The aim of this thesis is to examine process theology in the light of questions raised by environmental issues. To facilitate this study, different approaches to the nonhuman natural world developed in environmental philosophy - in particular in environmental ethics - are compared with the work of process theologians. The primary focus is on the systems of A.N.Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne, but John Cobb, Jay McDaniel and Daniel Dombrowski are also considered. In Chapter 1, the derivation of value and the formation of ethics in process thinking is examined, and its ethical methodology and content compared with classical utilitarianism and more recent consequentialist approaches to the nonhuman natural world. Ensuing problems including justice, replaceability, the identification of value with experience and the subjectivity of value judgments are considered. In Chapter 2, process ethics is compared with deontological approaches to environmental ethics which focus on the value of individual organisms and natural objects: in particular, the work of Paul Taylor. Problems generated by egalitarianism, individualism and the inability to affirm environmental restitution are examined. The capacity of process thinking to resist such criticisms is assessed. Collective consequentialist ethical approaches to the environment, characterized by Aldo Leopold and J.Baird Callicott, are laid alongside process ethics in Chapter 3. This raises questions concerning the nature of species and ecosystems, and the use of metaphors such as organism, community and society to describe them. The focus moves in Chapter 4 onto a comparison of the metaphysics and ethics of the Deep Ecology movement with that of process theology. This comparison concentrates on two main themes: attitudes to 'holism' and to the 'extension and realization of the self'. Finally, the question whether process theology should reform itself as a better response to environmental ethics is examined. Some suggestions about possible reformation are proffered, but it is tentatively concluded that process thinking is an inappropriate basis for environmental philosophy.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of North Texas, Aug., 2007. / Title from title page display. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M. Env. Sc.)--University of Adelaide, Mawson Graduate Centre for Environmental Studies, 1993. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Toledo, 2010. / Typescript. "Submitted to the Graduate Faculty as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Arts Degree in Philosophy." "A thesis entitled"--at head of title. Title from title page of PDF document. Bibliography: p. 80-87.

Thesis (B.A.)--Haverford College, Dept. of Philosophy, 2004. / Includes bibliographical references.

Defined by the excess of abstracted production, the exploitation of natural resources and the continued impoverishment of the excluded, the Anthropocene is both a narcissistic prophecy of doom and a call to examine the roots of the environmental crisis. Against the death of "the human" in the contemporary theory unveils the violence of a global healthcare crisis, the persistence of illness, pain and pollution as the dominant sensory and political regimes, as well as the desire to become post-and trans-human, and to do justice to the plight of nonhumans under the reign of the anthropos. While the era interpellates the whole species as its subject, the continual presence of racism, colonialism and capitalism points to the specific roots of climate change, environmental pollution, and interspecies violence. As such, both realist and activist approaches should consider the inclusion of the nonhuman into the political as the a priori condition of resistance or change. In this dissertation, I face up to this proposal, seeking to include nonhumans into the political and ethical sphere. In dialogue with animism, feminist materialism as well as decolonial and critical theory, I consider artistic and activist practices as communal, adaptive and programmatic. Rather than relying on a set of frameworks or the oeuvre of a thinker, I theorise the framework of "animorphism," which accounts for activist art that does not present us with ideas and representations of nonhumans as damaged and vulnerable persons, but lets them manifest as such. Animorphic art practice lends a new visibility to small and slow violences that might otherwise seem imperceptible within the grand narrative of the Anthropocene. Rather than testifying to the changing nature of our global species-being, these practices are a form of tactical and geo-ontological activism, which unravels the world in a futurist gesture. Against the dominant trends in post-humanist theory and environmental ethics, I criticize theorising nonhumans as "agency," "matter" or "flow," instead arguing for a personalization of those often excluded by "green" art and activism. This is not a purely aesthetic coalescence but an assertion of animorphism's suitability for developing adaptive practices in nonhuman communities in an era that necessitates and arises from damage, toxicity, predation and violence. The framework of animorphism pays attention to this condition and its resulting community. As such, its progressivism is no less than taking-into-account of the excluded. Through a theoretical inquiry as well as detailed case study analysis, I examine the practices of artists who intervene as designers, engineers and climate activists in order to resist the literal figurations of the anthropos but nevertheless remain attuned to the specificity of those, who struggle under the apocalyptic conditions of the world

In this thesis I attempt to base an environmental ethic on a quality called naturalness. I examine it in terms of quantification, namely, as to whether it can quantified? I then apply the concept to specific areas such as restoration and conservation to create an environmental ethic and to show how such an ethic would be beneficial in general, and especially to policy issues concerning the environment. The thesis consists of three chapters: (1) the definition of nature and natural by way of a historical approach; (2) the place of humans in this scheme; and (3) the place of value and the discussion concerning quantification.

Restoration seeks to heal the environment and make amends for damages done by human interference. Preservationists, however, claim that restoration is anthropocentric, hubristic, and ultimately misguided. I defend restoration against these criticisms, and examine narratives from Karl Marx and Lynn White, Jr. to explain human alienation from nature. I use a synthesis of lessons from Marx and White to favor a restoration paradigm over a preservationist model.

Early literature in the field of environmental ethics suggests that environmental problems are not technological problems requiring technological solutions, but rather are problems deeply rooted in Western value systems calling for a reorientation of our values. This dissertation examines what resources are available to us in reorienting our values if this starting point is correct. Three positions can be observed in the environmental ethics literature on this issue: 1. We can go back and reinterpret our Western canonical texts and figures to determine if they can be useful in providing fresh insight on today's environmental challenges; 2. We abandon the traditional approaches, since these are what led to the crisis in the first place, and we seek to establish entirely new approaches and new environmental identities to face the environmental challenges of the 21st century; 3. We look outside of the Western tradition for guidance from other cultures to see how they inhabit and interact with the natural world. This dissertation presents and evaluates these three options and ultimately argues for an approach similar to the third option, suggesting that dialogue with indigenous cultures and traditions can help us to reorient our values and assist in developing more sustainable environmental identities.

Surely, moral education is not merely intended to result in theoretical knowledge, but instead attempts to change people's behavior. However, when examining and evaluating current trends in moral education, it appears that hitherto moral education has fallen short of its goal to make people better. In this paper, I try to determine what has caused this perceived failure of moral education and conclude that approaches that focus on teaching moral reasoning skills rather than on teaching actual moral content, i.e., values and virtues, are generally ineffective for moral improvement. However, a more traditional form of moral education, namely character education, appears to be a viable alternative to the moral reasoning methods. Since character education can be regarded as the practical application of virtue ethics, I first describe and evaluate virtue ethics and defend it against potential criticisms. I then examine what methods are effective for teaching virtues, and how such methods can potentially be incorporated into the curriculum. Since virtues cannot be taught through theoretical instruction, the acquisition of good habits constitutes the necessary foundation for the establishment of good moral character. Some methods that have been suggested for laying the foundation for virtue are the use of stories, role play, as well as the inclusion of physical and outdoor activities, etc. Furthermore, habituation constitutes the basis for the acquisition of good habits, and as such it requires the application of rewards and punishment by a caring tutor, who at the same time can serve as a role model for virtuous behavior. Finally, I extrapolate if and how character education can be employed to make people more environmentally conscious citizens. I conclude that environmental virtue or character education is the most effective method of environmental education, since it affects how an individual understands, views, and subsequently interacts with the natural environment.