Li, Xu. / Thesis submitted in: December 2008. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 41-43). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Abstract --- p.i / Acknowledgement --- p.ii / Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 2 --- Background Study --- p.6 / Chapter 3 --- Model Formulation --- p.8 / Chapter 3.1 --- Trading Cost Function --- p.9 / Chapter 3.2 --- Notations and Optimality Equation --- p.11 / Chapter 4 --- Optimal Policy --- p.14 / Chapter 4.1 --- Preliminary Assumption and Results --- p.14 / Chapter 4.1.1 --- "Generalized (s, 5, H) Policy" --- p.14 / Chapter 4.1.2 --- Polya Distribution and Quasi-K-convex --- p.15 / Chapter 4.1.3 --- Assumptions --- p.20 / Chapter 4.2 --- Single Period Problem --- p.23 / Chapter 4.3 --- Finite-Period Problem --- p.30 / Chapter 4.4 --- The Algorithm --- p.36 / Chapter 5 --- Conclusion --- p.39 / Bibliography --- p.41

This dissertation describes two theories of risky choice based on a normatively axiomatized partial order. The first theory is an atemporal alternative to von Neumann and Morgenstern's Expected Utility Theory that accommodates the status quo bias, violations of Independence and preference reversals. The second theory is an extension of the Inter-temporal von Neumann-Morgenstern theory of Kreps and Porteus (1978) that features a normatively deduced preference for flexibility. A substantial part of the thesis is devoted to examining equilibrium implications of the inter-temporal theory. In particular, a multi-agent multi-period Bayesian rational expectations equilibrium is shown to exist under certain conditions. Implications to asset pricing are then investigated with an explicit parameterization of the model.

This thesis is mainly concerned with the question whether 'conventional' economic theory - especially the neoclassical theory of general equilibrium - is sufficiently flexible to accommodate the particular conditions prevailing in the developing countries. It is argued that most existing theories of economic underdevelopment adopt an interpretative approach which essentially amounts to relaxing some of the chief assumptions of the neoclassical theory. When applied to the two-sector model of general equilibrium, these theories generally yield predictions which are vastly different from those associated with the neoclassical assumptions of perfect competition, unlimited factor substitutability and unrestricted resource mobility. Several theories seek to explain the development problem in terms of the specific production processes used in poor countries. Myrdal's (1957) theory of cumulative causation, for example, effectively introduces increasing returns to scale in at least one sector or region of the economy; in contrast to the neoclassical theory, he thus nvisages a cumulative process of regional divergence in the output level per worker. Similarly, Richard Eckaus's (1955) explanation of the "factor-proportions problem" is based on the assumption of limited factor substitutability. This enables him to establish the existence of a so-called "unemployment equiIibrium", thus implying that developing countries may be faced with a conflict between the objective of maximizing social -welfare on the one hand, and that of full employment on the other. More recently, Leibenstein (1960) has shown that this trade-off may be complicated by the introduction of capital-biased technological inventions and innovations. The solution to the factor-proportions problem consists in the adoption of more appropriate, usually labour-biased technologies, increased capital formation and a reduction in the rate of population growth. Much of the postwar literature on economic development has focused on the imperfectly competitive structure of the product and the factor markets in developing countries. Myint (1954) has highlighted the role played by monopolies and ligopolies during the "opening-up" process of economic development. Likewise, both Lewis's (1954) dualist theory and Todaro's (1969; 1971) model of rural-urban migration attempt to explain the unemployment problem in terms of various factor price distortions. In an international context, Prebisch (1950; 1959) and Singer (1950) have again shown how prevailing differences in the structure of markets between developed and developing countries may turn the terms of trade against the latter; using a two-sector model, Bhagwati (1958) has demonstrated that such a deterioration in the terms of trade could bring about a net decrease in the welfare level of the countries concerned. Generally, the policy measures relevant to the "market imperfections" problem include the creation of job opportunities in the rural (rather than urban) sector, the encouragement of informal-sector enterprises,and the imposition of factor taxes and subsidies as a means of counteracting the adverse effect of factor price distortions on employment. A more recent approach to the unemployment problem is the plea by the International Labor Office (1970; 1972) for a redistribution of income within the developing countries. In terms of the two-sector model, such a policy may well succeed in eliminating labour unemployment caused by fixed factor proportions and/or factor price distortions. It should be realized, though, that a redistribution of income may lower the aggregate savings level, and hence also the growth rates of capital and labour employment in the economy. On the whole, it would seem that these theories do indeed adopt a modified version of the neoclassical theory in providing a fairly comprehensive explanation of the economic problems of labour unemployment, low incomes and inequality.

Traditional economic theory assumes that individuals are self-interested. They only care about their own well-being and disregard the impact of their actions on the others. However, the assumption of selfish individuals is unable to explain a number of important phenomena and puzzles. Individuals frequently engage in actions that are costly to themselves with no<p>apparent reward. Behavioural economics provides plausible explanations for these actions.<p>Individuals can be “boundedly rational" (Simon, 1955, and Kahneman et al. 1982) and/or can be driven by altruistic, equity and reciprocity considerations (see for an overview Fehr<p>and Schmidt, 2006). Over the past decade, researchers have applied behavioural economics<p>models to the study of organisations and how contracts should be designed in the presence<p>of non-standard preferences and asymmetric information or incomplete contracts (see for<p>an overview of the literature Köszegi, 2014).<p>In my current research, I try to be at the forefront of these new behavioural economics<p>applications into traditional industrial organisation and contract theory themes. The usual prescriptions of standard models can be misleading if potential differences in the agents' preferences are overlooked. Behavioural economics can make great progress if it takes into proper accountmarket and organisational features. / Doctorat en Sciences économiques et de gestion / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

This dissertation describes two theories of risky choice based on a normatively axiomatized partial order. The first theory is an atemporal alternative to von Neumann and Morgenstern's Expected Utility Theory that accommodates the status quo bias, violations of Independence and preference reversals. The second theory is an extension of the Inter-temporal von Neumann-Morgenstern theory of Kreps and Porteus (1978) that features a normatively deduced preference for flexibility. A substantial part of the thesis is devoted to examining equilibrium implications of the inter-temporal theory. In particular, a multi-agent multi-period Bayesian rational expectations equilibrium is shown to exist under certain conditions. Implications to asset pricing are then investigated with an explicit parameterization of the model. / Business, Sauder School of / Finance, Division of / Graduate

Fisher market models and market equilibrium computation algorithms have long been central research topics in economics, operations research, and theoretical computer science. Recently, they have found diverse applications in the design of Internet marketplaces. In this thesis, we develop tractable optimization models and algorithms for computing market equilibria under various practically relevant settings. In Chapter 1, we study first-order methods for computing market equilibria under a finite number of buyers with linear, quasilinear or Leontief utilities. For linear and Leontief utilities, we show that their corresponding convex programs---whose solutions are market equilibria and vice versa---exhibits strong-convexity-like structures after simple reformulations. This allows us to design the first gradient-based algorithms that achieve a linear rate of convergence for computing market equilibria. For buyers with quasilinear utility functions, we propose a new convex program capturing market equilibria, which is analogous to the Shmyrev convex program for linear utilities. Applying the mirror descent algorithm to this convex program leads to a distributed and interpretable Proportional Response (PR) dynamics that converges to equilibrium prices and utilities. This generalizes the classical PR dynamics and its convergence guarantees, previously known for linear utilities, to the case of quasilinear utilities. In Chapter 2, we consider a generalization of a linear Fisher market where there is a finite set of buyers and a measurable item space. We introduce generalizations of the Eisenberg-Gale convex program and its dual to this setting, which leads to infinite-dimensional Banach-space optimization problems. We show that these convex programs always have optimal solutions and these optimal solutions correspond to market equilibria. In particular, a market equilibrium always exists. We also show that KKT-type optimality conditions for these convex programs imply the defining properties of market equilibria and are necessary and sufficient for a solution pair to be optimal. Then, we show that, similar to the classical finite-dimensional case, a market equilibrium is Pareto optimal, envy-free and proportional. Moreover, when the item space measure is atomless, we show that there always exists a pure equilibrium allocation, which can be viewed as a generalized fair division, that is, a Pareto optimal, envy-free, and proportional partition of the item space. This leads to generalizations of classical results on the existence and characterizations of fair divisions of a measurable set. When the item space is a closed interval and buyers have piecewise linear valuations, we show that the infinite-dimensional Eisenberg-Gale-type convex program can be reformulated as a finite-dimensional convex conic program, which can be solved efficiently using off-the-shelf optimization software. Based on the convex conic reformulation, we also develop the first polynomial-time algorithm for finding a fair division of an interval under piecewise linear valuations. For general buyer valuations or a very large number of buyers, we propose computing market equilibria using stochastic optimization and give high-probability convergence guarantees. Finally, we show that most of the above results easily extend to the case of quasilinear utilities. In Chapter 3, we consider an online market setting where items arrive sequentially and must be allocated to buyers irrevocably. We define the notion of an online market equilibrium as time-indexed allocations and prices which guarantee buyer optimality and market clearance in hindsight. We propose simple, scalable and interpretable allocation and pricing dynamics termed as PACE (Pacing ACcording to Estimated utilities). When items are drawn independently from an unknown distribution with a possibly continuous support, we show that PACE leads to an online market equilibrium asymptotically. In particular, PACE ensures that buyers' time-averaged utilities converge to the equilibrium utilities of a static market with item supplies being the unknown distribution and that buyers' time-averaged expenditures converge to their per-period budget. Hence, many desirable properties of market equilibrium-based fair division such as envy-freeness, Pareto optimality, and the proportional-share guarantee are also attained asymptotically in the online setting. Next, we extend the dynamics to handle quasilinear buyer utilities, which gives the first online algorithm for computing pacing equilibria in first-price auctions. Finally, numerical experiments show that the dynamics converges quickly under various metrics.

The major objectives of this study are to: (i) improve the understanding of what is meant by economic diversification and economic diversity, (ii) provide a comprehensive conceptual framework for region-specific analysis of the relationship between changing economic structure and economic performance measured in terms of the growth, stability, and distribution of income and employment, and (iii) construct an operational model of a regional economy that can be used to assess the impacts of alternative development strategies. This study attempts to sort out the overlaps, contradictions, and gaps among the different economic and finance theories, and the different definitions and measures of economic diversification and diversity. The subject of economic diversification or diversity is addressed in the context of the question: "What is the relationship between a region’s changing economic structure and performance?" A structural model of a regional economy, an extended input-output model based on a social accounting matrix (SAM), serves as the foundation of the conceptual framework and operational model. The SAM-based input- output model explicitly depicts the functional relationship between economic structure and performance. The region’s demand, production technologies, and trade flows are included as part of economic structure. Economic performance is measured as the growth, stability, and distribution of regional income and employment, by occupation group. The structural model is used to analyze the relationship between economic structure and performance for a given time period, and to analyze changes over time. Growth, stability, and distributional impacts are considered simultaneously. By doing this, potential tradeoffs can be explicitly addressed. To identify the structural sources of growth and stability, the SAM-based input-output model is decomposed at different points in time. By decomposing a SAM-based model it is possible to analyze structural sources of growth and stability in terms of both supply and demand factors. Alternative development strategies can be modelled using this conceptual framework. The operational model quantifies the relationship between: (i) the anticipated growth and stability of exogenous final demands, and (ii) the anticipated growth, stability, and distribution of endogenous income and employment, by occupation group. The operational model focuses attention on the distributional impacts of changing economic structure and performance. The relationship between a region’s social welfare, and the aggregation scheme and accounting stance used in the analysis of economic impacts are explicitly addressed. As such, there are explicit social welfare criteria for comparing and ranking alternative development strategies. The operational model presented in this study is well-suited to many popular input-output application packages. / Ph. D.

Business Management / (M.Sc.(Operation Research))

The present work uses statistical mechanics tools to investigate the dynamics of markets, prices, trades and wealth distribution. We studied the evolution of market dynamics in different stages of historical development by analyzing commodity prices from two distinct periods : ancient Babylon, and medieval and early modern England. We find that the first-digit distributrions of both Babylon and England commodity prices follow Benford's Law, indicating that the data represent empirical observations typically arising from a free market. Further, we find that the normalized prices of both Babylon and England agricultural commodities are characterized by stretched exponential distributions, and exhibit persistent correlations of a power law type over long periods of up to several centuries, in contrast to contemporary markets. Our findings suggest that similar market interactions may underlie the dynamics of ancient agricultural commodity prices, and that these interactions may remain stable across centuries. To further investigate the dynamics of markets, we present the analogy between transfers of money between individuals and the transfer of energy through particle collisions by means of the kinetic theory of gases. We introduce a theoretical framework of how micro rules of trading lead to the emergence of income and wealth distribution. Particularly, we study the effects of different types of distribution of savings/investments among individuals in a society and different welfare/subsidies redistribution policies. Results show that while considering savings propensities, the models approach empirical distributions of wealth quite well. The effect of redistribution better captures specific features of the distributions which earlier models failed to do. Moreover, the models still preserve the exponential decay observed in empirical income distributions reported by tax data and surveys. / by Natalia E. Romero. / Vita. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2012. / Includes bibliography. / Electronic reproduction. Boca Raton, Fla., 2012. Mode of access: World Wide Web.

Wong Chung Yiu. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 56-59). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / List of Appendices / Chapter Chapter 1. --- Introduction / Chapter Chapter 2. --- Literature Review / Chapter 2.1 --- Literature Review on Tourism / Chapter 2.2 --- Literature Review on Production Externalities / Chapter 2.3 --- Literature Review on Unemployment / Chapter Chapter 3. --- The Basic Model and Elfects of Tourism / Chapter 3.1 --- The Basic Model / Chapter 3.2 --- Effects of Tourism on Residents' Welfare / Chapter 3.3 --- Concluding Remarks / Chapter Chapter 4. --- "Tourism, Unemployment and Residents.' Welfare" / Chapter 4.1 --- The Model / Chapter 4.2 --- EU'ects of Tourism on Residents' Welfare / Chapter 4.3 --- Concluding Remarks / Chapter Chapter 5. --- "Tourism, Capital Accumulation and Welfare" / Chapter 5.1 --- The Model / Chapter 5.2 --- "Effects of Tourism on Residents"" Welfare" / Chapter 5.3 --- Concluding Remarks / Chapter Chapter 6. --- Concluding Remarks / References / List of Appendices / Chapter A.1 --- Stability condition in equations (36) and (51) / Chapter A.2 --- Comparative statics in equation (60) / Chapter A.3 --- dPN/dΔ and dK/dΔ in equations (68) and (69) / Chapter A.4 --- Solutions of the system (**)