University of Macau / Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities / Department of Government and Public Administration

My dissertation is an advocacy of the idea that if aid proved to be ineffective, it is partly because of the donor and not only the recipient as it is usually argued. The thesis contributes to the theoretical and empirical literature on aid effectiveness and explores the ability of aid to achieve its goals in the presence of both incentives and informational problems. <p>The thesis consists of three essays dealing with a particular aspect of donor policies that may impact the effectiveness of aid: i) the drivers of aid allocation among recipient countries, ii) ex-post conditionality and the role of reputation in inducing compliance with aid contracts; iii) and finally, the optimal choice of aid modalities.<p>The first chapter investigates the drivers of U.S. aid policy. <p><p>I find considerable evidence that the pattern of aid is dictated as much by political and strategic considerations, as by the economic needs and merit of the recipients. Most importantly, inertia seems to impact heavily the aid allocation process. Any of these motivations, when excessive, would lead to a time inconsistency situation where the donor is not credible in his conditionality. With such an impact on aid allocation, the question arises on the effectiveness of conditioning aid provision on political, social, or economic reforms. This is precisely the scope of chapter 2.<p><p>The second chapter investigates the conditions under which reputation can serve as commitment device in order to induce donors of development aid to enforce aid contracts and recipients to comply with such contracts. The idea is that the success of conditionality rests solely on the availability of a commitment technology that ties the hands of the donor. Reputation concerns could create the required incentives and overcome the altruism effect on the donor side.<p><p>Notwithstanding that incentive creation must not be driven by the volume of aid only, but also by the way it is channelled, i.e. aid modality. This is particularly relevant for recipients with certain characteristics. Depending on the preference alignment of the donor and the recipient, the information structure in place, the optimal aid modality can change. The characteristics of the optimal aid package are investigated in chapter 3. Optimality imposes a mix of fixed project and financial transfer to recipient countries. The transfer can be negative for countries exhibiting a high willingness or ability to redistribute to the poor. This is interpreted as a contribution to the financing of the infrastructure project. The extent of the project (large or small size) is determined by the interest of government for the poor in the recipient country.<p> / Doctorat en Sciences économiques et de gestion / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

The Eisenhower Administration sought to create a large role for U.S. multinational corporations, who could provide a significant amount of the capital needed for trade expansion and industrial growth. This policy became known as "trade not aid." The trade not aid policy reflected both the fiscal conservatism and ideological beliefs of the Eisenhower Administration. By 1957 Eisenhower shifted to a policy of trade and aid. This study examines three foreign economic policies in the context of American-East Asian relations. It focused primarily on Japan, since that country served as the center of the American regional "workshop economy" concept in Asia. Tracing the development of the trade/aid program, this thesis then compares and contrasts governmental policies with business activity and opinion during the 1950s. It concludes that the foreign economic policy of the Eisenhower Administration contained serious flaws, served the needs of only a few countries in the region, and was weighted heavily toward a military support role rather than economic development. (Abstract shortened with permission of author.)

Abstract not available. / Thesis (MBA)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, 2005.

The United Kingdom's postwar economic recovery and the usefulness of Marshall Plan aid depended heavily on a rapid increase in exports by the country's manufacturing industries. American aid administrators, however, shocked to discover the British industry's inability to respond to the country's urgent need, insisted on aggressive action to improve productivity. In partial response, a joint venture, called the Anglo-American Council on Productivity (AACP), arranged for sixty-six teams involving nearly one thousand people to visit U.S. factories and bring back productivity improvement ideas. Analyses of team recommendations, and a brief review of the country's industrial history, offer compelling insights into the problems of relative industrial decline. This dissertation attempts to assess the reasons for British industry's inability to respond to the country's economic emergency or to maintain its competitive position faced with the challenge of newer industrializing countries.