Habilitationschrift--Leipzig, 1921. / Arbeiten zur Entwicklungspsychologie, Heft 5. Bibliographical references included in "Anmerkungen": (p. [162]-174).

The view that large-scale, long-range social theories cannot be predictive other than "in principle" is sufficiently widespread as to be considered the orthodox view. It is widely held that, lacking this predictive quality, social theories are cut off from a crucial form of vindication enjoyed by the experimental sciences. Thus many would agree with Ryan's assessment that while with regard to large-scale social changes "long-range prediction is not in principle impossible," nonetheless as a matter of practical methodology such a goal is of "dubious value." The reason commonly proffered as to why social theories cannot be predictive is the causal complexity of social life. Because of this feature, it is held, while we may be able to unearth interesting social generalizations, we will not be able to predict the many initial conditions together with which they predict. Alternately, due to this complexity we are able to achieve no better than tendency laws which do not permit predictions of sufficient precision to allow for predictive testing. This has been held to be true for other causally complex fields as well. Thus, Scriven has argued that Darwin was "the paradigm of the explanatory but non-predictive scientist" due to the constraints imposed on his methodology by the causal complexity of the biosphere. As a result of both an uncritical acceptance of the orthodox view and an inadequate analysis of Marx's methodology, Daniel Little has argued that Marxian theory is non-predictive. However, a thorough analysis of Marx's labour process theory shows it to be both clearly predictive and subject to justification by predictive assessment. Moreover, a formalization of the theory indicates that available data confirm it as regards both its central hypothesis and the matrix of social causation it exhibits. Little's position in regard to Marxian theory is strongly similar to Scriven's in regard to Darwinian theory. In both cases, faulty theoretical presuppositions combine with inadequate analysis to buttress false conclusions as to the asymmetry of explanation and prediction. Adequate analysis dispels Little's and Scriven's conclusions and exhibits important methodological parallels between Marx and Darwin. / Arts, Faculty of / Philosophy, Department of / Graduate

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D.Litt. et Phil. (Philosophy) / Please refer to full text to view abstract

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This thesis is centrally concerned with the current nee-liberal world order and its effects upon society. It is concerned to expose the contradictions and weaknesses within the knowledge systems that underpin our political reality. It considers economics as the determining discourse of neo-liberal politics, analytic biology as its determining discourse of individual persons, and analytic and neo-pragmatist philosophy as its leading systems of thought. In each case it finds a linear rationalism compatible with the determinist materialism of noo-Darwinism, and indeed explicitly invoking Darwin. This seems to vindicate Manuel Castells's fmding of this 'Knowledge Society' as driven by 'an abstract, universal instrumentalism'. The thought systems of this economic liberalism have seen politics subsumed within economics, de-humanising most of the institutions of the earlier Liberal tradition, to the detriment of both freedom and democracy. But it disputes Castells's assumption that this is a necessary reality and finds in neo-liberal education the exception to this dehumanising trend. Revitalised as 'Mode 2' knowledge production, this form of teaching, learning and research is found to be ideally suited to challenge the underpinnings of the very social order which initially produced it. The thesis as a whole is designed to employ Mode 2 methods in order to support this contention. Using this approach it seeks to demonstrate that in place of neo-Darwinism the ideas of the South African natural scientist Eugene Marais, concerning the significance of conscious thought itself within evolution, can provide a more convincing epistemoloy than the behaviourism and materialism of analytic biology. It finds John Maynard Keynes's acceptance of economics as a moral and not a natural science, more logically convincing and more inherently useful for social reconstruction than the current mathematicisation of economic theory. Prevalent philosophical approaches appear to serve only to reinforce the systems of thought already found (and found wanting) in politics, biology and economics. But again these philosophies are shown to be vulnerable to a Mode 2 critique, particularly employing the ontological understanding of the contemporary pragmatist philosopher Joseph Margolis, whose strong version of relativism allows for both bivalent and multivalent truth values more appropriate to understanding the complex realities of ethical and democratic societies. / Thesis (Ph.D.)-University of Natal, Durban, 2002.

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