Thesis (B.A.)--Haverford College, Dept. of Economics, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.S.)--Rochester Institute of Technology, 2007. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 25-26).

The voting system a government chooses has influence upon the way people vote, as it has some bearing on the average person’s utility received from voting. In the United States the Electoral College system is used to determine who becomes president-elect, but theoretical arguments have been made to support a change in voting structure to Proportional Representation. I developed my model to understand more about how a change in the voting structure would affect voter utility. My contribution to the research question focuses upon relative benefits of one voter in a specific party to another voter in another party. I used an empirical approach, using data pulled from past elections and survey data. My model suggests that Republican voters would receive a higher utility from a change in the voting system from the Electoral College to Proportional Representation. It is unclear whether Democrats would receive a higher benefit, but at least would receive a lesser utility change than that of the Republican voters.

The Constitutional Convention of 1787 was greatly divided over the question of how to select the new nation’s chief executive. The method finally adopted was a compromise between direct election and election by the national legislature and provided that individual states, as they saw fit, choose electors equal to the total number of Senators and Representatives. From the beginning, most of delegates considered the proposal awkward and irrational almost to the point of absurdity, but as they argued about it, they became convinced that it was then the only plan which could overcome the objections raised by other methods. The Convention had barely adjourned, however, when dissatisfaction over election of the President arose once again. Reform efforts began in the earliest Congresses. In the past one hundred and eighty years, more than 1000 amendments—perhaps more than on any other subject—have been introduced. These may be divided into two distinct classifications—direct and indirect methods of election. These may be divided into two distinct classifications—direct and indirect methods of election. From the district system proposed in the early 19th century to the proportional system advanced most prominently after World War II, each of the direct proposals has had its day and has been found wanting. It has become clear that other indirect methods of election would merely turn in some old problems for some new ones. The present system, however, is in serious need of reform. Its dangers are well documented. Failure of electors to vote in accordance with the desires of the voters and the present allocation of electoral votes makes it possible that under the present system a President can be elected who is not the choice of a majority of the citizens. Furthermore, the present system provides for an election in the House of Representatives if no candidate received the necessary 270 electoral votes. In a House election, each state casts one vote regardless of population. In view of these factors, the electoral college is an undemocratic institution, an historic remnant of a nation vastly different from the United States in the twentieth century. Through this nation’s years of development, the ideal of popular choice has become the most deeply ingrained of our governmental principles. Through our national experience we have learned that there is no safer or better way to elect our public officials. No matter how wisely or foolishly the American people choose their President, he is still their President. The electoral college should therefore be amended to insure that the chief executive is the voice of all 200 million Americans in practice as well as in theory. Only one type of proposed reform can claim to give the people this voice without creating other problems in the election of the President. It is the direct popular vote proposal under which each citizen’s vote regardless of where it is cast, would count equally with all other votes. The candidate receiving a majority or plurality, as decided by Congress, would be the new President. A run-off election would replace election by the House of Representatives if no candidate received the specified number of votes. No one, of course, can guarantee that direct election would never involve risks in the election of the President, but if one’s premise is based upon an overriding consideration of democracy, the risk seems worth taking.

The Electoral College and Jacksonian Democracy are two subjects that have been studied extensively. Taken together, however, little has been written on how the method of choosing presidential electors during the Age of Jackson changed. Although many historians have written on the development of political parties and the increase in voter participation during this time, none have focused on how politicians sought to use the method of selecting electors to further party development in the country. Between 1824 and 1832 twelve states changed their methods of choosing electors. In almost every case, the reason for changing methods was largely political but was promoted in terms of advancing democracy. A careful study of the movement toward selecting electors on a general ticket shows that political considerations in terms of party and/or state power were much more important than promoting democratic ideals. Despite the presence of a few true reformers who consistently pushed for a constitutional amendment guaranteeing that all states used the same method, the conclusion must be that politics and party demanded a change. This study relies heavily on legislative records at both the state and national level and newspapers throughout t the country from the period. Beginning with a brief history of the office of the president and an overview of the presidential elections prior to 1824, the author then carefully analyzes the elections of 1824, 1828, and 1832, as well as the various efforts to amend the constitutional provisions dealing with the Electoral College. Particular emphasis is placed on political factions at the state level, the development of the Democratic and National Republican parties nationally, and how each party used and at time manipulated the electoral process to secure a favorable outcome for their candidates.

Dr. Dinah Mayoo-Bobee, Assistant Professor, Department of History, East Tennessee State University, will address one of today’s hot topics at its inception and other issues which confronted the forefathers of our country.

The three branches of American government---judicial, legislative, and executive---serve important governmental roles, and present their own interesting political questions. We answer three here. First, what are the differences between judges and politicians, and how does this inform the formers' selection? Second, how do senators behave to satisfy their political preferences and the electorate's? Third, what is the optimal strategy for a candidate in the Electoral College? American states select judges in various ways. In Chapter 1, we analyze "merit selection." Typically, a nonpartisan commission culls applicants for judgeships, and an appointee is selected by the governor. Then, periodically, this judge undergoes a retention election: an up-or-down vote by the state's electorate. We contribute a microeconomic model to analyze these elections. We compare this institution, in welfare terms, to others used to appoint and retain judges. Finally, we analyze a recent and ongoing phenomenon: these elections are transforming from historically rubber stamp formalities into contested, politicized contests. The politicization of issues brought before courts increases the likelihood of judges being ousted. In Chapter 2, we explore the behavior of legislators in the U.S. Senate, and of the voters who elect them. We examine shifts in incumbent senators' espoused political positions over time, as the reelection campaign approaches. We introduce novel game theoretic models of incumbent-challenger interaction. We find, through empirical analysis of senators' roll call votes, that senators moderate their positions over time, as potential reelection approaches. Moreover, this moderation accelerates. This is explained by the behavior of voters: the moderation is mirrored by the attention paid by voters. Also, the identity of an incumbent's challenger plays an important role in the amount of moderation exhibited by the incumbent. In Chapter 3, we consider a highly adaptable game theoretic model of competition in the Electoral College. It takes the form of a repeated game. Candidates make allocation decisions to persuade voters. Candidates get utility from winning office, and disutility from expending resources. We characterize optimal campaign strategy, and present comparative statics. We show, inter alia, that a candidate with an inherent advantage may prefer a longer campaign. / text

This thesis briefly reviews the content of Article II, section 1 of the Constitution which established the Electoral College (modified by Amendment XII), and the principel reform plans that have developed over the years. The reform efforts are examined, together with their possible effects on the entire political system.

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The presidential contest of 1952 established a new trajectory for Florida politics. This pivotal election reversed decades of Democratic dominance and signified the beginning of presidential Republicanism in the state. Elections in the second half of the 20th century provided evidence of an increasingly favorable environment for Republican nominees. During this period Democrats were limited to carrying the state's electoral votes three times. GOP presidential ascendancy in Florida was augmented by partisan conversion and the disproportionate in-migration of white Northerners following World War II. Contrary to unrivaled 1980s support, which created an anchor in a new core Southern Republican electoral bloc, the 1990s restoration of competitiveness highlighted voter fluidity. This trend was exemplified by a virtual tie in the 2000 election. This paper confirms an atypical regional diffusion of Republican presidential dominance attributable to demographics. Contemporary Florida elections have been profoundly altered by an older population, increasing diversity due to immigration, and the erosion of Southern culture. Unlike intensifying national sectionalism, Florida has been classified as a "too close to call" during most of the past four presidential campaigns. A unique partisan balance is a component of a demographic profile mirroring the nation. Steady population growth has gradually positioned Florida as an unexpected presidential bellwether. The longevity of highly competitive national elections will continue to be primarily dependent on the partisan inclinations of newcomers.