稀土作為國防工業和科技產品之主要原料，因其材質具有特殊性及不可替代性，故原料供給來源之穩定有其重要性。目前全球稀土90％以上皆產於中國，然中國近年來積極地對於稀土之開採及出口，透過配額及許可證、出口關稅、價格控制、開採量限制等，對稀土採取管制措施，造成各國製造能源科技設備原料短缺，而引發美國、日本、歐盟等科技產品製造大國的不滿。 本文以GATT 1994及中國入會議定書對貨品貿易所作之承諾，作為分析中國稀土出口限制政策之法律依據，並主要參考「中國－原物料案（China-Raw Materials）」之小組裁決，輔以「中國－視聽服務案（China- Audiovisual Services）」之裁決，探究違反中國入會議定書承諾之稀土出口管制措施，是否有援用GATT 1994第20條一般例外條款之正當性，並對於中國稀土出口管制政策於WTO規範下之適法性進行分析，最後作出結論。 / The rare earths are essential for many hundreds of applications. The versatility and specificity of the rare earths has given them a level of technological, environmental, and economic importance considerably greater than might be expected from their relative obscurity. China supplies over 90 percent of rare earths globally, but has applied a series of restraints to limit the exportation and production of rare earths, including export duties and export quotas, and price and production control , leadind to raise serious concerns among industry in the U.S., Japan and European Unions. This thesis takes GATT 1994 and the Protocol of the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter China’s Accession Protocal) as the legal basis to analyze China’s rare earths export restriction measures. And in order to examine whether these dispute measures are pursuant to the WTO’s agreements, and whether Article XX of the GATT 1994 is available as a defense under China’s Accession Protocal, this thesis takes China-Raw Materials and China- Audiovisual Services’s ruling as the main references, and providing the conclusion of the study.

Performance requirements act as policy instruments for achieving broadly-defined economic and developmental objectives of States, especially industrial and technological development objectives. Many States consider that performance requirements distort trade and investment flows, negatively impact global and national welfare and disrupt investment decisions compared to business-as-usual scenarios. As a result, a number of States have committed to prohibiting performance requirements in international investment agreements (“IIAs.”). Performance requirement prohibitions (“PRPs”) are meant to eliminate trade-distorting performance requirements and performance requirements which replace investor decision-making by State decision-making. This thesis focuses on providing answers to two research questions: first, how do States prohibit performance requirements in IIAs? And second, how should PRPs in IIAs be interpreted and applied? For the first time, this thesis: proposes a comprehensive understanding of PRPs in IIAs by drawing notably on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) Uruguay Round of negotiations and on the United States Bilateral Investment Treaty (“BIT”) Programme; develops a detailed typology and analysis of PRPs in IIAs through the identification of systematically reproduced drafting patterns; conducts the first critical and in-depth analysis of all arbitral awards which have decided claims based on PRPs in IIAs; analyses interpretation and application issues related to provisions that exempt government procurement from PRPs and to reservations that shield sensitive non-conforming measures or strategically important sectors from PRPs; and anticipates the application of most-favoured nation (“MFN”) treatment clauses to PRPs in the future. Finally, this thesis formulates proposals that can help interpret and apply existing PRPs and draft future PRPs in a more deliberate and informed way.