This dissertation takes the form of an inter-subjective investigation into the ritual of performance, considering its function in terms of community engagement and its place in contemporary society. Ritual is placed in a secular context in which music is performed through the development of individual artistic expression, yet presented in a way that engages the audience as active participants. In this way audience and performer are united in experiencing the affect of music upon the emotions and the mind. / The views of art theorists, historians and critics, anthropologists, musicologists and arts practitioners, are held in the light of the author’s creative output through which a range of questions emerge regarding the cultivation of artistic identity, the artist’s role in the refinement of cultural expression, the relevance of live performance in the digital age, the transformational qualities of artistic practice upon the social and intellectual evolution of humanity, and the value of new musical language. / Chapter One examines the relationship between audience and musician from a performer’s perspective, in relation to Milton Babbitt’s article, Who Cares if You Listen? The connection between music performance and ritual practice and the possibility that artistic expression can actively engage audience receptivity is discussed in Chapter Two. Chapter Three contemplates the philosophical stance of the Art for Art’s Sake movement, that art exists in its own right without reference to the emotive experiences of humanity. Topics such as formal structure, the absence or presence of ethical content, the concept of aesthetic emotion and self objectivity, are examined alongside discussions of perception and consciousness. Chapter Four argues that performance, as ritual ceremony, becomes a porous boundary between lived and dream-like experience, through which the audience may pass to experience art on a profound level. The shared gesture of performer and audience becomes a life-enriching act that in turn nourishes all of society.

This dissertation takes the form of an inter-subjective investigation into the ritual of performance, considering its function in terms of community engagement and its place in contemporary society. Ritual is placed in a secular context in which music is performed through the development of individual artistic expression, yet presented in a way that engages the audience as active participants. In this way audience and performer are united in experiencing the affect of music upon the emotions and the mind. / The views of art theorists, historians and critics, anthropologists, musicologists and arts practitioners, are held in the light of the author’s creative output through which a range of questions emerge regarding the cultivation of artistic identity, the artist’s role in the refinement of cultural expression, the relevance of live performance in the digital age, the transformational qualities of artistic practice upon the social and intellectual evolution of humanity, and the value of new musical language. / Chapter One examines the relationship between audience and musician from a performer’s perspective, in relation to Milton Babbitt’s article, Who Cares if You Listen? The connection between music performance and ritual practice and the possibility that artistic expression can actively engage audience receptivity is discussed in Chapter Two. Chapter Three contemplates the philosophical stance of the Art for Art’s Sake movement, that art exists in its own right without reference to the emotive experiences of humanity. Topics such as formal structure, the absence or presence of ethical content, the concept of aesthetic emotion and self objectivity, are examined alongside discussions of perception and consciousness. Chapter Four argues that performance, as ritual ceremony, becomes a porous boundary between lived and dream-like experience, through which the audience may pass to experience art on a profound level. The shared gesture of performer and audience becomes a life-enriching act that in turn nourishes all of society.

The metaphysical dispute purporting to be about the ultimate nature of material things waged by Berkeley against Locke has these puzzling features: 1. It is irresolvable; both conclusions are designed to be logically fortified against refutation - by fact, common sense belief, or ordinary linguistic use. Thus each becomes logically necessary. 2. Nevertheless the contestants appeal to plain facts and ordinary speech in support of their theories, which thus appear to be empirical hypotheses. 3. The Locke-Berkeley dispute, although irresolvable, persists, and recurs in some twentieth century disputation about the material world and our knowledge of it. A detailed study of selected metaphysical texts reveals these eccentric characteristics. The hypothesis is offered that they appear eccentric only if we expect metaphysics to be like the natural sciences, philology, or plain description of empirical situations. I claim to explain points 1-3 as follows: 1. The dispute is irresolvable, and its conclusions a priori true in terms of the respective systems, because metaphysicians do not provide or describe ordinary information about the world or about language, but interpret it in accordance with a specific motive, determined by non-philosophical interest, and in the service of a general attitude which is expressed in a theory about how the world ought to be described. Redefinitions and special interpretations give an a priori air to the conclusions, but the dispute is basically a clash of attitude. 2. The metaphysical views look empirical because they arise from matter-of-fact considerations, and present a 'picture' of what the material world really is, though neither a description nor a scientific explanation. 3. The dispute is persistent, because the attitudes involved in its expression are common outlooks, which have been evident in western philosophy since the Ancient Greek Philosophers. It is also persistent because clashes of attitude can never be conclusively settled. The nature of a metaphysical view becomes clearer if we think about it by analogy with a work of art, rather than by analogy with a scientific hypothesis, a commonsense description, or a philological account.

This is an epistemological study, in which measure ment is taken as a paradigm of perceptual recognition---a notion in which perception is joined with judgment as a factor in understanding. Hence it has proved necessary to give an analysis of such recognition in general, with metric contexts as a special case. This has been done in terms of a very weak fundamental form of 'theory', as a form of basic comprehension, in which language (as part of the theories analysed) is not essentially involved, but treated as a special development. One type of theory is given thorough formal analysis: those 'recognitive theories' whose elements are taken, in the theory itself, to be recognized directly from perception, or extrapolated as in principle recognizable. Another type consists of 'substantive theories', seen as constructed to provide deeper understanding of the reality underlying recognized structures, but essentially involving elements not taken to be recognizable: this type receivesonly informal treatment, in terms of its associations with the first (especially in measurement). Special consideration is (unusually) given to attention and neglect,not in psychological terms, but as theory-guided selection from total experience. Neglect is seen not merely as negation of attention, but often a positive strategy (in measurement, strictly determined). Part I introduces the basic concepts, distinguishing the general approach from other relevant traditionsfoundational studies in measurement (Suppes et al.); linguistic analysis; some epistemologies (e.g., Goodman); philosophy of science. Part II sets up the formal analysis. Part III applies this analysis to contexts of measurement, with examples (only distance is fully treated others only in synopsis). Probability assessment is analysed as distinct from measurement. Part IV examines consequences for wider philosophical questions: language-based problems of knowledge and meaning; Wittgenstein's 'private language': and theory-based considerations of ontology; identity; truth, falsity and error; and observation in science.

Abstract not available.

The focus of this thesis is to offer a theory of the constitutive value of intellectual character due to its transformative influence. The specific transformative influence ascribed to intellectual character is that it counteracts self-deceptive mechanisms and disposes agents to obtain true beliefs and to avoid false beliefs. The true beliefs such character reliably produces are accurate representations, and not merely of empirical inputs but also conceptual schemes. Agents do not appear to require such accurate representations to fulfill various desires, or to achieve certain aspects of mental, social and physical well-being as identified by some psychologists. Consequently, agents do not require intellectual character to achieve a variety of things some have identified as good. Nonetheless, a distinction can be made between achieving the good and identifying the good, and it can also be acknowledged that the good is itself a matter of dispute. That is, there are a number of competing notions of the good, which appear to be influenced by various conceptual schemes, and this makes the identification of the good difficult. Intellectual character can fulfill a valuable role in the attempt to settle such disputes through its ability to facilitate true beliefs concerning the good. In fact, intellectual character is necessary to assure agents that their beliefs concerning the good are true due to the imperceptible mechanisms of self-deception. This assurance is itself valuable for any agent who wants to identify the good due to the indispensable role of true belief in attempts to identify the good. Even further, identification of the good is valuable for any agent who wants to achieve the good, since the attempt to identify the good better facilitates achievement of the good. Consequently, the assurance that intellectual character is necessary for is valuable for agents who both want to identify and achieve the good, and for this reason such character is constitutively valuable.

Every time we act in an effort to attain our epistemic goals, we express our epistemic agency. The present study argues that a proper understanding of the actions and goals relevant to expressions of such agency can be used to make ameliorative recommendations about how the ways in which we actually express our agency can be brought in line with how we should express our agency. More specifically, it is argued that the actions relevant to such expressions should be identified with the variety of actions characteristic of inquiry; that contrary to what has been maintained by recent pluralists about epistemic value, the only goal relevant to inquiry is that of forming true belief; and that our dual tendency for bias and overconfidence gives us reason to implement epistemically paternalistic practices that constrain our freedom to exercise agency in substantial ways. For example, we are often better off by gathering only a very limited amount of information, having our selection of methods be greatly restricted, and spending our time less on reflecting than on simply reading off the output of a simple algorithm. In other words, when it comes to our freedom to express epistemic agency, more is not always better. In fact, less is often so much more.

This thesis outlines the main features of empiricist and positivist epistemology and looks at the critique of this position developed by conventionalist philosophers of science. It then attempts to present the basis of an alternative realist epistemology. This realist alternative is then used as a means of laying down a set of methodological protocols for reinterpreting the anti-empiricist debate in development theory over "the articulation of modes of production". This debate was concerned with producing an alternative paradigm to explain the causes of poverty and underdevelopment in such a way that the internal determinations of poverty in nation-states would be part of the explanatory structure, rather than treating poverty and underdevelopment as a phenomenon which was essentially generated through relationships of exploitation between the countries of the "developed" and Third World. Having outlined the basic concepts of this debate in a manner which is compatible with the research protocols of methodological realism, the concepts - social formation, modes of production and articulation - are applied to the concrete context of peasant relations of production in the north Jordan Valley of the Occupied West Bank/the Central Highlands of Palestine. The last section considers some of the major strategic models designed to resolve the problem of Third World poverty and underdevelopment, viz. Community Development, the Green Revolution and Basic Needs. Finally, a radical democratic approach to development intervention is suggested as a background to development action in the context of settler-colonialism and military occupation.

The two traditional views in the epistemology of disagreement have offered distinct responses to the challenge of epistemic conflict. The purpose of this dissertation is to challenge these responses and offer a satisfactory position. This position is congruent with social epistemology as well as Christian apologetics. Chapter 1 introduces the epistemology of disagreement, giving attention to the concepts of disagreement found in the literature on religious diversity. This introduction also demonstrates that the two responses to disagreement possess features that are problematic for apologetics. Chapter 2 addresses the epistemic problems of the conciliatory response to disagreement. This chapter concludes that conciliation possesses an excessive view of testimony, and a low view of self-trust. Chapter 3 focuses on the epistemological matters of the steadfast position. This chapter maintains that steadfastness is premised on a deficient view of testimony, and an excessive view of self-trust. These two chapters show the internal deficiencies of both positions; thus, weakening their challenge against apologetics. Chapter 4 presents the position of virtue responsibilism as a satisfactory and advantageous response to the epistemology of disagreement. This response is the virtuous response to disagreement. Chapter 5 expands on the natures of two intellectual virtues: intellectual courage and open-mindedness. These two intellectual virtues are particularly relevant to the discussion of disagreement and apologetics. Chapter 6 applies the virtuous response to disagreement with experts and the challenge of religious diversity. The chapter shows that conciliation and steadfastness are unable to provide satisfactory responses to these issues, while the virtuous response presents an advantageous response for Christian apologetics. Chapter 7 summarizes the main points of the dissertation, offering practical applications as well as areas for further research.

No description available.