Die Europäische Währungsunion (EWU) umfasst heute 16 Staaten mit insgesamt 321 Millionen Einwohnern, sie ist mit einem Bruttoinlandsprodukt von 22,9 Billionen Euro einer der größten Wirtschaftsräume der Erde. In den nächsten Jahren wird die EWU durch die Aufnahme der 2004 und 2007 beigetretenen neuen EU-Länder weiter wachsen. Da der Beitritt von der Erfüllung der Kriterien von Maastricht abhängt, erfolgt die Erweiterung im Gegensatz zur 5. Erweiterungsrunde der EU nicht als Block, sondern sequentiell. Nach den Beitritten von Slowenien am 1.1.2007 und der Slowakei zum 1.1.2009 steht der Beitritt eines ersten großen Landes in den nächsten Jahren bevor. Daher stößt die Frage der Effekte eines solchen Beitritts seit geraumer Zeit auf breites Interesse in der ökonomischen Literatur. Das Forschungsziel der Dissertation ist es, die theoretischen Wirkungsmechanismen eines Beitritts der neuen Mitgliedsländer zur Europäischen Währungsunion abzubilden. Hierzu werden mögliche stabilitätspolitische Konsequenzen sowie die Auswirkungen eines Beitritts auf die geografische Wirtschaftsstruktur und das Wachstum dieser Länder in theoretischen Modellen abgeleitet. Die direkten Effekte des Beitritts werden in einem angewandt-theoretischen Modell zudem quantifiziert. Insgesamt wird der Beitritt aus drei verschiedenen Perspektiven analysiert: Erstens werden die Konsequenzen der Währungsunion für die Stabilitätspolitik der neuen Mitgliedsländer im Rahmen eines neukeynesianischen Modells betrachtet. Zweitens werden die mit der Transaktionskostensenkung verbundenen Gewinne in einem angewandten Gleichgewichtsmodell quantifiziert. Drittens werden die wachstumstheoretischen Wirkungen der Finanzmarktintegration in einem dynamischen Gleichgewichtsmodell untersucht. Da die drei Aspekte der makroökonomischen Stabilität, der Transaktionskostensenkung und der dynamischen Wirkungen der Finanzmarktintegration weitgehend unabhängig voneinander auftreten, ist die Verwendung verschiedener Modelle mit geringen Kosten verbunden. In der Gesamtbeurteilung des EWU-Beitritts der neuen EU-Länder kommt diese Arbeit zu einer anderen Einschätzung als bisherige Studien. Die in Teil eins ermittelten stabilitätspolitischen Konsequenzen sind entweder neutral oder implizieren bei Beitritt zur Währungsunion eine größere Stabilität. Die in Teil zwei und drei ermittelten statischen und dynamischen Gewinne eines Beitritts sind zudem erheblich, so dass ein schneller Beitritt zur Währungsunion für die neuen EU-Mitgliedsländer vorteilhaft ist. Unter Berücksichtigung der Ziele der Europäischen Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion (EWWU) müssen hierzu jedoch zwei Bedingungen erfüllt sein. Einerseits sind hinreichend entwickelte Finanzmärkte notwendig, um das Ziel einer Konvergenz der neuen und alten EU-Mitgliedsländer zu erreichen. Andererseits wird der Gesamtraum von einer stärkeren Finanzmarktintegration und einer Senkung der Transaktionskosten profitieren, jedoch durch die Übertragung von Schocks der neuen Mitgliedsländer instabiler. Daher kann der Beitritt der neuen Mitgliedsländer zur EWU für den Gesamtraum negativ sein. Diese Kosten sind nur dann zu rechtfertigen, falls über die schnellere Entwicklung der neuen Mitgliedsstaaten eine höhere Stabilität des Währungsraumes erzielt wird. Das neukeynesianische Wachstumsmodell gibt Hinweise, dass eine solche Entwicklung eintreten könnte. / The European Monetary Union consists of 16 member states, is inhabited by 321 million people and has a joint GDP of 22.9 trillion Euros. It is one of the largest economic areas in the world. In the next years the Eurozone will growth further, eight remaining new EU member states will join after their fulfillment of the Maastricht criteria. This makes accession rather sequential, Slovenia joined in 2007, Slovakia in 2009 and Estonia is about to join the Eurozone in 2010. However, these rules open the opportunity for a new EU-member state to postpone membership of EMU in violating the Maastricht criteria like Sweden. The contribution of my Ph.D. thesis is to derive channels of the impact of an EMU accession on the macro-economy. To this aim, I analyze the effects of accession on stability, growth and the geographical structure within theoretical models. The static effects of accession are quantified within a computable equilibrium model. In the conclusions I answer the question whether there are economic reasons for a new member state to avoid EMU membership. The thesis is organized in three parts reflecting three perspectives of accession. Within the first main chapter, the effects of accession on stability are analyzed within a dynamic general equilibrium framework (DSGE). After a short discussion of the effects of monetary arrangements on the stability of an economy, I analyze the well-known arguments of the theory of optimum currency areas. Thereafter the model is used to analyze the transmission of shocks within the monetary union. The second main chapter of the thesis is related to static effects of accession. I show that in five new member states gains from accession outpace costs. Nevertheless, the gain from accession varies among accession countries and economic activities. Overall, small open economies tend to benefit to a greater extent than medium-size, more closed economies. In the third main chapter of the thesis a multiregional growth model is developed. In this model further integration leads to more efficient financial markets which foster growth. Nevertheless, like in all new economic geography (NEG) models, there could be the outcome of a catastrophic agglomeration. Capital could move from poor accession countries to rich western Eurozone countries. To prevent such a catastrophic agglomeration, financial markets should show a minimum degree of development. The conclusion of the thesis supports the accession of new member states to the Eurozone. I argue that the consequences of EMU accession will be either neutral or positive for the accession countries. Since these countries tend to be more instable, they could gain from an equalization of shocks within the Eurozone. The static effects outpace the costs of accession. Within the last years we saw huge progress in the integration of new EU-member states into the international financial system. A catastrophic agglomeration should therefore be unlikely. However, market capitalization remains low and bank lending is less profitable than in western EU-countries so that a risk remains which could justify a postponement of accession.

The intent of this paper is to analyze the structural composition of the European Monetary Union and its implications for the European Financial Crisis, specifically with respect to Greece. This analysis will be driven by a trend analysis of several economic variables from 1999-2010. These variables range from the four requirements set under the Maastricht criteria, competitiveness indicators, and relative European trade balances, to international investment position. A quantitative and empirical analysis of this data finds that the Greek crisis was a result of structural issues with the EMU and the Greek government. The ECB’s inability to enforce the Maastricht Criteria and independent fiscal policy, as well as Greece’s inability to implement efficient fiscal and economic policy, resulted in growing imbalances within the Euro area, as well as a loss of competitiveness and irresponsible rise in sovereign debt for Greece. It is inferred that the EMU was ineffective in achieving its goals of integration; that Greece was not ready to join the EMU when it did; and therefore Greece as a Member State of the EMU was destined to fail.

The switch from a fixed exchange rate regime to a flexible exchange rate regime seldom goes smoothly. A major reason why devaluations are so disruptive is that countries are reluctant to abandon their fixed exchange rate regimes. This “reluctance to devalue” phenomenon is one of the puzzles in international finance. This dissertation makes towards understanding this “reluctance to devalue”. First, I investigate the factors that may influence the probability of a switch from a fixed to a flexible exchange rate regime using survival models. I find that pegs have non-monotonic duration dependence. Moreover, I find that GDP growth strongly influences the probability of abandoning a peg. Second, I propose that the “reluctance to devalue” could stem from uncertainty about the control over inflation after devaluation which raises the threshold of economic pain that could convince policy makers to devalue. I develop this argument in a rules-vs-discretion theoretical framework. Empirical analysis based on survey data from Bulgaria supports this hypothesis. Given that abandoning a fixed exchange rate regime is one of the three options that are available to countries on a peg, I investigate whether a periphery country's decision to abandon its peg is impacted by a potential move to a currency union. I find that the perception of “insurance” justified by expected-bailouts in a currency union increase the support for joining a currency union. The strength of this “safety net” perception is strong despite expected negative impact of the currency union on the country’s macroeconomic indicators.

The objective of this study is to investigate how the development regarding the short-term nominal interest rate in Portugal would have differed from that set by the ECB 1999-2011 in a situation where they did not enter the European Monetary Union. To do this, we use the Taylor rule, which incorporates economic activities such as inflation and output and how these deviates from their target. Constructing the Taylor rule, we estimate its reaction functions using an Ordinary Least Square Regression on annual data from the period 1988-1998. The reaction functions serve as weights on the deviations for inflation and output. The result reached is that the interest rate set by the ECB since 1999 is far below that interest rate required by the Portuguese economic situation. Further, we discuss how the influence in the setting of the ECB interest rate differs considering the member countries size.

This thesis looks at how European Single Currency (EURO) that began circulating on January 2002 as a legal tender will affect the European integration process. Because money has been accepted as one of the founding elements of a state for centuries, whether the Euro will be effective in the direction of a probable &ldquo / United States of Europe&rdquo / or not? Firstly, theoretical and historical roots of European integration are explained in the thesis as the basis of economic integration. The foundation, the stages and institutional mechanism of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is looked at throughout the thesis with the theories of Regional Economic Integration and Optimum Currency Areas (OCA). The thesis reaches the conclusion that economic integration may gradually bring about the need for political integration in the EU, but not necessarily.

This thesis aims at evaluating the impact of euro upon European identity. By analyzing the theory of identity and the concept of money, this thesis reveals the relationship between currency and collective identity and applies this logic to the dynamics between euro and European identity. In order to grasp a better understanding, the thesis studies some selected member states in more depth and evaluates each one within their special circumstances. The findings of this thesis suggest that the constructive impact of euro upon European identity is determined by the level Europeanization or the strength of the sense of Europeanness in respective member states. To this extent the euro has a constructive impact upon European identity in member states in which Europeanization or European identity is perceived positively. On the other hand, in those member states in which Europeanization or European identity is perceived negatively, the euro has neither negative nor constructive impact.

In this paper we analyse the implications of the euro for the international reserves in the Eurosystem. Two conceptually different effects of the changeover have to be distinguished: a technical effect that largely arises as a matter of accounting, and a behavioural effect that stems from the fact that the optimal demand of the aggregate Eurosystem is not equal to the sum of the optimal country levels. The technical effect arises from two main sources: the abolishment of the ECU-creating mechanism, and the redefinition of international reserves which precludes (former) reserves that were denominated in euro-currencies. As a result the average reserves of the Eurosystem in 1999 amounted to $287 billion, considerably less than in 1998 ($345 billion). We then derive a reserve demand function for the aggregate Eurosystem using panel data estimation techniques and simulate reserve demand for the situation after the regime shift. The optimal aggregate level of reserves turns out to be some $188 billion, which implies excess reserves in the Eurosystem amounting to approximately $100 billion in the year 1999. We go on by proposing a key by which this excess could be allocated to the individual countries taking the asymmetric distribution of reserves in the Eurosystem into account. Finally we classify and enumerate the proposals for making use of the estimated reserve overhang. (author's abstract) / Series: EI Working Papers / Europainstitut

This thesis examines whether EU and EMU memberships appeared to protect the member countries’ trade, measured in exports, during the 2008 global financial crisis. The panel data analysis is based on a country sample of 40 OECD and EU countries during the period from 2000 to 2016. By employing a pooled Ordinary Least Squared (OLS) regression and an augmented gravity model, we investigate how the EU and EMU countries’ trade was impacted in comparison to the average of the OECD countries’ trade during the crisis. The results indicate that being a member of the EU or the currency union did not pose additional protection, as the member countries’ trade seemed to be more negatively impacted by the crisis than the average trade in the OECD countries.

O objetivo deste estudo é investigar, através do estimador de diferenças em diferenças, se a adoção da união monetária européia ampliou tanto o comércio quanto a correlação bilateral dos ciclos econômicos entre seus membros, em comparação com outras economias da OCDE. A evidência apresentada sugere ser esse o caso, nos indicando que a união monetária, como processo último das teorias de integração, pode não ser um fim, mas sim um meio para o alcance da integração entre as economias. / The goal of this paper is to investigate, by means of a simple difs-in-difs technique, whether the adoption of the monetary union among the members of the European Monetary Union (EMU) has increased both bilateral trade and bilateral correlation of business cycles between them rather than amidst other OECD economies. We present evidence suggesting this to be the case, witch tells us that monetary union, as the last stage of the theories of economic integration, may not be an end by itself, but means of achieving the economic integration.

We analyse the dynamics of the standard deviation of demand and supply shocks as well as of the demand component of GDP across countries in the European Monetary Union (EMU). This analysis allows us to evaluate the patterns of cyclical comovement in EMU and compare them the cyclical performance of the new members of the EU and other OECD countries. We make use of sigma-convergence methods to identify synchronization patterns in business cycles. The Eurozone has converged to a stable lower level of dispersion across business cycles during the end of the 80s and the beginning of the 90s. The new EU members have also experienced a strong pattern of convergence from 1998 to 2005, when a strong divergence trend appears. An enlargement of the EMU to 22 members would not significantly decrease its optimality as a currency area. There is evidence for some Europe-specific characteristics as compared to global comovements in business cycles. (authors' abstract)