In this dissertation, I argue that Aristotle's account of friendship is egoistic. Focusing on the Nicomachean Ethics, I begin with VIII.2. Here Aristotle claims that in all friendships, friends love only because of the lovable (φιλητóv), which divides into the useful, pleasant, and good. I argue that "because of (διὰ)" refers to at least the final cause and that "the lovable" refers to what appears to contribute one's own happiness (εuδαιμoνία); therefore Aristotle claims that in all friendships, friends love only for the sake of their own happiness. This result may seem incompatible with some types of concern Aristotle principally attributes to his normative paradigm of complete friendship: wishing goods for the sake of the other and loving the other for himself. One might argue that these types of concern are altruistic, and so it cannot be the case that in all friendships, friends love only for the sake of their own happiness. I argue that these types of concern ultimately hinge on one's own happiness. The object is the lovable (what appears to contribute to one's own happiness), specifically the good instantiated by the other's virtue; further, what a virtuous person takes as valuable about another's virtue is how it facilitates her own virtuous activity, that is, her own happiness. From here I turn to Aristotle's notion of 'another self'. One popular interpretation of other selfhood defies the altruism/egoism divide. Here the essential feature of other selfhood is virtue, which allows for no prioritization among virtuous people; there is no prioritization of the other over oneself (as in altruism) nor of oneself over the other (as in egoism), since the relevant parties are equal in moral standing (they are virtuous). Assessing the instances of 'another self' in the Nicomachean Ethics VIII.12, IX.4, and IX.9, I argue for an egoistic interpretation of other selfhood; the essential feature of other selfhood is involvement in one's own actualization. That is, what makes other selves valuable is how they facilitate one's own virtuous activity, one's own happiness. Finally, I address the doctrine of self-love in the Nicomachean Ethics IX.8. Again, some interpreters derive non-prioritization from the text; Aristotle claims that all virtuous people identify with the understanding (voũç), so, the non-prioritization interpretation goes, there can be no prioritization among virtuous agents, as they are identical in the relevant way. I argue for an egoistic interpretation of IX.8; Aristotle endorses praiseworthy self-love, which involves maximizing the superlatively valuable fine (καλòν) for oneself over others. Moreover, such self-prioritization occurs precisely by gratifying the understanding, that which was supposed to ground non-prioritization.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-02T20:12:13Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2310.pdf: 1867602 bytes, checksum: f52a1dd06e0f3435e26f0e2371ea1484 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009-02-04 / This work aims to analyze the Nietzsche s project of an ethics of friendship, as it appears in the writings of the so-called second period of the production of the German philosopher (1876-1882). We begin with the hypothesis that the Nietzsche s philosophy undertaking must be understood as an experimental process that aims to overthrow the metaphysical foundations of the philosophy, art and religion to reveal a affirmative and original intent of morality in which the individual's self appears as main theme. This moral of the individuality, however, relies on the notion of friendship because the individual is understood by Nietzsche as a multiple and constituted from the basis of relations among their peers, whose result is the assertion of life. Objects to the morality of compassion for this lead to the denial of the existence abnegation of the individual and their submission to the fellow man, the German philosopher recovers the notion of friendship as antidote to the decadence of modern relationships, whose balance is the rise of the absolute value of equality gregarious and the consequent illness of the human. The assertion of himself and of the reality are the foundations of a type of thinking that connects the morality to individual pathos which is constructing the shaft from the experimental and obtain as result not a canon of values, but the freedom of spirit and happiness tragic-existential. This hypothesis will require an analysis of methodological assumptions that mark the thought of Nietzsche in this second period, summarized under the concept of experimentalism. In the first chapter of this work is carried out an examination of the experimental procedure and the use of this stratagem for analysis of life and human phenomenon, which leads to the relationship between loneliness, illness and friendship as a privileged space for experimenting with the individual with himself. The three following chapters deal with the Nietzsche's critical of the foundations of the ethics of compassion and then be listed the two devices that characterize the design his project of the ethics of friendship: freedom of spirit and sharing of happiness.The notion of freedom of spirit encompasses some of the virtues of his moral of the future: the courage of detachment, the simplicity that make possible the nomadic life of the stroller and strength of the enemy. The sharing of happiness refers, in turn, the concept of life as celebration, virtue of the laughter and a sense prophylactic of the Mitfreude, which opposed to the compassion (Mitleide) presents itself as a congratulation (Mitfreunde). / O presente trabalho de pesquisa pretende analisar o projeto nietzscheano de uma ética da amizade, tal como esse se apresenta nos escritos do chamado segundo período da produção do filósofo alemão (1876-1882). Parte-se da hipótese de que o empreendimento filosófico de Nietzsche deve ser entendido como um processo experimental que almeja derrocar as bases metafísicas da filosofia, da arte e da religião para revelar uma intenção afirmativa e original da moralidade na qual a autoformação do indivíduo aparece como mote principal. Essa moral da individualidade, entretanto, se apóia sobre a noção de amizade porque o indivíduo é compreendido por Nietzsche como múltiplo e constituído a partir de relações entre seus pares, cujo resultado é a asserção da vida. Opondo-se à moral da compaixão por esta conduzir à negação da existência pela abnegação do indivíduo e sua submissão ao próximo, o filósofo alemão recupera a noção de amizade como antídoto contra a décadence das relações modernas, cujo saldo é a ascenção do valor absoluto da igualdade gregária e o consequente adoecimento do humano. A afirmação de si e da realidade enquanto tal são as bases de um tipo de pensamento que liga a moralidade ao pathos individual que se contrói a partir do eixo experimental e obtém como resultado não um cânone de valores, mas a liberdade do espírito e a alegria trágico-existencial. Essa hipótese exigirá uma análise dos pressupostos metodológicos que marcam o pensamento de Nietzsche nesse segundo período, resumidos sob a noção de experimentalismo. No primeiro capítulo desse trabalho realiza-se um exame do procedimento experimental e do uso desse estratagema para análise da vida e dos fenômenos humanos, o que conduz à relação entre solidão, doença e amizade como espaços privilegiados de experimentação do indivíduo consigo mesmo. Os três capítulos seguintes tratam de analisar a crítica de Nietzsche aos fundamentos da ética da compaixão para, em seguida serem elencados os dois dispositivos que caracterizam o projeto de uma ética da amizade: a liberdade do espírito e a partilha da alegria. A noção de liberdade de espírito encerra algumas das virtudes apresentadas por Nietzsche para a sua moral do futuro: a coragem do desprendimento, a simplicidade que possibilita o nomadismo do andarilho e a resistência do inimigo. A partilha da alegria remete, por sua vez, à concepção da vida como festa, à virtude do riso e ao sentido profilático da Mitfreude, a qual, contraposta à compaixão (Mitleide) se apresenta como congratulação (Mitfreunde).