Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:21:31Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Etiene Maria Bosco Breviglieri.pdf: 1711543 bytes, checksum: 47b9fab6e0f761d6c41b276e86544ab5 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-02-27 / This study presents a comparative analysis of the risk of development as exclusion of liability in different jurisdictions. For this purpose, includes the main concepts and ideas advocated by the sociologist Ulrich Beck has called that today's society as "risk society". Within this paper presents a legal analysis of the text of the European Directive n. 374 of 1985 on the effects of their adoption by different member states of the European Community as a starting point for further reflections on the possible inclusion of the risk of development as excluding liability in our civil or consumerist law. It also includes reflections of new technologies and their interaction with the risk of development in order to confirm their applicability or not with nanotechnology and genetic manipulation. Due to the continued appearance of innovative technologies whose risks cannot be predicted and calculated the work points to the use of the principle of precaution and prevention to control risks from new technologies. Finally, it also brings two proposals of lege ferenda that address the risk of development planning in our civil and consumer in promoting the discussing of possibility of additions to the theme of the Civil Code and the Code of Consumer Protection / O presente trabalho apresenta uma análise comparada do risco do desenvolvimento como excludente de responsabilidade civil em diferentes ordenamentos. Para isso, inclui como conceitos primordiais as idéias defendidas pelo sociólogo Ulrich Beck que denominou a sociedade atual como sociedade do risco . No âmbito jurídico este trabalho apresenta uma análise do texto da Diretiva Européia n. 374 de 1985 apontando os efeitos de sua adoção por diferentes estados membros da Comunidade Européia como ponto de partida para posteriores reflexões sobre a possível inserção do risco de desenvolvimento como excludente de responsabilidade seja em nosso ordenamento civil ou na legislação consumerista. Inclui ainda o presente estudo reflexões sobre as novas tecnologias e sua interação com o risco de desenvolvimento no intuito de comprovar sua aplicabilidade ou não a nanotecnologia e a manipulação genética. Em virtude do aparecimento constante de tecnologias inovadoras cujos riscos não podem ser previstos e calculados o trabalho aponta a utilização do princípio da precaução e da prevenção para controle dos riscos inerentes às novas tecnologias. Por fim, traz ainda duas propostas de lege ferenda que abordam o tema do risco de desenvolvimento em nosso ordenamento no âmbito civil e consumerista promovendo o debate sobre possíveis inclusões do tema no Código Civil e no Código de Defesa do Consumidor

L’autonomie de la volonté demeure aujourd’hui encore, et heureusement, un fondement central du droit civil des contrats. Les principes de liberté contractuelle et de force obligatoire du contrat laissent aux contractants le choix d’aménager les différents paramètres et conditions d’exécution de leur entente, y compris de prévoir à l’avance la limitation ou même l’exclusion de la responsabilité découlant de l’inexécution du contenu contractuel. Cette liberté n’est cependant pas sans borne. Celle-ci doit, depuis l’adoption du Code civil du Québec, obligatoirement s’insérer dans une philosophie morale du rapport contractuel. Ainsi, la question de savoir si l’autonomie de la volonté des contractants va jusqu’à permettre à ceux-ci de s’exonérer d’une obligation essentielle dans le rapport contractuel fait l’objet du présent mémoire. Seront donc étudiés, d’abord, les principaux concepts juridiques interpellés par une telle problématique, soit l’exonération conventionnelle de responsabilité, d’une part, et le concept d’obligation essentielle du contrat, d’autre part. Par la suite, sera observée, dans quelle mesure les principes de liberté contractuelle et de force obligatoire du contrat sont susceptibles de fonder, sous le Code civil du Bas-Canada, d’abord, et sous le Code civil du Québec, ensuite, l’exonération conventionnelle de l’inexécution d’une obligation essentielle. La dernière partie de l’étude sera réservée à l’impact de la moralité contractuelle du Code civil du Québec sur l’exonération conventionnelle de responsabilité. Au regard de la jurisprudence contemporaine, cette conception morale du contrat s’oppose visiblement à ce que l’exonération conventionnelle puisse servir à dégager un contractant de l’inexécution d’une obligation essentielle. / Party autonomy still remains, thankfully, one of the key foundations of civil contract law. The principles of contractual freedom and of the binding force of contracts leave the contracting parties with the choice of defining the different parameters and terms of implementation of their agreement, including a provision for the limitation or even the exclusion of liability arising from a breach of contract. However, freedom has its limits. Since the adoption of the Civil Code of Quebec, this freedom must necessarily be considered within the context of a moral philosophy of the contractual relationship. The subject of the present thesis thus raises the question of whether the contracting parties’ autonomy goes as far as allowing them to release themselves from an essential obligation within the contractual relationship. Firstly, we shall study the main legal concepts raised by this issue: the exclusion of liability clause, on the one hand, and the concept of essential obligation, on the other. Secondly, we shall see to what extent the principles of contractual freedom and binding force of contract are likely to justify the enforcement of an exclusion clause in the event of a fundamental breach of contract, first under the Civil Code of Lower Canada, then under the Civil Code of Quebec. The last part of the study will be dedicated to the impact of contractual morality within the Civil Code of Quebec on the exclusion of liability clause. In light of contemporary jurisprudence, the moral conception of the contract clearly conflicts with using the exemption clause to release a party in the event of his or her breach of an essential obligation.