European efforts by the transition towards EMU. The small size of most of the economies underlying these still "emerging" bond markets poses the question of minimum efficient scale and which options to pursue. We argue that the joint bond funds and regional bond market linkups that follow existing trade, FDI and bank ties will broaden the sources of finance, can improve market discipline, provide signals to the market, and thus increase financial stability. Based upon bond market data and analysis of regional efforts like the Asian Bond Funds, we argue that bond market development should be given more attention to foster growth and stability. (author's abstract) / Series: EI Working Papers / Europainstitut

In the 2003 Treaty of Accession, the signatories agreed that all New Member States (NMS) that joined the European Union (EU) in 2004, would adopt the euro, even if no timetable was provided. Why have some NMS not been able to join the euro area even if they made serious attempts at the outset? What are the circumstances and policies in these countries that have led them not yet to adopt the euro? Has it been lack of political will on the part of the government, a strong voice in the opposition, a euroskeptic president, insufficient administrative capacity, or lack of policy learning? Though there is no consensus among economists as to whether or not adopting the euro in the short run is a good idea, an economic cost-benefit analysis would suggest that in the long run euro adoption is positive for NMS. Yet, macroeconomic analyses cannot explain the change in government policies that may lead to euro adoption. Political scientists have typically focused on collective identity, policy learning, ideas and knowledge transfer among central bankers and other political elites, as well as adjustment to global pressures and Europeanization. This political science literature is unable to provide a satisfactory explanation as to why the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland have not adopted the euro yet. I argue that the role of domestic politics is key to explaining the process of euro adoption in Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland: government policies, elections, electoral cycles as well as constitutional rules, veto points, central banks, public opinion and the media turn out to be crucial in explaining the lagging euro adoption process in these countries. / Graduate

Thesis (doctoral) - Freie Universität, Berlin, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 189-203).

Given the growing effect that globalisation and integration has had upon economies and regions, the process of monetary union has become an increasingly topical issue in economic policy debates. This has been driven in part by the experience and successes of the European Monetary Union (EMU), which is widely perceived as beneficial to member countries. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is an example of a group of countries that has realised that there are benefits that may arise from economic integration. This paper makes use of an interest-rate pass through model to investigate whether the pass-through of monetary policy transmission in ten SADC countries has become more similar between January 1990 and December 2007 using monthly interest rate data. This is done to determine the extent of macroeconomic convergence that prevails within SADC, and consequently establish whether the formation of a regional monetary union is feasible. The results of the empirical pass-through model were robust and show that there are certain countries that have a more efficient and similar monetary transmission process than others. In particular, the countries that form the Common Monetary Area (CMA) and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) tend to show evidence of convergence in monetary policy transmission, especially since 2000. In addition, from analysis of the long-run pass-through, the results reveal that there is evidence that Malawi and Zambia have shown signs of convergence toward the countries that form the CMA and SACU, in terms of monetary policy transmission. The study concludes that a SADC wide monetary union is currently not feasible based on the evidence provided from the results of the pass-through analysis. Despite this, it can be tentatively suggested that the CMA may be expanded to include Botswana, Malawi and Zambia.

In conformity with the goal of the African Union to build a monetary union for the entire African continent, one of the goals of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) is the formation of a monetary union with a single central bank. Towards this end certain macroeconomic convergence criteria, which are closely aligned with those used by the European Union (EU), have been set. While empirical research on whether or not SADC would benefit from the formation of a currency union has focused on the optimum currency area criteria, no reference to these criteria is made in the SADC programme. Instead, the SADC approach has been governed by a set of macroeconomic convergence criteria synonymous with those pursued by the European Monetary Union (EMU) prior to its formation. Doubts regarding the future of the EU have recently been raised as a result of debt crises in certain member states, implicitly raising questions about the adequacy of the convergence criteria that were adopted. Accordingly, this study considers the feasibility of establishing a currency union in the SADC region. The proposed convergence criteria are assessed against the theory of optimum currency areas as well as in terms of their adequacy in the light of recent EU experience. In addition, the paper provides a preliminary assessment of the fiscal sustainability of the SADC region by conducting Engle-Granger cointegration tests on the public debt and revenue series for the SADC countries under analysis. It was observed that SADC has made considerable progress towards meeting its macroeconomic convergence criteria in recent years. However, in light of the regions' heavy dependence on commodity exports coupled with recent price fluctuations in this regard, the sustainability of this progress is questioned. Furthermore, a review of the EMU experience to date highlights numerous flaws in its approach and the potential challenges the SADC region should consider in moving forward with its agenda. In essence, the study suggests that almost all the SADC member states are fiscally unprepared for monetary union formation and the recent EMU debt crisis has highlighted the importance of acquiring a state of fiscal sustainability prior to union formation. In addition, it is imperative that the SADC members continue to address issues of product diversification, intraregional trade and political unification, all of which should be governed by a centralised fiscal authoriry.