Abstract Employee Stock Bonus (ESB) is a unique bonus model to link employee salary package with company performance under the current regulation in Taiwan. Comparing with Employee Stock Option (ESOP) in USA, ESB is different in accounting process, company¡¦s actual cost and the model of employee gain in spite of the principle of linking employee salary package to corporate performance is the same. Moreover, the incentive effectiveness and the impact on shareholders¡¦ value between ESB and ESOP need to be clarified. The objectives of this research are to discuss the pros and cons of ESB program as well as to analyze the implementation history and decision characterization of ESB in Taiwan. In the first part of this study, we compare the difference between ESB and ESOP in terms of their fundamentals, implementation and incentive effectiveness, as well as analyze the impact on shareholders¡¦ value by various accounting principles and valuation models approaches.¡@In the second part, we do a history study on ESB implementation history of Taiwan hi-tech industries. We point out some improper ESB decisions that hurt shareholder¡¦s value. We also propose some indexes to measure effectiveness, efficiency of ESB and degree of impact on shareholder¡¦s value. In the third part, we apply regression methodology and cross-sectional analysis to characterize the ESB decision using the samples from Taiwan listed hi-tech companies between 1998 to 2001. We conclude the following contributions in this research: 1. The fundamental of ESB is to provide employee bonus by diluting shareholder¡¦s value. During bull market or stock price appreciates after stock splits, ESB perfectly incorporates employee bonus with shareholders¡¦ value. On the other hand, ESB becomes an extra overhead for shareholders during bear market or stock price depreciates after stock splits. 2. What employees gain from ESB is paid by equity market instead of being paid by the company, no matter whichever accounting principle is adopted. Recognizing ESB as company expense will present income statement in more a proper way but will not impact book value of equity. 3. To recognize ESB as company expense will reduce ¡§intrinsic value of equity¡¨ evaluated by EBO model as EBO model is based on accounting profit. As DFC model is based on free cash flow, ¡§intrinsic value of equity¡¨ evaluated by DFC model will not change even if different accounting principles are adopted. However, ¡§intrinsic value of equity per share¡¨ will be slightly affected by the dilution of share number. 4. In the research samples, mean of ¡§the market value of ESB over average appreciation value of company¡¨ is 13%¡Astandard deviation is 53%¡Amedian is 8%, which implies the welfare effectiveness created by ESB to shareholders varies with individual company. 5. The result of empirical study supports that the main measurement index for managers to decide the share number of ESB program is ¡§total market value of ESB¡¨ instead of ¡§profit share rate¡¨ or ¡§dilution rate¡¨, regardless companies which adopted ¡§fix profit share rate for ESB¡¨ policy. 6. According to the result of empirical study, ¡§the market value of ESB ¡¨ is significantly positive- correlated to growth opportunity, merit raises rate, net profit growth rate, and significantly negative ¡V correlated to company size and financial leverage. ¡§The market value of ESB per employee¡¨ is significantly positive-correlated to company size, growth opportunity, merit raises rate, net profit growth rate, and significantly negative ¡V correlated to financial leverage. The result is consistent with hypotheses that are based on Agency Theory, Information Asymmetry Theory and Scale of Economic. The result of empirical study is not able to support the hypotheses that managers will offer employee more value of ESB according to the appreciation of company value.

Abstract Employee stock option had been discussed for long time and had become very popular topic for current corporates¡¦ financial management. The importance of its option value model becomes hot topic now. The recommended model based on FASB No. 123 may not be helpful to see its payoff distortion from risk aversion and employee exit rate factors. We choose some companies at Taiwan which use employee stock option as their financial tool and study how both risk aversion and employee exit rate impact their value with modified binomial tree method. The results show that risk aversion factor is more sensitivity and cause option payoff change its value within very narrow input range, while employee exit rate also change option value sigfincantly after 10% exit rate range. Hence. Evaluation of risk aversion and employee exit rate factors become important. Companies need to search for optimal solution of those factors to achieve optimal option valuation and its relative incentive effect in order to retain their employee.

abstract: In this paper, I investigate whether participation in employee stock option exchange programs contains private information about future stock returns. High participation in employee stock option exchange programs is associated with negative future abnormal returns over the ensuing 12-month period. This association is moderated by the transparency of the firm's information environment: high institutional ownership and high financial statement informativeness weaken the negative relation between participation and abnormal returns. Controlling for transparency of the firms' information environment, the association between participation and future returns arises primarily from firms that allow the CEO to participate. / Dissertation/Thesis / Ph.D. Accountancy 2013

員工分紅配股制度在我國已行之有年，然而我國目前的會計處理係將其按面額列為盈餘之分配，引發財務報表可能無法有效反映公司經營成本之議。而財政部於八十九年六月提出員工分紅配股按實價課稅的構想，亦引起各界廣泛的討論。另一方面，證券交易法於八十九年六月修訂後，引進了員工認股選擇權制度，其相關的會計與租稅問題亦是一項值得探討的議題。因此本研究即針對「員工分紅配股」與「員工認股選擇權」之會計及課稅問題加以探討，期能提出意見供有關單位參考。經由文獻探討、模擬試算及問卷調查的結果，本研究之主要結論如下： 1.員工分紅配股之會計處理，應按股票市價列為薪資費用，而市價則以股東會決議日市價（除權後）來衡量。根據本研究模擬試算的結果顯示，如果將員工分紅配股按市價列為薪資費用，會對九成左右的樣本公司損益產生重大的影響（以稅前淨利的5﹪為基準）。問卷調查的結果顯示，會計師與學者較贊成按市價列為薪資費用，而上市上櫃公司則較贊成按面額列為盈餘分配。關於員工分紅配股之市價衡量方式，在贊成按市價衡量的受訪者中，以贊成按股票發放日收盤價來計算之比例為最高。本研究建議，在過渡階段，宜先要求公司在財務報表附註中揭露，若員工股票紅利按市價認列為薪資費用之擬制性淨利及擬制性每股盈餘。 2.員工認股選擇權之會計處理，初期宜參考美國SFAS No.123之規定，鼓勵企業採用公平價值法衡量酬勞成本，但亦允許企業採用隱含價值法計算；惟若企業採用隱含價值法，則須揭露採用公平價值法下之擬制性淨利及擬制性每股盈餘。問卷調查的結果顯示，有八成的受訪者贊同上述的處理方式。此外，受訪者亦相當贊成對員工認股選擇權的評價模式及參數估計方法加以限制，以及贊成公司應在財務報表上對員工認股選擇權作詳細的資訊揭露，以便財務報表使用者能自行估計相關之酬勞成本。 3.員工分紅配股之實價課稅議題，應以恢復課徵證券交易所得稅為根本解決之道。而實價的認定，原則上應採股票發放日收盤價。惟考量我國目前證券交易所得稅停徵的情況，以及股票市價具波動性，本研究建議按股票發放日收盤價的一定比率（如70﹪~90﹪）計算員工薪資所得，或以「股東會決議日收盤價（除權後）」、「除權日收盤價」及「股票發放日收盤價」三日市價較低者列計。問卷調查結果顯示，會計師及學者較贊成員工分紅配股按實價課稅，而上市上櫃公司則較贊成按面額課稅。關於市價的計算方式，贊成實價課稅的受訪者較贊成按「股票發放日市價」與「除權日市價」來計算。另外，大部分的受訪者贊成公司得將員工股票紅利列報為薪資費用。 4.員工認股選擇權之租稅課徵，應以員工行使日股票市價超過認購價格的部分，計入員工的薪資所得課稅；此外，公司亦得將員工因認股權而申報薪資所得的金額，在申報營利事業所得稅時列報為薪資費用。問卷調查的結果顯示，受訪者較贊成按行使日的差價課稅，而其中以會計師的贊成比例為最高。另外，會計師及學者亦較贊成公司得相對列報為薪資費用。

本研究主要探討高階經理人之選擇權與公司績效之關聯性，研究發現，公司發給高階經理人之選擇權價值與Tobin’s Q呈正向關係。為區分誘因調整（the incentive alignment perspective）與利益榨取（the rent extraction perspective）兩觀點，本研究將選擇權預測值分為經濟因素、公司治理與殘值三部分。研究結果顯示依據經濟因素所預測出之選擇權價值與Tobin’s Q呈正向關係，其符合誘因調整觀點，即發放選擇權可減少代理問題。而依公司治理所預測出之選擇權價值，則與Tobin’s Q 呈負向關係，此亦與利益榨取觀點相符，即當公司治理較差時，發給高階經理人之選擇權往往較股東最適程度為高。此外，本研究亦發現選擇權與Tobin’s Q有一非線性關係。 / This study examines the association between employee stock options (ESOs) and future firm performance (Tobin’s Q). The evidence shows that the value of ESOs granted to CEOs in the current and past five years are positively associated with Tobin’s Q. To test the incentive alignment perspective and the rent extraction perspective, this study predicts the value of ESOs granted to CEOs due to economic determinants, governance quality and residual value. I find that the predicted component of ESO grants due to economic determinants are positively related with Tobin’s Q, consistent with the incentive alignment perspective that ESOs are granted to reduce the agency problem. Further, the predicted component of ESO grants attributable to the governance factors are negatively associated with Tobin’s Q, indicating that for firms with poor governance, the actual level of incentives executives receive may go well beyond the optimal level for shareholders. The negative association is consistent with the rent extraction perspective. Moreover, this study also finds a non-linear association between the Tobin’s Q and the ESO grant values.

本研究主要目標在探討有關員工認股選擇權租稅政策訊息之發布，是否對國內發行員工認股權憑證之上市及上櫃公司— 資訊電子業的股票報酬造成異常影響。在五個事件期間中，以第一、二及第五個事件期（即員工認股選擇權初步比照員工分紅入股依面額課徵所得稅、財政部初步擬定員工執行認股權時，須以執行價與當初認購價格間的價差，核課所得稅以及財政部在民國93年4月30日發布員工認股權證課稅行政命令，依照財政部當初的規劃，在執行日課徵員工認股權證的所得稅之兩事件期）中發現以面額或價差課稅之消息初步規劃和發布，確實對市場造成負向異常報酬。而有利員工之認股選擇權租稅政策消息發布（即財政部未對課稅政策做出最後決定）時，市場對資訊電子業股價產生正向累積異常報酬。 另外，研究亦發現，不利員工之員工認股選擇權課稅行政命令發布之特定事件時期，發行比例愈高及發行員工認股權之公司，過去研究發展支出愈高者，將產生較小之負向累積異常報酬。 相較於員工分紅入股制度，員工認股選擇權之激勵效果更能提供長期之誘因，但單就對工之課稅制度而言，收到的似乎是相對不利之懲罰效果。 / In this thesis, event study methodology is employed to examine the electronics industry’s stock market reaction to the announcement of tax policy changes of employee stock option. Market model and Ordinary Least Square (OLS) are adopted to estimate abcdrmal returns (AR) and accumulated abcdrmal returns (CAR) during event periods. A related issue also examined is the relation between the ratio of employee’s stock options and the CAR. Specifically, the effects of five events are examined. The first、second and fifth event (when Minister of Finance proposed to tax employee Stock options based on their par value. The second is when the Ministry of Finance announced that employee stock options would be taxed at the difference between the market price employee execute the option and the execute price．The fifth event is when Minister of Finance indeed announced an administrative decree) really show up the negative CAR. Findings concluded by the thesis are as follows: 1. When the Finance Minister proposed to tax employee stock options based on their par value or at the difference between the market price employee execute the option and the execute price, electronics companies on average had negative CAR. 2. During the fifth event period, companies with higher ratio of employee stock options and R＆D expenses had lower negative CAR than those with lower ratio of employee stock options and R＆D expenses.

員工認股權之發行，可降低企業代理成本，並達激勵員工之效果。過去研究指出，公司股權結構及董事會組成特性的不同，將對員工認股權獎酬政策產生影響。據此，本研究以員工認股權證發行比例及員工認股權價值，作為衡量員工認股權獎酬指標，並以民國九十年至九十五年間發行員工認股權之台灣上市櫃公司為樣本，探討員工認股權與公司治理間之關聯性。實證結果顯示如下： 一、董監事持股率與員工認股權獎酬無顯著關係。 二、經理人持股率與員工認股權價值呈顯著負相關。 三、內部董事持股率與員工認股權證發放比例及價值皆具有顯著正相關，並與後者呈先增後減之倒U型關係。 四、機構投資人持股率與員工認股權證發行比例呈顯著負相關，與價值呈顯著正向關係。 五、董事會規模與員工認股權證發放比例及價值皆呈顯著正相關。 六、董事長兼任總經理及獨立董事席次比例皆對員工認股權價值具顯負相關。 / Employee stock option plans are often used to alleviate agency cost and to serve as a tool for motivation. Previous studies have indicated that different ownership structure and composition of board members have impact on employee stock option compensation policy. Accordingly, this study used the ratio of stock option granted to the common shares outstanding and the market value of the total option shares granted as the indication of stock option compensation to test whether employee stock option plans are related in some way to corporate governance. Sample firms are selected from listed companies in Taiwan Stock Exchange and OTC firms granting stock options during the period of 2001 to 2006. Empirical results are as follows: 1.There is no significant relationship between the percentage of stock holdings of board members and employee stock option plan. 2.The percentage of top management stock holdings is negatively associated with the market value of employee stock option with statistical significance. 3.Internal directors’ stock holding ratio is positively associated with the employee stock option ratio and market value. Specifically, the relation between the internal directors’ stock holding ratio and the market value of the employee stock option is convex. 4.The institutional investors’ stock holding ratio is negatively associated with employee stock option ratio but positively associated with market value of employee stock option. 5.The board size is positively associated with both the ratio and market value of the employee stock option. 6.Both the duality of Chairman/CEO and the percentage of independent directors are negatively associated with the market value of employee stock option.