This paper aimed to analyse the impact of power sharing on democracy. The paper also compared the approach of Burundi and Rwanda in their constitutions to the concept of power sharing.

This paper aimed to analyse the impact of power sharing on democracy. The paper also compared the approach of Burundi and Rwanda in their constitutions to the concept of power sharing.

Based on the case study of the mediation of the Polish-Lithuanian dispute from 1920 to 1923, this dissertation explores the League of Nations' emergence as an agency of modern territorial and ethnic conflict resolution. It argues that in many respects, this organization departed from prewar traditional diplomacy to establish a new, broader concept of security. At first the league tried simply to contain the Polish-Lithuanian conflict by appointing a Military Commission to assist these nations in fixing a final border. But the occupation of Vilna by Polish troops in October 1920 exacerbated Polish-Lithuanian relations, turning the initial border dispute into an ideological conflict over the ethnically mixed region of Vilna, claimed by the Poles on ethnic grounds while the Lithuanians considered it the historical capital of the modern Lithuanian state. The occupation spurred the league to greater involvement via administration of a plebiscite to decide the fate of the disputed territories. When this strategy failed, Geneva resorted to negotiating the so-called Hymans Plan, which aimed to create a Lithuanian federal state and establish political and economic cooperation between Poland and Lithuania. This analysis of the league's mediation of this dispute walks the reader through the league's organization of the first international peacekeeping operation, its handling of the challenges of open diplomacy, and its efforts to fulfill its ambitious mandate not just to prevent war but also to uproot its socioeconomic and ethnic causes. The Hymans Plan reflected this ambition as well as commitment to reconciling the tenets of balance of power and territorial status quo with the principle of self-determination and minorities' protection when drawing new boundaries and creating new states.

Since the 1990s, ethnic divisions have replaced the cold war as the world's most important source of violent conflict (Lijphart 2002). According to Fearon and Laitin (2003), a conservative estimate of the total dead between 1945 and 1999 is 16.2 million, five times the interstate toll, as a direct result of about 127 civil wars that each killed at least 1,000. The problem of ethnic tensions is so widespread and serious that it has presented a major impediment to further democratization in this century and has possibly caused a third reverse wave of democratization (Lijphart 2002). Are ethnic tensions and conflicts inevitable in heterogeneous states? Which governmental institutions (parliamentary or presidential) and electoral systems (PR or SMD) create the best framework for addressing ethnic conflict? Is there any one-size-fits-all institutional solution to ethnic conflict? This dissertation aims at answering these urgent but under-explored questions, especially the last two about the effects of institutional arrangements. This dissertation will hold out institutional prescriptions that meet the needs of specific divided societies through a large-N quantitative study covering all ethnic groups in Minorities at Risk dataset from 1985 to 2003. / text

My research focuses on the role of historical legacies in shaping conflict dynamics and reinforcing social divisions today. I highlight the importance of equity in creating effective long-term governance and resilient institutions. Using the Philippines southern region of Mindanao as a case study, the three papers in my dissertation come together to provide evidence that the robust relationship between ethnic homogeneity and institutional development may not hold consistently over elongated time frames. I argue that while homogeneous communities are often quicker to organize through informal norms, the slower process of channeling regulations through structured, fixed institutions may sacrifice short term efficiency in favor of long-term durability. Viewing fractionalization as a process, I argue that this institutional trajectory will only unfold when examined through a historical lens and if fractionalization occurs in ways that incentivize collaboration instead of competition between groups. My first paper highlights the importance of a mutual investment in exchange across groups for setting communities on a path towards resiliency to communal conflicts. I argue that communities with histories of religious and ethnolinguistic diversity, alongside intergroup exchange, are more likely to invest in formal processes to resolve disputes, which in time leads to more robust institutions to mediate conflict between groups. I use 1939 census data on local dialects to show that contemporary Peace Zones are more likely to form in areas where members of the majority group invested in learning minority languages historically. The second paper provides evidence that the process of fractionalization, rather than just fractionalization itself, will carry long term consequences for institutional development. I argue that increased ethnic fractionalization during times of low conflict can break down political dynasties, which strengthens long term government responsiveness. Using census and administrative data, I show that where municipalities had higher levels of fractionalization prior to the mass migration and discriminatory laws initiated by US colonial authorities there are higher ratings of local government efficiency today. However, sharper demographic changes during the period of mass migration are associated with decreases in contemporary local government efficiency. The third paper uses original survey data collected on the management of land conflicts to explore where and why some local courts show more bias against minority groups. Survey results show that local government officials are more likely to expect community courts to rule in favor of minority groups in communities that fractionalized prior to mass migration. However, sharper demographic changes during mass migration are associated with a decreased expectation that a member of a minority group will accept the ruling of a local court. I provide evidence that historical institutional arrangements are generating path dependencies by showing that historical fractionalization prior to mass migration is associated with the development of fixed institutions to resolve conflict across multiple time periods historically and today. These papers provide theory and evidence of enhanced institutional resilience and an ability to adapt to new challenges or opportunities in communities with histories of intergroup cooperation. While fractionalization may initially weaken coordination, the institutional arrangements designed to overcome this new barrier can promote long term durability and strengthen a community's ability to effectively manage future conflicts.

Conflict in deeply divided societies often has a profound impact both on the societies in which the conflict is located, and on the surrounding states and societies. Constitutional engineers working in such societies are inevitably attracted to power-sharing as a means of stabilising inter-group relations. Consociational democracy is a form of power-sharing democracy which is particularly attractive for a divided society, because its demands on the society are relatively few. It aims to separate the communities in the conflict as much as possible, while emphasising elite co-operation in the formal institutions of government. A difficulty with consociational democracy, however, is that the elite co-operation it requires to function is also required for the system to be adopted, yet will not necessarily be present. Cyprus is an excellent example of the difficulty of gaining agreement on a consociational regime for a divided society. In 1963, the consociational Republic of Cyprus collapsed as a result of mistrust between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. In 2004, a consociational system of government was designed for Cyprus by a team of UN experts under the direction of then-Secretary-General, Kofi Annan. The system of government was rejected in April 2004 at a referendum, and, consequently, was not adopted. This thesis examines why Cyprus has thus far been unable to adopt a political settlement. Failure is as hard to explain as success. Success may have many fathers and failure none, but there are as many possible causes of a failure as of a success. There is also the difficulty of the counter-factual: what facts would need to be different to produce success where experience is only of failure. The thesis systematically examines possible causes of failure, including the idea of consociational democracy itself, the particular consociational designs proposed for Cyprus, and the influence of historical aspirations and experiences. Particular attention is paid to the idea that there may be key factors which must be present before a consociational solution can be adopted. The factors, selected for this case study for their apparent relevance to Cyprus, are elite co-operation, segmental isolation, a balance of power between the disputant groups, and the ability of the international community to offer incentives for compromise. It is argued that these factors, especially elite relations and the complex web of causes which determine these, are central to an explanation of the Cyprus experience.

This dissertation analyzes several topics related to political life in ethnically divided societies. In chapter 2, I study the relationship between ethnic social conflict, such as protests, riots, and armed inter-ethnic violence, and bloc partisan identification. I find that protests have no effect on bloc support for political parties, riots increase bloc partisan identification, and that armed violence reduces this phenomenon. In chapter 3, I analyze the factors that influence the targeting of ethnic groups by ethnic parties in social conflict. I find some empirical evidence that conditions favorable to vote pooling across ethnic lines reduce group targeting by ethnic parties. In chapter 4, I analyze the effects of ethnic demography on ethnic party behavior. Through a qualitative analysis of party behavior in local elections in Macedonia, I find that ethnic parties change their strategies in response to changes in ethnic demography. I find that co-ethnic parties are less likely to challenge each other for power under conditions of split demography. In fact, under conditions of split demography, I find that co-ethnic parties have political incentives to unite behind a single party because intra-group competition jeopardizes the group's hold on power.