Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2003. / Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 157-170). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2001. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2000. / Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 54-55). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Institute of Paper Chemistry, 1960. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 100-102).

Lic.-avh. (sammanfattning) Stockholm : Karolinska institutet, 2008. / Härtill 2 uppsatser.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2002. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 178-188). Also available online.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Wyoming, 2008. / Title from PDF title page (viewed on Feb. 26, 2010). Includes bibliographical references (p. 182-187).

This dissertation examines game-theoretic equilibrium analysis applications to deregulated electricity markets. In particular, three specific applications are discussed: analyzing the competitive effects of ownership of financial transmission rights, developing a dynamic game model considering the ramp rate constraints of generators, and analyzing strategic behavior in electricity capacity markets. In the financial transmission right application, an investigation is made of how generators’ ownership of financial transmission rights may influence the effects of the transmission lines on competition. In the second application, the ramp rate constraints of generators are explicitly modeled using a dynamic game framework, and the equilibrium is characterized as the Markov perfect equilibrium. Finally, the strategic behavior of market participants in electricity capacity markets is analyzed and it is shown that the market participants may exaggerate their available capacity in a Nash equilibrium. It is also shown that the more conservative the independent system operator’s capacity procurement, the higher the risk of exaggerated capacity offers. / text

In consumption goods markets, we observe both bargaining and searching. However, in this literature, very little work has been done to incorporate both features into one model. This study addresses this problem. In my first chapter, I add a bargaining parameter to a traditional sequential search model and solve for the new equilibrium in this set-up. Then, I do some comparative statics, changing the distribution of the bargaining parameter to see what happens to the equilibrium. Finally, I use the model to explain two seemingly contradicting empirical works in the literature of discrimination in the auto market. Ayres and Siegelman (1995), using data they collected from a controlled experiment, found that the initial offers for the minorities are higher. Yet Goldberg (1996), using consumer expenditure survey data (CES), reported that there is no significant difference between the final prices for minorities and non-minorities. My model reconciles these two results and shows that if minorities have a more dispersed bargaining parameter distribution and if the final transaction prices are the same at the mean level, then the initial offer distribution for the minorities first-order stochastically dominates that for the non-minorities. In my second chapter, I investigate how the bargaining process affects firms’ offer distribution and thus the final price distribution. Based on Varian (1980), I add a bargaining parameter into the model, and solve for the new equilibrium in this set up. Then, I do some comparative statics, changing the distribution of the bargaining parameter to see what would happen to the equilibrium. This model yields the same results as the first chapter. In the third chapter, I applied my theoretical model to the automobile market, and empirically test the model. I used CES data, and my findings support the theoretical model. The minority dummies are not significant in determining the mean level of consumers’ bargaining ability distribution, but are significantly positive in determining the variance of the distribution. / text

In many countries across the world, fossil fuels, especially petroleum, are the largest energy source for powering the socio-economic system and the transportation sector dominates the consumption of petroleum in these societies. As the petroleum price continuously climbs and the threat of global climate changes becomes more evident, the world is now facing critical challenges in reducing petroleum consumption and exploiting alternative energy sources. A massive adoption of plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs), especially battery electric vehicles (BEVs), offers a very promising approach to change the current energy consumption structure and diminish greenhouse gas emissions and other pollutants. Understanding how individual electric vehicle drivers behave subject to the technological restrictions and infrastructure availability and estimating the resulting aggregate supply-demand effects on urban transportation systems is not only critical to transportation infrastructure development, but also has determinant implications in environment and energy policy enactment. Driving PEVs inevitably changes individual’s travel and activity behaviors and calls for fundamental changes to the existing transportation network and travel demand modeling paradigms to accommodate changing cost structures, technological restrictions, and supply infrastructures. A prominent phenomenon is that all PEV drivers face a distance constraint on their driving range, given the unsatisfactory battery-charging efficiency and scarce battery-charging infrastructures in a long period of the foreseeable future. Incorporating this distance constraint and the resulting behavioral changes into transportation network equilibrium and travel demand models (static and/or dynamic) raises a series of important research questions. This dissertation focuses on analyzing the impact of a massive adoption of BEVs on urban transportation network flows. BEVs are entirely dependent on electricity and cannot go further once the battery is depleted. As a modeling requirement in its simplest form, a distance constraint should be imposed when analyzing and modeling individual behaviors and network congestions. With adding this simple constraint, this research work conceptualizes, formulates and solves mathematical programming models for a set of new BEV-based network routing and equilibrium problems. It is anticipated that the developed models and methods can be extensively used in a systematic way to analyze and evaluate a variety of system planning and policy scenarios in decision-making circumstances of BEV-related technology adoption and infrastructure development. / text