No description available.

In the two decades after the partial enfranchisement of women in 1918 and the removal of legal disabilities which excluded them from the magistracy, women in the West Riding of Yorkshire were mobilized to seek a new civic role as councillors and as justices of the peace through membership of women's organisations, of the women's sections of political parties and to a lesser extent as a consequence of their widespread involvement in charity work. By the post-war period, too, traditional arguments against the ordination of women in the Free Churches had lost credibility and a number of women became church ministers in the strongly Nonconformist West Riding. Women magistrates were rapidly accepted on equal terms and from the start shared duties equally with their male colleagues. Ordination of women in the Free Churches was premissed on the principle of complementarity and, although usually obliged to accept the less desirable churches, women ministers experienced little hostility. The majority of women councillors, however, justified the need for their election on the grounds of the distinctive contribution that women could make to local government. By identifying only certain issues on which women's views should be sought and concentrating on areas of local government which only affected the lives of women and children their contribution was seen to be limited. Individual women's influence over their appointment as magistrates was minimal and their numbers remained low primarily because local advisory committees failed to adopt progressive criteria for their recommendations. Traditional attitudes were still too deeply entrenched to allow many women to seek ordination and it was the identification of a limited role for women, together with social, cultural and economic factors, which militated against any significant increase in their representation on local councils in the West Riding throughout the period.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

D.Phil. / The purpose of this research was to answer the following question: Can a feasible liberal model be developed and defended that promotes and integrates egalitarian and Anon-egalitarian @ and aggregative values, while at the same time respecting the individual as an autonomous agent, who, as such, may be held accountable for the consequences of his decisions and actions but not for those consequences that may be attributed to his circumstances? In order to answer the research question a systematic examination of the leading liberal conceptions of equality, with special attention to an alternative approach in terms of a substantive equality of opportunity model, is undertaken. The research falls into three distinguishable parts. In the first part the role of equality in Rawls=s theory of justice as fairness was critically analysed. The conclusion reached was that whereas Rawls=s theory provides valuable insights on which to base a liberal theory of equality his theory fails to provide specific guidelines on which to make the crucial distinction between autonomous choices and choices dictated by the person=s circumstances. In the second part the conceptions of equality found in the work of Nozick, Dworkin, Sen and Walzer were compared with that of Rawls and explored for its potential for grounding a liberal conception of equality based on equality of opportunity. Limited support for the compound equality of opportunity model is found in Nozick=s libertarian conception of equality as formal equality of opportunity. Conceptually Dworkin=s conception of equality as equality of resources was found to be a powerful model to distinguish between those circumstances over which the individual has no control and therefore should not be held accountable and those choices over which the individual exercises control and hence should be held accountable. Moving from the equality of resources approaches, as exemplified by Rawls and Dworkin, to the equality of opportunity approaches, Sen=s equality of capability is discussed. Of particular importance is Sen=s insight that equality of opportunity requires one to take into consideration the individual=s capacity to convert the means at his or her disposal into ends and henceforth that these differential conversion capacities should be equalized. The compound equality of opportunity model proposed in this thesis in important part rests on the assumption that equality is a complex value which derives its value from the context in which it is employed. As such Walzer=s idea of complex equality is valuable in that it recognizes the plurality and the contextuality of the ideal of equality. In the third part the compound equality of opportunity model is introduced by distinguishing between equality of results and equality of opportunity approaches. It is then argued that it is possible, even though imperfectly, to distinguish between circumstances and autonomous choice by means of statistical techniques whereby people may be grouped by identifying independent variables predicative of success in the different spheres of life. It is shown how this approach may enable us to hold people accountable for their autonomous actions and choices but not for their circumstances. It is further argued that efficiency and aggregative considerations may operate as moderating variables in the different spheres of life. It is also argued that this model will promote accountability at the individual as well as the institutional level and how substantive equality of opportunity should predominate at the early stages of life while formal equality of opportunity should prevail at the point where positions of some importance are distributed so that third party interests are protected. This thesis is concluded with the claim that conceptually the model is feasible and capable of implementation. If we take seriously the idea of individual autonomy and accountability, and the notion that equality of opportunity provides the means to isolate the consequences of individual effort and motivation from the consequences of (undeserved) circumstances, then something like the compound equality of opportunity model may provide the means to give expression to our convictions. / Prof H.P.P. Lötter Prof E.F.J. Malherbe

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2006. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Since the passage of Title IX, there has been a steady decline of women head coaches in intercollegiate athletics. Previous research indicated that perceived treatment and access discrimination may be a plausible cause of the decline; however, research has not identified the antecedents of discrimination. Research indicates that sexism levels are associated with hiring intentions, ascription of attributes to managers, and performance appraisals. This study attempted to identify sexism as one possible antecedent of discrimination. A dyadic study between head and assistant collegiate coaches was utilized to determine the relationship between hostile and benevolent sexism, treatment and access discrimination, and intentions to leave the profession. I sampled 364 head coaches and 163 assistant coaches, creating 71 dyads. Each of the measures was validated in previous research. Results indicated that men possessed higher levels of hostile (M = 2.02, SD = 1.02) and benevolent (M = 2.33, SD = 1.01) sexists beliefs than females (M = 2.00, SD = .97, M = 1.62, SD = 1.00). Additionally, females coaches indicated significantly higher levels of perceived access discrimination (F [1, 384] = 38.05, p < .01), treatment discrimination (F [1,384] = 7.353, p < .01) and intentions to leave (F [1, 384] = 13.146, p < .01) than men. Results indicate that there is a correlation between benevolent sexism and access discrimination (r = .322, p < .001) within the coach dyads. Further, to support previous literature, this study found that 17% of the variance in intentions to leave the profession was explained by perceived treatment and access discrimination. Though the results of this study show only one relationship between sexism and perceived discrimination, the results that sexism is present in intercollegiate athletics and that females perceive higher levels of discrimination and intentions to leave the profession are an interesting finding. Sexism may have an effect on perceived discrimination; however, the relationship may be mediated through other variables such as group identity or organizational citizenship behavior. Ultimately, this study has indicated that sexist beliefs are present in intercollegiate athletics and has negative implications that should be further researched.

The concept of human dignity is an essential and inextricable element of equality rights. In Law v. Canada the Supreme Court united around the concept of dignity to determine section 15(1) cases. This test was abandoned in R v. Kapp, deciding that dignity was too abstract and subjective. This paper argues that the problems with the Law test did not come from the concept of dignity itself, but rather from the reasonable claimant test which focused on subjective feelings and legislative intentions. This paper presents an alternative conception of human dignity, which proposes that substantive equality should be a matter of equal concern based on two principles of human dignity: the principle of equal intrinsic value and the principle of personal responsibility. The analysis must be truly contextual, focused on the objective consequences of discrimination and the circumstances that create and foster inequality.

The concept of human dignity is an essential and inextricable element of equality rights. In Law v. Canada the Supreme Court united around the concept of dignity to determine section 15(1) cases. This test was abandoned in R v. Kapp, deciding that dignity was too abstract and subjective. This paper argues that the problems with the Law test did not come from the concept of dignity itself, but rather from the reasonable claimant test which focused on subjective feelings and legislative intentions. This paper presents an alternative conception of human dignity, which proposes that substantive equality should be a matter of equal concern based on two principles of human dignity: the principle of equal intrinsic value and the principle of personal responsibility. The analysis must be truly contextual, focused on the objective consequences of discrimination and the circumstances that create and foster inequality.