In recent times we have seen coalitions of fiscally conservative member states who have sought to block further financial integration. Despite their small size, these states have come together and taken on the rest of the European Union with much success. They have had to do this since Brexit has cost them a large and powerful ally, the United Kingdom. With growing support for more integration in Germany and France, smaller states who object to further integration have had to stop their interest from being ignored. The thesis makes use of Liberal Intergovernmentalism, Rational Choice andTwo-Level Game Theory to develop the analysis. The method used is historical, which allows the question to be answered by looking at the patterns and motivations of previous coalitions. The analysis shows how coalitions, due to the distribution of power amongst member states, are necessary for small states in having their say. The analysis also looks at how these coalitions come together, how they alter the power and approach of the small states to the negotiation table. Using the case of the Frugal Four, this thesis determines the value of coalitions and attempts to determine whether coalitions are the way forward in EU negotiations due to the large UK- shaped power vacuum left over by Brexit. This thesis sees that resulting from the power shift strongly favouring the pro-integration forces and the large states coalitions offer the only means for small states to avoid having their interest ignored. The coalition also offers long term assurance for these states in the pursuit of their national preferences.