No description available.

<p> The main purpose of this study is to depict Nagarjuna's implication on how he redefined the Four Conditions (<i>catv&amacr;rah&dotbelow; pratyay&amacr; </i>) as the cognitive linguistic structure by allocating 32 functional metadata throughout the texts of M&umacr;lamadhyamakak&amacr;rik&amacr; (MMK). Following subtle traces of <i>lokasam&dotbelow;vr&dotbelow;tisatya</i> (the conventional truth) in the text of MMK, the integrated framework of a cognitive linguistic structure can be detected. Nagarjuna did not negate nor degrade the conventional truth in the context of MMK. The Four Conditions conceal their cognitive variations underneath language, yet they can be consolidated as a structure of knowledge that has capacity of preservability, in a sense of linear consistency of unchanging combinational conditions, as well as recognizability, in a sense of circular transition of changing between two combinational conditions. Such an algorithm of cognition as well as communication are possible because one is able to detect the conditional changes when the stream of cognitive process evolves from one cognitive entity to another with a paradigm of <i> prat&imacr;tyasamutp&amacr;da</i> that is described as <i>"imasmim&dotbelow; sati idam&dotbelow; hoti</i> (Because this exists that exists.)" of the Early Buddhism. The Four Conditions and their relevant 32 metadata are the foundational platform that N&amacr;g&amacr;rjuna developed in MMK which mutually interlock and capture the cognitive stream in the structure of language.</p>

No description available.

The Kripke/Wittgenstein paradox and Goodman’s riddle of induction can be construed as problems of multiple redescription, where the relevant sceptical challenge is to provide factual grounds justifying the description we favour. A choice of description or predicate, in turn, is tantamount to the choice of a curve over a set of data, a choice apparently governed by implicitly operating constraints on the relevant space of possibilities. Armed with this analysis of the two paradoxes, several realist solutions of Kripke’s paradox are examined that appeal to dispositions or other non-occurrent properties. It is found that all neglect crucial epistemological issues: the entities typically appealed to are not observational and must be inferred on the basis of observed entities or events; yet, the relevant sceptical challenge concerns precisely the factual basis on which this inference is made and the constraints operating on it. All disposition ascriptions, the thesis goes on to argue, contain elements of idealization. To ward off the danger of vacuity resulting from the fact that any disposition ascription is true under just the right ideal conditions, dispositional theories need to specify limits on legitimate forms of idealization. This is best done by construing disposition ascriptions as forms of (implicit) curve-fitting, I argue, where the “data” is not necessarily numeric, and the “curve” fitted not necessarily graphic. This brings us full circle: Goodman’s and Kripke’s problems are problems concerning curve-fitting, and the solutions for it appeal to entities the postulation of which is the result of curve-fitting. The way to break the circle must come from a methodology governing the xidealizations, or inferences to the best idealization, that are a part of curve-fitting. The thesis closes with an argument for why natural science cannot be expected to be of much help in this domain, given the ubiquity of idealization.

Moral virtues need intellectual virtues. I support this claims by (1) proposing a response in terms of intellectual virtues and other psychological factors to situationalist critiques against moral virtue, (2) arguing that intellectual virtues must assess moral contexts for proper manifestation of moral virtue, and (3) showing that interrelations between moral and intellectual virtues deem them inextricable in moral behavior. These arguments--(1), (2), and (3), respectivelyare designed to show the function, the prescriptive advantage and the descriptive accuracy of intellectual virtues in virtue theory. Further, I argue that supplementing virtue theory with intellectual virtues yields more subtle characterological assessments of agents in moral action. Finally, I demonstrate the function of intellectual virtues to fill the theoretical gap revealed by the problem of moral luck.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 2002. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 209-212).

Thesis (M.A.)--Denver Seminary, 1995. / This is an electronic reproduction of TREN, #090-0013. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 196-202).

<p> This dissertation suggests that network governance theory may have reached an impasse, and in order to pursue its advance, new methods need to be used. It tests the viability of actor-network theory on providing new insights on network governance, which could contribute to the strengthening of network governance theory. The author suggests that actor-network theory may offer both an epistemology and ontology that intents to not impose current definitions and divisions of traditional social science. By doing so, actor-network theory focuses on the performance of associations rather than on the traditional categories of structures, institutions, individuals or groups &mdash; characteristic of most network governance studies.</p><p> This study tests the viability of actor-network theory in a complex international environmental policy network in the Andean Amazon. It employs Latour&rsquo;s three-movement method of deployment of controversies, rendering associations traceable again, and reassembling governance. The methodological strategy provides a clean slate to search for a new perspective of network governance, which is based on participants&rsquo; perspectives. It is found that associations are established among programs, projects, public policies, among others; and that this associations seem to remain even if organizations, programs, and projects leave the network. Actor-networks&rsquo; roles in network governance appear to be not static, and their degree of affiliation ranges from formal to informal associations.</p><p> Applying actor-network theory in the study of network governance suggests that action is dislocated, and that groups are in continuous formation. Groups&rsquo; boundaries are define and redefine based on participants&rsquo; perspectives and associations. Finally, a discussion in regards to the implications of this research for both network governance and actor-network theory is offered. </p>

Imagine living one day without asking a single question. Why not try it. How long before a question surfaces in your mind. How long before you are compelled, by force of necessity or habit, to ask it. Questioning is an integral part of our everyday lives. We use it to learn, to communicate, to express ourselves and to understand our world. Questioning binds us to common goals, allows us to establish common ground and is a vital tool in our daily search for information. What we ask, how we ask and where, when, and who we ask determines a large proportion of what we come to know about our world and the people that we share it with. That’s why questioning matters. Regardless of who we are, questioning occupies a familiar, ubiquitous, and indispensable place in our lives. This thesis examines the nature and value of questioning. It opens in Chapter One with an overview of the history of questioning in the Western philosophical tradition, uncovering divergent roles for questioning in distinct historical contexts, and changing attitudes towards the practice in line with underlying epistemological commitments. In Chapter Two a contemporary context for the epistemology of questioning is offered, providing an indication of the nature and scope of contemporary philosophical inquiry into questioning, and outlining a contemporary epistemological context for the investigation. Chapter Three begins the analytical investigation, presenting a characterisation of questioning as a social epistemic practice, and a characterisation of questions as acts, drawing on the results of a large online survey. Chapter Four investigates the value of questioning, highlighting its role in the acquisition of epistemic goods, such as knowledge and understanding, and in the dissemination of these goods within epistemic communities. Chapter Five examines the nature and practice of good questioning, presenting a component-based account of good questioning, drawing on the results of an original empirical study conducted with schoolchildren. Chapter Six explores the nature of virtuous questioning, offering a characterisation of the intellectual virtue of inquisitiveness and highlighting the distinctive role of inquisitiveness in the intellectually virtuous life. Finally, Chapter Seven investigates the role that questioning plays in education and presents an argument in support of educating for virtuous questioning. The epistemological examination of questioning captures its essential character and significance. Questioning matters because of the purpose that it serves; that of finding things out. We ask questions in order to gather information on the basis of which we form beliefs and decide how to act. Through the information that we gather and the beliefs that we form, we arrive at knowledge and understanding. Questioning matters because it forms the basis of what we know and understand, as individuals and communities. This thesis examines questioning in light of its central epistemological significance. As such, it provides the groundwork for an epistemology of questioning.

When interpretations vary for the same set of evidence, what should be done? Options include just agreeing to disagree, maintaining one’s initial beliefs, or going all the way to completely suspending judgment. Taking this final option binds an agent to some interesting views, including an acceptance of epistemic dilemmas. However, the kind of total skepticism some philosophers want out of disagreement is probably a pipe dream – if there is no best option, no option can be eliminated.