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The President's agenda position-taking, legislative support, and the persistence of time /Anderson, William David, January 2005 (has links)
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2005. / Title from first page of PDF file. Document formatted into pages; contains x, 255 p.; also includes graphics. Includes bibliographical references (p. 243-255). Available online via OhioLINK's ETD Center
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The commander's sword & the executive's pen presidential success in congress and the use of force /Ragland, James Deen. Greig, James Michael, January 2007 (has links)
Thesis (M.S.)--University of North Texas, Aug., 2007. / Title from title page display. Includes bibliographical references.
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Battles as information domestic observers, the executive, and cost-benefit assessments during war /Grady, Kristopher Barrett. January 2008 (has links)
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Michigan State University. Dept. of Political Science, 2008. / Title from PDF t.p. (viewed on Aug. 19, 2009) Includes bibliographical references (p. 263-280). Also issued in print.
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Coalizões governamentais sobredimensionadas na América Latina, 1979-2012Meireles, Fernando January 2015 (has links)
Nos últimos anos, a maior parte da literatura sobre as relações executivo-legislativo em sistemas presidencialistas vem enfatizando o papel da formação de coalizões governamentais, através da distribuição de ministérios, na obtenção de maiorias legislativas. Contudo, essas coalizões formadas raramente são iguais, já que umas são maiores e, por causa disso, mais propensas à problemas coordenativos e de agência. Mas o que explica a decisão de um presidente de incluir mais ou menos partidos em seu gabinete? Com um banco de dados original contendo informações sobre 168 coalizões na América Latina entre 1979 e 2012, este artigo testa algumas das hipóteses correntes sobre o fenômeno. Entre outros, os resultados mostram que legislativos fortes e efetivos, presidentes que dispõem de maiores poderes legislativos e maior fragmentação partidária aumentam a probabilidade de ocorrência de coalizões sobredimensionadas em diversas especificações. / Research on executive-legislative relations in presidential systems have emphasized how presidents use cabinet appointments to form and manage government coalitions in the absence of majority legislative support. Yet not all coalitions look alike, as some are bigger and, consequently, more prone to agency and coordination problems than others. But what shapes presidents’ decision to include more or less parties in their coalitions? While several hypotheses exist in the literature, few have been tested in a systematic fashion, none focusing on why surplus coalitions form. This paper intends to fill this gap by examining an original time-series cross-sectional dataset comprising 168 unique coalitions in all 18 Latin American presidential countries since 1979. In particular, I find that strong and effective assemblies, presidents with great legislative powers and high levels of party fragmentation are associated with oversized coalitions in different model specifications.
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Coalizões governamentais sobredimensionadas na América Latina, 1979-2012Meireles, Fernando January 2015 (has links)
Nos últimos anos, a maior parte da literatura sobre as relações executivo-legislativo em sistemas presidencialistas vem enfatizando o papel da formação de coalizões governamentais, através da distribuição de ministérios, na obtenção de maiorias legislativas. Contudo, essas coalizões formadas raramente são iguais, já que umas são maiores e, por causa disso, mais propensas à problemas coordenativos e de agência. Mas o que explica a decisão de um presidente de incluir mais ou menos partidos em seu gabinete? Com um banco de dados original contendo informações sobre 168 coalizões na América Latina entre 1979 e 2012, este artigo testa algumas das hipóteses correntes sobre o fenômeno. Entre outros, os resultados mostram que legislativos fortes e efetivos, presidentes que dispõem de maiores poderes legislativos e maior fragmentação partidária aumentam a probabilidade de ocorrência de coalizões sobredimensionadas em diversas especificações. / Research on executive-legislative relations in presidential systems have emphasized how presidents use cabinet appointments to form and manage government coalitions in the absence of majority legislative support. Yet not all coalitions look alike, as some are bigger and, consequently, more prone to agency and coordination problems than others. But what shapes presidents’ decision to include more or less parties in their coalitions? While several hypotheses exist in the literature, few have been tested in a systematic fashion, none focusing on why surplus coalitions form. This paper intends to fill this gap by examining an original time-series cross-sectional dataset comprising 168 unique coalitions in all 18 Latin American presidential countries since 1979. In particular, I find that strong and effective assemblies, presidents with great legislative powers and high levels of party fragmentation are associated with oversized coalitions in different model specifications.
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Coalizões governamentais sobredimensionadas na América Latina, 1979-2012Meireles, Fernando January 2015 (has links)
Nos últimos anos, a maior parte da literatura sobre as relações executivo-legislativo em sistemas presidencialistas vem enfatizando o papel da formação de coalizões governamentais, através da distribuição de ministérios, na obtenção de maiorias legislativas. Contudo, essas coalizões formadas raramente são iguais, já que umas são maiores e, por causa disso, mais propensas à problemas coordenativos e de agência. Mas o que explica a decisão de um presidente de incluir mais ou menos partidos em seu gabinete? Com um banco de dados original contendo informações sobre 168 coalizões na América Latina entre 1979 e 2012, este artigo testa algumas das hipóteses correntes sobre o fenômeno. Entre outros, os resultados mostram que legislativos fortes e efetivos, presidentes que dispõem de maiores poderes legislativos e maior fragmentação partidária aumentam a probabilidade de ocorrência de coalizões sobredimensionadas em diversas especificações. / Research on executive-legislative relations in presidential systems have emphasized how presidents use cabinet appointments to form and manage government coalitions in the absence of majority legislative support. Yet not all coalitions look alike, as some are bigger and, consequently, more prone to agency and coordination problems than others. But what shapes presidents’ decision to include more or less parties in their coalitions? While several hypotheses exist in the literature, few have been tested in a systematic fashion, none focusing on why surplus coalitions form. This paper intends to fill this gap by examining an original time-series cross-sectional dataset comprising 168 unique coalitions in all 18 Latin American presidential countries since 1979. In particular, I find that strong and effective assemblies, presidents with great legislative powers and high levels of party fragmentation are associated with oversized coalitions in different model specifications.
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Cross-avenue politics the case of Colombia and Brazil /Pachon Buitrago, Monica. January 2008 (has links)
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2008. / Title from first page of PDF file (viewed September 23, 2008). Available via ProQuest Digital Dissertations. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 166-174).
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Social mobilisation and the pure presidential democracies of Latin AmericaLopez Garcia, Ana Isabel January 2014 (has links)
This thesis seeks for an explanation of social mobilisation by examining the nuts and bolts of the institutional design of democracies. Since the nature of executive-legislative relations in democracy is an important influence on the distribution of policy outcomes between actors in society, and consequently on the extent of support (or inclusion) of citizens to the way power is exercised, the present work investigates how pure presidentialism (and the whole range of institutional accessories that can be combined with this particular executive) affects the opportunities and constraints for social mobilisation. This is done by conducting a within-format comparison across pure presidential regimes in Latin America, where most pure presidential regimes are located. The thesis is grounded in both quantitative and qualitative methods of research. Quantitatively, protest events are measured across time and space and the parameters are estimated through pooled cross-sectional time-series models for count data. Qualitatively, three case studies are examined: Bolivia (electoral rules), Ecuador (non-legislative and legislative presidential power) and Venezuela (party system). The main findings of this study are: Within presidential systems social mobilisation is more likely to occur whenever: (1) presidents are selected in runoff elections in the assembly, and (2) constitutions allow the immediate re-election of the president. However, the prospects for social mobilisation are not significantly affected by the extent to which electoral formulae promote the entry of parties to the assembly. As regards to the relative powers of the presidency and the legislature, the extent of the decree and veto powers of the president do not affect the occurrence of social mobilisation. Instead, the probability of contentious action is greater whenever (3) the capacity of legislatures to censure and sanction the members of the executive is low; and (4) legislatures have weak authority over public spending. Lastly, it is shown that the probability of social mobilisation does not vary across majoritarian and minority governments; neither is social mobilisation susceptible to the levels of electoral volatility in the legislature. Rather, (5) social mobilisation is highest whenever the pro-presidential contingent in the legislature is dominated by one large political party. The thesis thus concludes by strongly advocating for the inclusion of the format of the executive as an important variable in the comparative study of social mobilisation and of the substantive outputs of a democracy, in general.
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Relações executivo-legislativo nas províncias argentinas: delegação parlamentar e sucesso dos governadores / Executive-legislative relations in Argentinean provinces: parliamentary delegation and governors successBarrientos, Miguel 10 August 2015 (has links)
O objetivo deste trabalho é analisar as relações entre o Poder Executivo e o Poder Legislativo em nível provincial na Argentina. Tanto estas relações entre os poderes do Estado quanto a esfera estadual colocam-se como temas de relevância nos estudos de ciência política na atualidade, que analisam os sistemas presidencialistas em diferentes níveis. O federalismo e o presidencialismo são matérias recorrentes nos estudos sobre as instituições na Argentina. Os debates enfatizam o papel que o presidente tem na dinâmica das interações entre os entes e os poderes, ora na esfera nacional, ora nas próprias províncias. Tradicionalmente, as análises levavam em consideração um predomínio do executivo e da administração federal em distintas esferas, supondo que o legislativo era um simples homologador das decisões executivas e colocando um véu no que realmente se passava tanto nas arenas legislativas quanto nos níveis provinciais. Um novo grupo de estudos demonstrou, através de análises da produção legislativa, que o presidente argentino não é todo-poderoso, encontra empecilhos em sua relação com o legislativo, e só consegue aprovar metade das propostas que encaminha ao parlamento nacional, evidenciando que não há tal predomínio de um poder sobre o outro. Seguindo estes trabalhos, assim como a literatura que trata sobre a temática, a presente tese busca novos enfoques para estudar o que acontece no presidencialismo estadual na Argentina. Estudam-se os projetos de lei ingressados nas câmaras baixas provinciais e as taxas de sucesso que parlamentares e governadores conseguem em sua aprovação. Compara-se o comportamento dos atores nos trabalhos legislativos, levando em consideração os poderes constitucionalmente conferidos a eles, as regras eleitorais para os cargos executivos e legislativos, a estruturação do Poder Legislativo em uma ou duas câmaras, o tamanho das bases governistas e a organização interna do legislativo em forma mais e menos centralizada. Usando estes fatores que incentivam maior ou menor produção legislativa por parte de governadores e parlamentares, busca-se esclarecer o papel que eles cumprem no processo decisório das províncias argentinas. / The main objective of this thesis is to analyze the relations between Executive and Legislative powers in the Argentinean provinces. Nowadays, these relations between the powers of the State in those two spheres of government are relevant subjects in the Political Science studies, which analyze presidential system at different levels. The federalism and presidentialism are frequent topics in the papers of Argentinean institutional analysis. The interactions between the spheres and powers at national or provincial levels are fundamental debates that emphasize the center role of the President in the power relation dynamics. Traditionally, scholars presupposed a predominance of federal Executive and administration. They assume that Legislative was a simple approval agency of Executive decisions, putting a veil in what really happened in both legislative and provincial levels. Recently studies demonstrate, using a legislative production analysis that Argentinean President is not almighty, as was thought to be. They found obstacles in the relation between the Executive and Legislative power, and demonstrate that the success rate rise about to the half of the bills, showing that there is no dominance of one power over another. Following these researches and the literature on the issue, this thesis looks for new approaches to study the provincial presidentialism in Argentina. The success rates of the bills presented by Governors and representatives to the provincial low chambers are used here as performance indicators. This work compares the behavior of actors at legislative office, taking into account their constitutional instruments, the electoral rules to executive and legislative positions, the difference between the legislative structure (one or two chambers), the parliamentary group of the official coalition, and the internal legislative organization depending on a more or less centralized way. It pretends to achieve their role in decision process at Argentinean provinces using all these factors that incentive Governors and representatives to higher or lower legislative production.
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Relações executivo-legislativo nas províncias argentinas: delegação parlamentar e sucesso dos governadores / Executive-legislative relations in Argentinean provinces: parliamentary delegation and governors successMiguel Barrientos 10 August 2015 (has links)
O objetivo deste trabalho é analisar as relações entre o Poder Executivo e o Poder Legislativo em nível provincial na Argentina. Tanto estas relações entre os poderes do Estado quanto a esfera estadual colocam-se como temas de relevância nos estudos de ciência política na atualidade, que analisam os sistemas presidencialistas em diferentes níveis. O federalismo e o presidencialismo são matérias recorrentes nos estudos sobre as instituições na Argentina. Os debates enfatizam o papel que o presidente tem na dinâmica das interações entre os entes e os poderes, ora na esfera nacional, ora nas próprias províncias. Tradicionalmente, as análises levavam em consideração um predomínio do executivo e da administração federal em distintas esferas, supondo que o legislativo era um simples homologador das decisões executivas e colocando um véu no que realmente se passava tanto nas arenas legislativas quanto nos níveis provinciais. Um novo grupo de estudos demonstrou, através de análises da produção legislativa, que o presidente argentino não é todo-poderoso, encontra empecilhos em sua relação com o legislativo, e só consegue aprovar metade das propostas que encaminha ao parlamento nacional, evidenciando que não há tal predomínio de um poder sobre o outro. Seguindo estes trabalhos, assim como a literatura que trata sobre a temática, a presente tese busca novos enfoques para estudar o que acontece no presidencialismo estadual na Argentina. Estudam-se os projetos de lei ingressados nas câmaras baixas provinciais e as taxas de sucesso que parlamentares e governadores conseguem em sua aprovação. Compara-se o comportamento dos atores nos trabalhos legislativos, levando em consideração os poderes constitucionalmente conferidos a eles, as regras eleitorais para os cargos executivos e legislativos, a estruturação do Poder Legislativo em uma ou duas câmaras, o tamanho das bases governistas e a organização interna do legislativo em forma mais e menos centralizada. Usando estes fatores que incentivam maior ou menor produção legislativa por parte de governadores e parlamentares, busca-se esclarecer o papel que eles cumprem no processo decisório das províncias argentinas. / The main objective of this thesis is to analyze the relations between Executive and Legislative powers in the Argentinean provinces. Nowadays, these relations between the powers of the State in those two spheres of government are relevant subjects in the Political Science studies, which analyze presidential system at different levels. The federalism and presidentialism are frequent topics in the papers of Argentinean institutional analysis. The interactions between the spheres and powers at national or provincial levels are fundamental debates that emphasize the center role of the President in the power relation dynamics. Traditionally, scholars presupposed a predominance of federal Executive and administration. They assume that Legislative was a simple approval agency of Executive decisions, putting a veil in what really happened in both legislative and provincial levels. Recently studies demonstrate, using a legislative production analysis that Argentinean President is not almighty, as was thought to be. They found obstacles in the relation between the Executive and Legislative power, and demonstrate that the success rate rise about to the half of the bills, showing that there is no dominance of one power over another. Following these researches and the literature on the issue, this thesis looks for new approaches to study the provincial presidentialism in Argentina. The success rates of the bills presented by Governors and representatives to the provincial low chambers are used here as performance indicators. This work compares the behavior of actors at legislative office, taking into account their constitutional instruments, the electoral rules to executive and legislative positions, the difference between the legislative structure (one or two chambers), the parliamentary group of the official coalition, and the internal legislative organization depending on a more or less centralized way. It pretends to achieve their role in decision process at Argentinean provinces using all these factors that incentive Governors and representatives to higher or lower legislative production.
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