Thesis (Ph.D.)--Boston University / PLEASE NOTE: Boston University Libraries did not receive an Authorization To Manage form for this thesis or dissertation. It is therefore not openly accessible, though it may be available by request. If you are the author or principal advisor of this work and would like to request open access for it, please contact us at open-help@bu.edu. Thank you. / The central problem of this dissertation is to test some aspects of the hypothesis that a modified version of Edgar Sheffield Brightman's Moral Laws constitutes a fundamental theoretical framework for social ethics. A test case is considered which compares the implicit assumptions made qy certain religious social ethicists with those characteristic of moral law social etlncs. It is hypothesized that if social ethics based on moral laws do represent fundamental principles, then evidence of dependence on them will be found in the writinr,s of those who hold to other systems. These investigations allow six propositions to be made on the proper components of a viable social ethic. These are derived from the investigation of the presuppositions of moral laws and the consequences of the types of appeals made to moral law social ethics by Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul Ramsey. Two methodological procedures are used. The first is an analytic and synthetic exposition of the central theoretical problem of outlining particular aspects of moral law foundations for social ethics. This exposition includes contributions of philosophy and social science. These data are incorporated into a fourfold re-classification of Brightman's Noral Laws as amended to include a law of the ideal of community. The second methodological procedure involves the use of content analysis of selected works of Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul Ramsey. The analysis is made by examining the arguments in specific ethical considerations in terms of the adequacy of their theoretical framework. It is noted that the authors rely on arguments analogous to the principles of moral law social ethics where their theory seems inadequate, and that the theoretical framework often makes no improvement on moral law social ethics. The limitations of this study are uncerstood in terms of the use of the data. In the work on the expansion of Edgar S. Brightman's Horal Laws, contributions by other philosophers and by social scientists are limited to the areas where their thinking is consonant with that of Brightman, although new insights of these thinkers are incorporated. The thought of neither Reinhold Niebuhr nor Paul Ramsey has been exhaustively analyzed. This dissertation is not primarily concerned with this problem but rather, only with their thought as illustrative material. The limits of the conclusions regarding this illustrative material are that some forms of Christian social ethics may be subsumed in moral law social ethics without doing violence to the ethical efficacy of Christian theory. This excludes, however, accepting the exclusiveness of revelatory data as a presupposition. It is concluded that at least six aspects of moral law foundations for social ethics are universally valid. First, that the term "normative system" must be understood as capable of development; second, that any valid social ethics must be adequately grounded in an empirical approach; third, that empiricism must be broadly understood in terms of a theory of reality which is organic and pluralistic; fourth, that ethics must always find its locus in the category of personality which, in social ethics, is integral to the concept of community; fifth, that ethical terms and their validity may only be understood in the light of one's understanaing of the nature and function of culture; sixth, that religious ethics should be included as part of the data of moral experience. / 2031-01-01

Despite being one of the most influential writers of his era, Edgar Allan Poe led a mostly tragic life of impoverishment and personal failures and tragedies. This essay explores to what extent this affected Poe’s writing, by examining the portrayals of the emotions of grief and sorrow in some of Poe’s work, via close-reading. Further, the essay contains a shorter biographical analysis of Poe’s life and work, in order to establish a connection between the two. The meaning of the emotions of grief and sorrow within Poe’s works are discussed, and connected to Poe’s biography. The results show that Poe’s works are sometimes converging with tragedies from his own life, his personal tragedies and his stories featuring death, grief and sorrow converge on several occasions throughout his intense career.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Boston University / PLEASE NOTE: Boston University Libraries did not receive an Authorization To Manage form for this thesis or dissertation. It is therefore not openly accessible, though it may be available by request. If you are the author or principal advisor of this work and would like to request open access for it, please contact us at open-help@bu.edu. Thank you. / The purpose or the dissertation is to compare the epistemology and theodicy or Edward John Carnell with that or Edgar Sheffield Brightman in order to draw out philosophic conructs between the two philosophers. Their basic epistemological conflict concerns philosophic starting point. For Brightman, epistemological starting points other than the diversified unity or present consciousness (datum self, shining present) are either limiting abstractions or inferences (reliable and unreliable) from this datum self. For Brightman the datum self (with its experiences immediately given) is undeniable tact. Since the truth or claims is not directly given, claims must be tested. However, insisting that starting point dominates method, conclusion, and criterion or truth, Carnell rates one area or experience (namely, "internal ertable experience," innate norms, or Augustine's "eternal concepts") as well as a truth-claim (namely, the Bible as infallible) as having superior epistemological value [TRUNCATED]. / 2031-01-01

This thesis focuses on the creative work of Edgar Allan Poe, and pieces together how various references to music in his poems and tales function in ways that echo throughout his oeuvre. By taking into account the plots and themes that surround references to music in Poe’s works, this thesis explores how Poe uses and describes music as it inhabits real world settings, liminal spaces, and otherworldly sites. The literature this thesis draws from ranges from tales little-discussed in Poe criticism, such as “The Spectacles” and “The System of Doctor Tarr and Professor Fether,” to more complex and popular tales such as “The Fall of the House of Usher” and “The Masque of the Red Death”; the same is true of the poems, which range from “Fanny” to “Annabel Lee.” The exploration of the less critically popular texts in conjunction with the more critically popular ones brings to light a clear hierarchy of music’s function in the tales and poems of Edgar Poe in ways that converse with his treatment of madness and the divine. The work of music and literature scholars will serve as the basis for distinguishing and historically positioning Poe’s use of certain musical terms, as well as ultimately providing a means to express the mythical, philosophical, and theological implications of music’s place in Poe’s works.

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Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Iowa, 1925. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [315]-332).

For many years authors have repeated stories and myths about Frank Lloyd Wright, overstating purported influences and unjustly degrading periods of Wright’s work. Discrepancies in Wright’s own discourses have not made the task of characterizing him any easier. To better understand Wright’s works and influences, the focus must shift to those who have authored the narratives about Wright. Among the most important of these was Edgar Kaufmann jr. [sic]. Other early Wright commentators, such as Henry-Russell Hitchcock, Grant Carpenter Manson, and Bruno Zevi are usually mentioned before Kaufmann, but Kaufmann published more about Wright than any one else, until his death in 1989. Hitchcock worked on twenty-two books and articles about Wright, Manson on nine, and Zevi on seventeen. Kaufmann authored thirty works about Wright, more than Zevi and Manson combined. Kaufmann is generally referred to as the son of Fallingwater, but his Wrightian scholarship and design theory extended far beyond his role in bequeathing his family’s famous retreat. Kaufmann’s writing career spanned over three decades and included more than forty works, with topics about Wright, “Good Design,” skyscrapers, and the museum industry. His writings reveal a complex scholar who at times was led by the trends of his time, and who was not afraid to reevaluate and redefine his past work. From Kaufmann’s first article about Wright in Art News, to his work establishing Fallingwater’s tour program, he communicated Wright’s methods and analyzed his rhetoric. During Wright’s lifetime, Kaufmann followed his wishes for interpreting his work. But after Wright’s death, Kaufmann was swayed by a number of contemporary ideas, such as indeterminacy and systems. Most of Kaufmann’s writings focused on Wright’s later architecture, clarifying his rhetoric, discussing his influences and space, and telling the history of Fallingwater. Kaufmann is a key figure in the narrative about Wright because of his unique perspective as a student, a client, and a friend that no other historian can claim. Deciphering Kaufmann’s writings allows for an examination of one of the major voices behind Wright’s story. / text

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This dissertation comprises exegesis and critique of the personalistic idealism of Edgar Sheffield Brightman (1884 - 1953). Chapter One offers a biography of Brightman's life and identifies the intellectual heritage out of which he emerged and in which his thought may be situated. Chapters Two to Seven contain major exegesis of Brightman's metaphysical system relevant to the detailed critique and redefinition of person which follows in the remaining two Chapters. In these chapters the implications of Brightman's account of experience are examined extensively. The critique develops from relatively minor difficulties to a comprehensive analysis of the relationship that holds between the way he viewed experience and the category of substance. The argument will show that there is a distinction between experience and person which Brightman failed to recognize. The person is discovered to be (what will be called) a functional unity of purposive will and body with experience being one dimension of the person rather than its defining criterion. The concept of person as a functional unity of purposive will and responsive body with experience being a dimension in the person is found to be a more consistent outworking of Brightman's experiential foundation than his own bifurcation of person and body.