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This thesis presents six essays relating to various aspects of the workings of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System (EMS), an adjustable-peg exchange rate regime that has been in operation in Europe since 1979. The essays follow its development, from its inception in 1979, to its near collapse in 1992, and its current prospects in the context of economic and monetary union. The essays focus on several aspects of the EMS, notably volatility of exchange rates, offshore interest rates and forward exchange rates, the target zone model, time-series analysis of exchange rate changes, and how the EMS fits in with current plans for economic and monetary union in Europe.

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The United States acted unilaterally to terminate the Bretton Woods monetary system in August 1971, and international exchange rate management went from a regime of fixed to floating parities, much to the displeasure of the membership of the European Community. The Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations adopted policies that heavily benefited U.S. reform objectives and domestic economic goals, which frequently clashed with allied concerns, and damaged American monetary relations with France and West Germany. Yet, the inability of France and the Federal Republic of Germany to form cohesive economic and monetary policies throughout international negotiations or within the European Community (EC), allowed American desires to dictate the path and pace of European integration. France and Germany attempted, with limited success, to influence U.S. monetary policy through bilateral diplomacy during years of exchange rate fluctuations, dollar devaluations, oil shocks, and payments deficits. Finally, President Valery Giscard d'Estaing and Chancellor Helmut Schmidt created the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1979, reversing the trend of half-hearted attempts at European integration so relevant the decade before. The EMS detached the EC's currencies from the dollar's control, was compatible with the reformed international monetary system, advanced a more independent European monetary identity, and formed the base for future monetary integration. As a result, the EMS, as the birthplace of the Euro, the single European currency launched in 2002, may soon rival the dollar's position as the primary reserve currency. American monetary policies designed to improve the health of the dollar during the 1970s were a catalyst for European integration. However, as the European Union deepens its economic integration and the Euro grows in strength, it seems that U.S. policies created a regime and a currency that will challenge its dominant position in international monetary affairs.

Thesis (M. Econ.)--University of Hong Kong, 1996. / Includes bibliographical references (leaf 119-121).

Thesis (M.Econ.)--University of Hong Kong, 1996. / Includes bibliographical references (leaf 119-121). Also available in print.

The author sketches the development and legal status of the European Currency Unit (ECU), the predecessor of today's European single currency Euro, and asks whether from the perspective of (former) German monetary law, this currency unit had to be looked at not as a domestic currency ("Deutsche Mark"), but rather as a foreign one.

The purpose of this thesis is to sum up the evolution of monetary policy of the European Union so far and to review the impact of the global financial crisis upon the euro area outlining its future. The other purpose is to analyze the Maastricht convergence criteria fulfillment by the Czech Republic and to sum up if the Czech Republic is or isn't ready to enter the euro area and to adopt the common currency. The first and the second part of the thesis are more descriptive of dealing with the historical evolution of monetary policy from the initial formation in the European Economic Community to the origin of the European Monetary system. The third part brings the reader particular information about the Economic and Monetary union and phases of its foundation. It also brings about the European Central Bank which is the most important institution for monetary policy of the European Union and in the end summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of adopting the common currency. In the fourth part I try to assess the impact of the global financial crisis upon the states of the euro area and mention the view of experts on its future. The last chapter deals with the potencial entry of the Czech Republic to the euro area. That review is based on the analysis of the Maastricht convergence criteria fulfillment.

The author sketches the development and legal status of the European Currency Unit (ECU), the predecessor of today's European single currency Euro, and asks whether from the perspective of (former) German monetary law, this currency unit had to be looked at not as a domestic currency ("Deutsche Mark"), but rather as a foreign one.

En 1969, dans une Communauté économique européenne (CEE) aux fondements déjà bien établis, et sous l’égide d’un néogaullisme assumé par la présidence de Georges Pompidou, l’Allemagne devient le modèle d’une France en quête de politique industrielle qui lui permettrait d’affirmer son rang sur l’échiquier international. Depuis le milieu des années 1960, le système monétaire international est fragilisé par l’endettement considérable des États-Unis. La France veut être à l’initiative d’une relance de l’Union économique et monétaire (UEM). Cette décision politique doit lui permettre d’adapter son économie et son industrie à l’instabilité grandissante du Système monétaire international. Comme le rappelait Jacques Rueff, « L’Europe se fera par la monnaie ou ne se fera pas ». L’action de l’économie française durant cette période qui court de la relance de l’Union économique et monétaire (décembre 1969) à la rédaction du Traité de Maastricht (février 1992), jalonnée par la mise en place du Système monétaire européen (SME : janvier 1979) et de l’Acte unique (janvier 1986), repose sur une volonté politique primordiale au service des relations avec la RFA, puis de l’Allemagne réunifiée. Les relations monétaires franco-allemandes ont pour but de promouvoir une Europe forte, maîtresse de son destin, et, d’une certaine façon, de revenir à une stabilité des changes. Le mythe de la stabilité de « l’étalon-or » a des acceptations différentes des deux côtés du Rhin. Si des études historiques récentes ont été consacrées partiellement aux conséquences de l’évolution des politiques monétaires européennes (et surtout françaises) sur l’intégration économique et monétaire dans la CEE, elles demeurent souvent centrées sur le septennat de VGE ou le début du premier mandat de François Mitterrand. La genèse de l’UEM est un processus dynamique long qui court de décembre 1969 à février 1992. En fait, les relations monétaires franco-allemandes englobent deux niveaux de décisions et d’applications. En premier lieu, sont à mentionner, les plus hautes instances politiques (présidence, chancellerie et ministères, mais aussi Commission européenne). En second lieu, interviennent les banques centrales dont le rôle quant à la mise en place et l’application des politiques monétaires est primordial. Cette dichotomie illustre l’avènement progressif du primat de l’économie sur la politique, perçu et analysé différemment en France et en Allemagne. Les attentes et les objectifs politiques et économiques divergent. Nous montrons dans cette étude que le processus d’UEM apparaît souvent comme un engrenage économique, où la politique cède le pas à l’économie. Les relations monétaires apparaissent asymétriques. Le pouvoir politique français a comme véritable interlocuteur le pouvoir économique allemand, représenté par la Bundesbank. Le « couple » franco-allemand est un mythe politique, français, que brise la libéralisation économique mondiale. L’UEM est, pour l’Allemagne, un moyen d’établir une Allemagne européenne au sein d’une Europe fédérale. En France, elle apparaît pour les gouvernements néo-gaullistes et libéraux comme un moyen de compenser une grandeur blessée, alors que les gouvernements socialistes donnent l’impression de l’utiliser pour compenser une idéologie en déroute. L’UEM parvient à la stabilité monétaire, mais en refusant l’Union politique européenne, proposée par l’Allemagne, la France laisse s’éloigner le rêve d’une Europe puissance et établit les bases une Europe allemande. / In 1969, in a well-established European Economic Community (EEC) under the neo-Gaullist presidency of Georges Pompidou, Germany stood as a model for France, looking for an effective industrial policy and a recovery of its rank on the international scene. Since the mid 1960s the international monetary system had been weakened by the growing US debt. France wanted to be the leader of the economic and monetary union (EMU). This political decision was a means to improve its economy confronted with the instability of the international monetary system. As pointed out by Jacques Rueff, « L’Europe se fera par la monnaie ou ne se fera pas. » During this period, from the relaunch of the EMU (December 1969) to the Maastricht Treaty (February 1992), French economic action was based on a strong political will defined to reinforce the relationships with the Federal German Republic, and then the reunified Germany. The Franco-German monetary relationships aimed to promote a strong and independent Europe and to restore an exchange rate stability. The “golden standard” stability myth was viewed and understood differently in France and Germany. If recent historical studies have been partially devoted to the consequences of European monetary policies (essentially in France) on economic and monetary integration in the EEC, they focused on the 1974-1981 or 1981-1986 periods. The creation of the EMU was a dynamic process running from December 1969 to February 1992. Franco-German monetary relationships included two levels of decision-making. First, on the political level, there was the presidency, the chancellery, the European Commission and the ministers. Second, its counterpart, economic power. The latter requires analysis of the role played by central banks in the definition and application of monetary policies. This dichotomy illustrates the progressive transition between the political level and the economic level during the 1980s. The decline of politics and the primacy of economics were analyzed differently in France and Germany. Political and economic objectives and expectations were contrasted and divergent. This study demonstrates that the EMU dynamic was an economic process where politics gave way to economics. Monetary relations were asymmetric. The real interlocutor of French political authorities was German economic power, represented by the Bundesbank. The Franco-German tandem was a political myth broken by world economy liberalization. For Germany, the EMU was a device to define a European Germany in a federal Europe. In France, it represented an illusory means to restore French primacy for conservative and liberal governments and a way of compensating a failing ideology for socialist governments. The EMU provided monetary stability, but the dream of a powerful and independent Europe vanished with the Maastricht treaty. Even as it rejected the idea of European political union defended by the German diplomacy, France paradoxically laid the foundations of a German Europe.