This dissertation work provides a kaleidoscope of alternative empirical estimation techniques while illuminating and challenging conventional approaches and established findings in the Corporate Finance literature. In particular, the observed „conglomerate discount“ and the effect of diversication and concentrated ownership on firm value are revisited in the course of my cumulated doctoral thesis. In doing so, the main emphasis lies on the inference of causation in the presence of endogeneity concerns, namely by considering potential distortions caused by unobserved heterogeneity, reverse causality or non-random self-selection.

This dissertation work provides a kaleidoscope of alternative empirical estimation techniques while illuminating and challenging conventional approaches and established findings in the Corporate Finance literature. In particular, the observed „conglomerate discount“ and the effect of diversication and concentrated ownership on firm value are revisited in the course of my cumulated doctoral thesis. In doing so, the main emphasis lies on the inference of causation in the presence of endogeneity concerns, namely by considering potential distortions caused by unobserved heterogeneity, reverse causality or non-random self-selection.:1 A Corporate Finance Application of the Oaxaca-Blinder De-composition: Causes of the Diversification Discount 1.1 Introduction 1.2 Corporate diversi_cation and its agency-related costs 1.3 The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition as an approach to explaining the excess value gap 1.3.1 Pooled sample OLS decomposition 1.3.2 The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition 1.4 Sample selection and description 1.4.1 Sample selection and variables 1.4.2 Sample description 1.5 Empirical analysis and discussion 1.5.1 Basic results 1.5.2 Robustness tests 1.6 Conclusion 1.7 Tables 1.8 References 1.9 Appendix 2 A Paradoxon of Policy Intervention: The Case of the German Tax Reduction Act 2.1 Introduction 2.2 The Tax Reduction Act of 2000 2.3 Theoretical Framework 2.3.1 Investor View 2.3.2 Investee View 2.4 Data and Descriptives 2.4.1 Sample 2.4.2 Summary Statistics 2.4.3 Identification Strategy 2.5 Estimation Framework 2.5.1 The Effect of the Tax Reform on Ownership Concentration and Firm Value 2.5.2 The Effect of Ownership Concentration on Firm Value 2.6 Conclusion and Discussion 2.7 Tables 2.8 Appendix 2.9 References 3 Good Matches Last Longer { Unobserved Heterogeneity across Firm-Owner Matches 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Estimation Framework 3.2.1 Empirical Model 3.2.2 Error Decomposition 3.2.3 The OLS Estimator 3.2.4 The Instrumental Variable (IV)-Approach 3.2.5 Prediction of Bias Direction and Relevance 3.3 Data and Sample Description 3.3.1 Sample 3.3.2 Summary Statistics 3.4 Results 3.4.1 Cumulative Effect of Ownership Concentration 3.4.2 Cumulative Effect of Ownership Concentration by Owner Types 3.5 Discussion and Conclusion 3.6 Tables 3.7 Appendix 3.8 References 4 About estimating gains from diversification and why firms self-select 4.1 Introduction 4.2 Modelling gains from diversification 4.2.1 Potential outcomes and switching regressions 4.2.2 Expected firm values and selection bias 4.2.3 Diversification gains and selection bias 4.3 Modelling selection into diversification 4.3.1 Selection according to highest expected outcome 4.3.2 Selection on expected gains 4.4 Sample selection and descriptives 4.4.1 Sample selection and excess value measure 4.4.2 Distribution of firm characteristics 4.5 Results 4.5.1 OLS and IV estimation 4.5.2 Endogenous switching regression 4.6 Conclusion 4.7 Tables 4.8 References