Taking its departure from the debate on the Iraq war, the article examines three so-called „doctrines“ on European foreign policy. According to the first one, there is no such thing as an EU foreign policy. This may come as a surprise for policy-makers but is a common view among media commentators, analysts and some diplomats. The second doctrine holds that the EU’s foreign policy has been, is, and always will be a failure. Reasons for this gloomy view show considerable variations and are most likely unsustainable in the long run. The third approach is more optimistic, counting on the EU’s material volume, yet often ignoring the need to politically cash in if international clout is the quest.

In this issue, we continue and complete the debate on the future of the transatlantic relationship and of world order after the Iraq war. The debate was initiated by an article by Thomas Risse (Freie Universität Berlin) in WeltTrends 39, which has provoked a remarkable reaction within the German academic community, as documented in WeltTrends 40. This issue features additional comments and the rebuttal by Thomas Risse. <br>Most authors believe that the transatlantic partnership is in a serious crisis, but claim that it remains without an alternative for both sides of the Atlantic.

In this issue, we continue and complete the debate on the future of the transatlantic relationship and of world order after the Iraq war. The debate was initiated by an article by Thomas Risse (Freie Universität Berlin) in WeltTrends 39, which has provoked a remarkable reaction within the German academic community, as documented in WeltTrends 40. This issue features additional comments and the rebuttal by Thomas Risse. <br>Most authors believe that the transatlantic partnership is in a serious crisis, but claim that it remains without an alternative for both sides of the Atlantic.

Können wir heute schon von einer europäischen Außenpolitik sprechen? Angesichts der tiefen Gräben, die weiterhin zwischen den EU-Mitgliedern hinsichtlich einer „Gemeinsamen Außen-und Sicherheitspolitik“ bestehen, erscheinen vollmundige Diskurse über „eine europäische Sicherheitsdoktrin“ und „einen europäischen Außenminister“ eher als Geisterbeschwörung. In diesem Heft wird die Frage nach der europäischen Außenpolitik aus unterschiedlichen Perspektiven und mit verschiedenen Prognosen diskutiert. Wird deutsche Außenpolitik wieder Machtpolitik? Gunther Hellmann sieht die Gefahr und plädiert für einen „offensiven Idealismus“. Damit beginnt WeltTrends eine neue Debatte zu Deutschlands internationaler Politik, die in den nächsten Heften geführt wird.

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Die Vision einer Europäischen Außenpolitik zwischen den Supermächten USA und UdSSR prägte die Debatte im Westeuropa der Nachkriegszeit. Lange Zeit glaubten die überzeugten europäischen Protagonisten an die Idee, mittels einer strengen Sachlogik dem Ziel einer politischen Integration zwangsläufig näher zu kommen und eine gemeinschaftliche Außenpolitik zu erreichen, und zwar über die Bildung einer integrierten Wirtschaftsunion hin zu politischen Mechanismen. Man argumentierte mit Nachdruck: Die wirtschaftliche Integration sei nicht nur ein Schritt auf dem Weg zur politischen Vereinigung, sondern bereits ein Teil des Zieles selbst.1 Wie sehr der Glaube an diese Sachlogik im Verlauf der Jahrzehnte getrogen hat, davon zeugen Mühseligkeit, Langwierigkeit und teilweise Ergebnislosigkeit der Anstrengungen, eine gemeinsame europäische Außenpolitik zu schaffen. / Starting from the post-war vision of a supranational Western Europe, the author describes the history of a Common Foreign and Security Policy. The main focus is on the development of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) since the 1970s. Possibilities and limits of such a cooperation are highlighted. The author states that the EPC was designed pragmatically and was not incorporated into the legal system of the EU. He analyses the permanently strained relations between the national states in Europe and their effort to reach common competences in the area of foreign and security policy.

With lessons learned from the 1999 Kosovo intervention as a point of departure, this thesis addresses the question of whether the development of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) doctrine and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) actually made a difference in determining whether and how Europe responded to subsequent mass atrocities in its neighbourhood. Viewing the RtoP as an emerging international norm, a social constructivist framework is applied to explore the influence of norms on European foreign policy-making. It is argued that even an emerging international norm can be influential if it is considered a legitimate behavioural claim. The influence of the RtoP will be assessed by gauging the extent to which it is distinctively used to justify foreign policy decisions and to communicate the basis for those choices to a wider audience. The development of the RtoP and the CSDP from 1999-2011 in theory and practice paves the way for an in-depth case study analysis. Focusing on the UN, the EU as well as French, German and British discourses, the question of whether the RtoP has actually made a difference will be answered by scrutinizing European responses to the Libyan crisis (March – October 2011) and the Syrian crisis (March 2011 – September 2013). Ultimately, light is shed not only on the relevance of the RtoP for Europe but also on the role of the EU as a security actor in its neighbourhood.

The thesis tests the efficacy of Principal-Agent (PA) theory in explaining the creation and development of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). As such, the thesis is subject as well as theory-driven. Empirically, the focal point is how the interaction between the EU member states and the European Commission affected the development of the ENP. It is a theme which is largely overlooked in the ENP literature. In terms of theory, the ENP represents a fascinating case study for PA analysis not only because it has rarely been applied to the field of EU foreign policy but also because PA has seldom been used for studying the evolution of a policy (both pre and post-delegation). Conceptualising EU member states as principals and the European Commission as agent, the thesis examines PA dynamics through the following three ENP policy stages: formulation (2002-2004), finalisation (2004-2006), and implementation (2007-2009). Three hypotheses are tested for each stage of the ENP. Two hypotheses are rooted in PA scholarship, and address the influence of the agent as an informal agenda-setter, while the third distinguishes the agent's influence between different stages of the policy development. Methodologically, the research design is based on within-case process-tracing while the empirical data is drawn from a triangulation of official documents, secondary sources and elite interviews. The thesis findings show that during the initial stages of the policy, the Commission took advantage of its favourable position (e.g. informational asymmetries and uncertainty among the member states) to establish itself as the key actor in the ENP. As the ENP evolved, the Commission’s influence has diminished while the member states, collectively and individually, became more engaged in determining the course of the policy. However, contrary to PA assumptions, member states' increased oversight over the Commission did not come as a response to disobedient behaviour. Based on the empirical data, the Commission, as an agent, was in fact trying to implement the ENP following the guidelines which were previously agreed by its principals. Thus, in the case of the ENP, my PA analysis shifts from the traditional inquiry of how principals control opportunistic agents, to examining how principals could hinder the work of the agent. This phenomenon, broadly defined by Thompson (2007) as the ‘principal problem’, is an anomaly in existing PA literature dominated by an agency-biased standpoint and has previously not been analysed in the context of the European Union. Finally, the wider implication of this thesis is that there is still room for broadening the scope of PA analysis while highlighting the necessity to keep a watchful eye on both the principals and the agent.

The second election of President Bush is the climax of twelve years of successful activity by the Republicans. Rarely before could an American president rely on a majority in both houses of the Congress. Consequently, Bush has ever since his re-election conveyed the impression that he is committed to follow the paths he had taken during his first term at home and in international affairs without any concessions. Therefore, also his new initiatives towards Europe seem to be aimed only to improve the transatlantic atmosphere but not to develop a more cooperative American foreign policy.

The author offers a survey of recent studies on the role of the European Union in world affairs. While some theoretical and conceptual progress has been made since the 1970s and 1980s, a good deal of the current work is still largely descriptive. Only a small number of studies take factors such as culture, norms, or ideas sufficiently into account. Referring to such variables, however, promises a value added for the explanation of certain phenomena in EU external relations. With reference to IR Theory, an institutionalist approach that conceptualises ideas as an intervening variable is therefore proposed.