In this thesis I explore the attitudes, arguments, and actions of British political elites in connection with the development of human rights law in Europe and the UK. I do this by examining British input into five key episodes for the development of European supranational rights and their incorporation into domestic legal orders (namely the drafting of the European Convention on Human Rights 1950, the drafting of the European Social Charter 1961, the acceptance of individual petition in 1966, the failed 1970s Bill of Rights debate, the passing of the Human Rights Act 1998, and recent developments such as the UK ‘opt-out’ to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, and the emergence of a new ‘British Bill of Rights’ debate). Casting light on British involvement in less examined periods in European rights development, I challenge existing, isolated, explanations for the more focal episodes (such as Simpson’s rational-choice post-colonial thesis for individual petition acceptance, and ideological accounts for New Labour’s post-1997 constitutional reform). Responding to the most recent literature in the area, central to my analysis is the question of how rights progress relates to inter-party conflict. By considering continuities and discontinuities in elite political discussion of rights I argue that while conflict is a significant underlying feature of every major episode of rights progress during the last sixty years, and is less evident in less progressive periods, other factors have had a greater influence over the form, timing, and extent of rights progress. Most significant amongst these is the constitutional ideological development of the Labour party and the critical connection between Labour’s elevation of the Convention within the UK constitutional space and revisionist shifts in party thinking.

Le concept d'autonomie personnelle est apparu récemment dans l'ordre juridique européen, comme la faculté pour la personne humaine de mener sa vie comme elle l'entend. Ce concept trouve son ancrage dans un système juridique en pleine mutation, tiraillé entre deux traditions, l'une anglo-saxonne qui constitue un modèle autonomique de protection des droits de la personne, et l'autre continentale, plus paternaliste. Le rôle des juges constitutionnels européens et des organes de la Convention européenne des droits de l'homme s'est révélé décisif pour faire émerger la notion d'autonomie personnelle au sein de l'ordre juridique, et pour l'ériger progressivement en principe matriciel des droits fondamentaux. La prise en considération de l'autonomie personnelle vise, en effet, à modifier la protection juridique de la personne humaine, qui n'est plus générale et abstraite mais ajustée et concrète, répondant ainsi aux enjeux actuels de la protection des droits de l'homme et de la réalité sociale.Le but de cette étude est d'analyser la fonction de l'autonomie personnelle, vecteur d'intégration sociale de toute personne humaine, et élément participatif au pluralisme interne essentiel à une société démocratique. L'analyse porte sur les avancées permises par la reconnaissance de l'autonomie personnelle dans la protection des droits individuels et dans ceux des minorités. Malgré certaines réticences doctrinales, cette fonction se révèle limitée dans la remise en cause des valeurs sociales qu'elle pouvait induire, mais elle s'avère primordiale au développement de la protection des droits de la personne humaine. / The concept of personal autonomy recently appeared in the European justice system as a means by which people can lead their lives as they wish. This concept has its roots in an evolving justice system, torn between two traditions: the Anglo-Saxon model of individual rights; and the paternalist Continental approach. The role of constitutional European judges and the inner-workings of the European Convention on Human Rights has proved decisive for the development of the idea of personal autonomy which lies at the heart of the justice system, and its evaluation within the matrix of fundamental rights. Taking into account personal autonomy aims to effectively alter the judicial protection of the rights of the person which is no longer general and abstract but rather concrete and refined, and also addresses current issues of the protection of human rights and the reality of society.The aim of this study is to analyse the function of personal autonomy and the direction of human social interaction and the participative element of internal pluralism which is essential to a democratic society. The analysis focuses on advances permitted by the recognition of personal autonomy in the protection of individual rights and those of minorities. In spite of some doctrinal reluctance, this function proves limited in light of questions regarding social values which it might raise, but it proves essential to the development of the protection of the rights of the person.