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Prior research has demonstrated that CEO behavior influences how people perceive corporations and that CEOs associated with controversy can damage corporate reputations. Research also illustrates that attitudes based on prescribed racial and gender characteristics render Black and female CEOs as incongruent with leadership positions. The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of two different corporate errors as justification factors leading to prejudicial evaluations of leaders with stigmatized identities (e.g., race and gender), with a particular emphasis on the intersection of race and gender on leader- and organization-based evaluations. Participants were randomly assigned to one of 12 corporate conditions ([CEO race: white v. black] x [CEO gender: male v. female] x [Corporate error: no error v. diversity error v. non-diversity error]) and assessed to provide responses via an online experiment. Although results revealed a significant main effect of corporate error on leader and organization perceptions, there was no evidence of an interactive effect of CEO race and gender on leader and organization perceptions. Furthermore, the non-significant interaction of race and gender was not impacted by the context of the corporate error. I discuss theoretical and practical implications, study limitations, and avenues for future research.

The research conducted for this thesis had two broad aims. The first was to provide descriptive information about the use of computer-based information systems (CBIS) in regional small business. The second of the aims was to examine the relationships among key constructs identified from the literature and to explore how they contributed to predicting CBIS success in regional small business.In the second phase of the analysis, Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) was used to examine the factorial constructs underlying the data. Constructs were identified that measured CEO characteristics, two measuring organisational characteristics, four measuring aspects of decision-making, and five measuring perceived CBIS success. Correlations among the constructs were examined prior to relationships among the constructs being explored using hierarchical regression analysis. The constructs were also examined in a single measurement model to determine their collective effect and relationships with the constructs measuring CBIS success based on structural equation modelling. Notwithstanding the limitations of the research, it resulted in the identification of relationships among key variables that predict CBIS success. The identification of items associated with decision-making processes, and the identification of the factorial constructs underlying the data is a major contribution to a portion of the literature that was non-existent. The final measurement model is also a significant contribution in identifying and specifying the relationships constructs measuring CEO characteristics, organisational characteristics, decision-making and CBIS success in regional small business. / Doctor of Philosphy (PhD)

Critics often cite poor executive compensation schemes as one of the leading causes of the recent credit crisis. This paper investigates whether compensation structures at the end of the 2006 fiscal year created incentives for Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) in the oil industry to take on excessive risk, which subsequently may have lead to weaker firm performance during the crisis. I find no evidence to support the argument that higher pay sensitivity through option and other incentive awards lead to worse firm performance. In fact, results do not provide any evidence that company performance during the crisis was related to CEO incentives.

The compensation of CEO’s has been at the forefront of the public’s mind for the past few years. During the recession, one could not go a day without hearing about the atrocious salaries and bonuses that executives were being paid. Although it only recently became an explosive topic, academics have been researching all aspects of compensation for many years. One of the earliest looked at the idea of pay for performance (Jensen and Murphy 1990), and the field has taken off from there. Many studies have been done on the determinants of compensation, and I was interested in how age relates to compensation. I created a model for determining compensation, but also took it one step further and looked at the compensation structure across different industries as well. I found that age did indeed influence compensation levels, but that it only had some effect on pay structure and only in certain industries.

Educational Specialist research project (Educational Specialist Degree)--University of Dayton. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 44-46).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, Graduate School of Business, June 2001. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.

China’s investments in R&D are forecast to surpass those of the US in 2022, thereby attracting capital, innovation and a large number of returnee managers. In the past eight years alone, the number of returnees has increased five-fold, with the country’s high-tech parks, particularly Beijing’s Z-Park, also known as China’s Silicon Valley or the Silicon Valley of the East, proving considerable attractions. In this context, in which start-ups are vital for economic growth and for the further development of Chinese investments in leading-edge innovation, understanding how the significant cultural differences between returnee and local managers affect management control systems (MCS) is of key importance. Drawing on a survey of more than 200 companies and data from 435 one-to-one interviews, this study investigates the relationship between CEO characteristics, government financial support and MCS sophistication in the context of fast-growing high-tech enterprises in China’s Silicon Valley. The study develops an MCS sophistication index as an aggregate measure of six main factors (the importance of MCS to the firm, system structure, system operations, system completeness, frequency of use and the level of data aggregation), and measures MCS sophistication by 46 individual management control subsystems. The study predicts and verifies a positive relationship between CEO and firm international exposure and between CEO education and the level of MCS sophistication. It also predicts and verifies a positive relationship between government financial support and MCS sophistication in a context in which privately held and managed venture capital and banks provide such support. The study further analyses the interaction effect of government financial support and CEO characteristics on MCS sophistication. Its empirical findings suggest that, despite their cultural differences, neither local nor returnee managers feel the need for better MCS. Only when there is potential access to government funding do returnee managers have better tools to implement more sophisticated MCS than their local counterparts, thus underlining how international work experience provides Chinese managers with the tools, but not the mindset, for superior MCS. Most previous studies focus on listed companies in China, whereas this study constitutes one of the first to focus on start-ups using an extensive array of data. It also contributes to the definition of a more systematic MCS sophistication measure, thus allowing more complete analysis of MCS at the firm level. Improving upon previous studies, the research reported herein also encompasses a large set of CEO characteristics to analyse their interaction with government financial support, thereby contributing to a better understanding of MCS in a key area of China’s future development. / published_or_final_version / Economics and Finance / Doctoral / Doctor of Philosophy

This thesis investigates how chief executive officer (CEO) equity incentives affect the remediation of material weaknesses (MWs) in internal control. First, we predict that the sensitivity of CEO stock and stock option portfolios to stock price (CEO price sensitivity or delta) has a positive impact on firm promptness in remedying MWs, because CEOs whose personal wealth is tied to stock price suffer losses from negative market reactions to the public disclosure of MWs. Second, we predict that the sensitivity of CEO stock option portfolio to stock-return volatility (CEO volatility sensitivity or vega) has a negative impact on firm promptness in remedying MWs, as firms with internal control weaknesses are associated with higher information and operating risks that manifest in stock return volatility. Our empirical results, based on a sample of firms disclosing MWs in internal control under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) during November 15, 2003 and August 27, 2006, are consistent with the above predictions. We further provide evidence that an effective board of directors could mitigate the undesirable, negative impact of CEO volatility sensitivity on MWs remediation. We measure firms’ promptness in remedying MWs based on their subsequent internal control audit opinions (e.g., Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2008; Goh 2009); and CEO price (volatility) sensitivity as the dollar change in CEO stock and option portfolios (option portfolio) from a 1 percent change in stock price (Core and Guay 2002). This thesis is innovative with respect to the prediction and evidence of the opposing effects from CEO price and volatility sensitivities on internal control quality. This new evidence contributes to the literature that examines managerial incentives embedded in stock-based and option-based compensation plans in various economic contexts (e.g., Knopf et al. 2002; Coles et al. 2006; Low 2009; Armstrong et al. 2013). Our findings suggest that when stock constitutes a major part of CEO compensation, the mandatory disclosure requirement of SOX provides a channel for the stock market to discipline CEO. However, when options dominate CEO compensation, volatility sensitivity and the associated risk-taking incentive can cause CEOs to delay rectifying internal control deficiencies. These results have interesting policy implications for regulators and firms concerning mandatory disclosure and compensation design. Moreover, this thesis contributes to the broad literature on corporate governance by documenting an interaction between corporate governance and CEO incentives, namely that strong corporate governance mitigates the undesirable risking-taking incentive caused by CEO option holdings. Overall, this thesis deepens our understanding on mechanisms through which regulators, firm executives, and boards of directors strengthen internal control over financial reporting in the post-SOX era. / published_or_final_version / Business / Doctoral / Doctor of Philosophy

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