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Aristotelian eudaimonism – as Daniel Russell puts it – is understood as two things at once: it is the final end for practical reasoning, and it is a good human life for the one living it. This understanding of Aristotelian eudaimonism, on which one’s ultimate reason for doing all that one does is one’s own eudaimonia, has given rise to what I call the “self-absorption objection.” Roughly, proponents of this objection state that the main problem with neo-Aristotelian accounts of moral motivation is that they prescribe that our ultimate reason for acting virtuously is the fact that doing so is good for us. In an attempt to adequately address this objection, I break with those contemporary neo-Aristotelian accounts of moral motivation that insist that the virtuous agent ought to be understood as performing virtuous actions ultimately for the sake of her own eudaimonia (enlarged, no doubt, to include the eudaimonia of others). On the alternative neo-Aristotelian account of moral motivation I go on to defend – what I call the altruistic account of motivation – the virtuous agent’s ultimate reason for acting virtuously is based on a desire to act in accordance with her particular conception of the good life, where what makes such a conception good is not that it is good for her, but rather good, qua human goodness. More specifically, on the altruistic account of motivation I advance, the virtuous agent may be understood as being motivated by human goodness, valuing objects and persons only insofar as they participate in human goodness, and where all of the virtuous agent’s reasons, values, motivations, and justifications are cashed out in terms of human goodness – as they say – “all the way down.” / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) / In this dissertation, I advance a neo-Aristotelian account of moral motivation that is immune from what I call the “self-absorption objection.” Roughly, proponents of this objection state that the main problem with neo-Aristotelian accounts of moral motivation is that they wrongly prescribe that our ultimate reason for acting virtuously is the fact that doing so is good for us. In an attempt to sidestep this objection, I offer what I call the altruistic account of motivation. On this account, the virtuous agent’s main reason for acting virtuously is based on her desire to act in accordance with a particular conception of the good life, where what makes such a conception good is not that it is good for her, but rather good, qua human goodness.

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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Georgia State University, 2007. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 29-37, 104-113).

In my thesis, I examine the role of character friendship for the agent’s moral development in Aristotle’s ethics. I contend that we should divide character friendship in two categories: a) character friendship between completely virtuous agents, and, b) character friendship between unequally developed, or, equally developed, yet not completely virtuous agents. Regarding the first category, I argue that this highest form of friendship provides the opportunity for the agent to advance his understanding of certain virtues through the help of his virtuous friend. This process can be expressed in two ways. In the first way, I take character friendship in (a) as a relationship that is based on mutual relinquishing of opportunities for action or giving up external goods based on each agent’s needs. This process helps the agents develop their character in certain virtues which have remained slightly underdeveloped than others due to nature (NE 1144b4-7), or development (Politics 1329a9ff). This means, for instance, that if agent A is wealthy and his friend B is a middle class worker and they win the lottery together, A will relinquish his share of money to his friend so that he will be able to practice the virtue of magnificence; a virtue that his previous financial condition prevented him from developing appropriately. The second process is rather different and new in scholarly debate concerning Aristotle’s theory of moral development. I suggest that the completely virtuous agent is able to further develop his character through a process I will describe as interpretative mimesis. In this process, the agent receives the form of his friend’s action and is able to apply this pattern of behaviour in a situation that he thinks is appropriate. I have to highlight though the fact the fact that he does not just ape his friend’s action. Instead, he interprets the action based on his skills and abilities and the demands of the situations he faces. Thus, this pattern works as an extra epistemological tool in the agent’s hand in new and challenging moral situations. Now, case (b) comes on the opposite side of the majority of scholars’ view on character friendship. They think that Aristotle reserves character friendship only for completely virtuous agents. I argue that this is not the correct approach, and that less than completely virtuous agents can take part in character friendships as well. This view has the advantage of making character friendship in (b) a tool in Aristotle’s hands for his agents of lower moral level to develop their understanding of virtue and its applications. I propose that the route of moral development in case (b) resembles the one in the second process of case (a). Namely, the agent receives the form of his friend’s action and uses it as a pattern in some new situation he has to face. I will not name the process though as “interpretative” or any kind of mimesis. The reason for this is that Aristotle gives us textual evidence (NE 1172a9-14) for an imitative method of moral development only for the second process of case (a). I will take case (b) then as a pattern guide application of my friend’s action which we could call pre-interpretative mimesis period of the agent’s moral development. If my arguments are correct then character friendship is much more valuable than scholars thought. Our friends turn out to be examples of good action who guide us through the sweaty and painful path that is called virtue. And this path never stops; even if we have become “moral heroes”; or, put it differently, “masters” of practical wisdom.

The media landscape is changing, the blogs has taken focus from the traditional media. The PR industry is having a hard time following the rapid development, especially developing an ethical framework. This study aims to examine how PR-practitioners who works at PR- agencies, members of the industry association PRECIS, discuss blog cooperations as a tool on behalf of their clients. The study also examines how the collaboration between the agency and the blogger operate, especially how practitioners discuss issues concerning ethics and moral in their blog cooperations. This study is based on qualitative interviews with PR-practitioners who describes their thoughts of working with blogs as a tool and how they reflect on ethics, rules and frameworks. The findings of this research indicate that there is an uncertainty in the industry due to how practitioners approach to an ethical framework. The findings also show that practitioners see the blog as a great asset and that the medium is under constant development.

本文旨在探討魏晉南北朝撰文家訓的興盛原委及發展現象。所謂撰文家訓 ，是指在具有血源或養子關係的家庭中，由長輩、族長和尊者，對晚輩、族人 及卑者布施的文字訓誡。 　　較諸前代，魏晉南北朝撰文家訓不但數量大增，而且篇幅內容的深、廣度也 有顯著躍進，因此學界普遍認同魏晉南北朝是家訓趨向成熟的過渡期。本文關 注的問題是：為什麼撰文家訓會在漢魏之際大量出現？而這時的家訓在內容、 撰作形式上，跟前代的作品有何分別？甚或以同時代的作品比較，不同氏族創 作的家訓在命題上存在什麼異同？以及這些特徵與差異是受到什麼因素影響而 產生的？ 　　本文嘗試以家族為研究單位，著重分析十五支具有家訓傳承現象的氏族的 撰文家訓內涵，務求找出該家族的價值取向，挖掘家訓這種為導引家族發展方 針而出現的實用文體之精神。其次，對於部分以單篇形式流傳的家訓，本文也 會將之聯繫至政治、社會的層面，考查政治氛圍、知識分子的心態和社會地位 差距，跟家訓發展的交互影響。冀能完整呈現出魏晉南北朝家訓發展的畫面。 本論文共分六章：除第一章緒論及第六章總結外，正文部分共有四章。第 二章主要疏理前人對撰文家訓定義理解的分歧，以明確研究範圍與材料對象。 第三章從史學的角度，追溯家訓文學之由來，了解其在先秦至兩漢時之遞變， 並嘗試探析魏晉家訓作品大量湧現的原因。第四章、五章則以家訓作品本身作 為考察的對象，分析當時不同地域及氏族的家訓內容特色，並會比對家訓出現 歧異的原因，外在環境因素與家訓發展的交互影響，藉此了解家訓作品中慣常 出現內容的精神基點所在。 Abstract This thesis examines the reasons of mass production and the development of textual family-instructions during Wei, Jin & the North-South Dynasties. Textual family- instructions, refers to “A written reprimand issued by the elders or chiefs whom have blood or adoption relationship with the younger. - 2 - 　Compared to the previous dynasties, textual family-instructions appeared in Wei, Jin & the North-South Dynasties not only increased in number, but the depth and breadth were also enhanced. Therefore, scholars generally agree that this is a transition period for family-instructions. This phenomenon led me to ponder upon a number of issues: Why did the numbers of family-instructions grow rapidly between the age of Han and the Wei Dynasty? Are there any differences in comparing a family-instruction in Wei, Jin & the North-South as well as in the previous Dynasties? By comparing with the contemporary works, what are the similarities and differences among them? What are the factors causing the differences and similarities? In order to approach the topic in a holistic way, this study not only explores the contents of each single family-instruction, but also reviews all works from the same clan. I sort out fifteen clans which emphasized on family-instruction heritage, so that the core values and development policy of the whole clan could be clearly observed. For those single-piece family-instruction, would be observed together with the political and social context. Therefore, through the study of the political climate, the mentality of intellectuals, disparities status in the society, the result of family- instruction development could be achieved in a more comprehensive way. This thesis contains six chapters. Chapter I is “Introduction and Chapter VI “Conclusion. Chapter II gives definition of textual family-instruction, which clarifies the scope of the study. Chapter III is written from the perspective of history, tracing the origin, understanding of the transitions, also the reasons of recruiting mass production of family-instruction during Wei, Jin & the North-South Dynasties. Chapter IV & V analyze the features of family-instruction by different clans, and find out the reasons for discrepancy. Also, the external factors influencing the contents of family-instruction will also be investigated.

At first glance, the project of moral enhancement (making people more moral) may appear uncontroversial and obviously worth supporting; surely it is a good idea to make people better. However, as the recent literature on moral enhancement demonstrates, the situation is not so simple – there is significant disagreement over the content of moral norms as well as appropriate means by which to manipulate them. This disagreement seriously threatens many proposals to improve society via moral enhancement. In my dissertation, I develop an understanding of how, exactly, disagreement poses problems for moral enhancement. However, I also argue that there is a way forward. It is possible to bring about moral improvement without commitment to particular and controversial moral norms, but instead relying on relatively uncontroversial ideas concerning morally reliable processes. The upshot is that, while attempting to directly manipulate people’s moral ideas is objectionable, it is relatively unproblematic to focus on helping people reason better and avoid akrasia, with the justified expectation that this will generally lead to moral improvement. We should, therefore, focus not on how to bring people in line with what we take to be the right ideas, motives or behaviors. Rather, we should look to helping people determine for themselves what being moral consists in, as well as help ensure that they act on those judgments. Traditional, non-moral education, it turns out, is actually one of the best moral enhancers we have. In fact, the tools of philosophy (which is, in many aspects, concerned with proper reasoning) are central to the project of indirect moral enhancement. Ultimately, one of the best ways to make people morally better may well be to make them better philosophers.

Litteraturstudiens syfte är att utforska vad tidigare forskning säger om hur lärare kan hanterar etikundervisningen i religionsämnet. Genom att ställa frågorna; hur kan lärare förhålla sig till formandet av etikundervisningen samt vilka svårigheter etikundervisningen kan utgöra för lärare till tidigare forskning inom området har syftet besvarats. Metoden för litteraturstudien har varit en systematisk litteraturstudie och den analysmetod som använts är en kvalitativ innehållsanalys av forskningslitteraturen som valts ut genom en systematisk sökning i olika databaser. Resultatet visar brister i lärares ämnesdidaktiska kompetens vilket leder till oreflekterad undervisning som till stor del bygger på lärarens eget tyckande i kombination av etikrepresentationen i läroböckerna. Det finns dock metoder som lärare kan använda för att skapa en heltäckande förståelse för etikämnet i form av läran av och läran om etik kombinerat med ett existentiell och samhällsorienterat synsätt. Detta bidrar till att fånga etikens komplexitet som grundas i läroplanens öppna formulering av etik begreppet. Vidare problematiseras vems perspektiv som blir representerat i etikundervisningen samt vilka som exkluderas och hur lärare kan arbeta för att medvetandegöra eleverna om detta i undervisningen.

This thesis is about justice between people born at different times: the way in which they interact and the extent to which those interactions can be a matter of justice. Its principal aims are: to present certain theories that describe what justice over time might look like; to present certain theoretical problems for this subject; and to understand the impact of these problems upon these theories. The thesis draws mainly upon: the work of David Hume, John Rawls and David Gauthier as sources of certain social contract theories; and the work of Wilfred Beckerman, Gustaf Arrhenius and Derek Parfit for certain problems faced by these theories. The central argument of the thesis is that the theoretical obstacles to the application of justice thrown up by the temporal dimension are not as significant as they might appear. In particular, there are good reasons to believe that social contract theories are more susceptible to intertemporal extension and less encumbered by temporally-related problems than previously thought. The conclusion of the thesis is that, issuing from a clearer view of certain theoretical obstacles to their inclusion, there is significant potential for future people to be considered within the scope of justice over time as described by certain social contract theories and that present people have self-interested reasons to take this project seriously.