國際貿易是經濟發展的重要手段之一，然而無論在開發中或已開發國家，貿易商皆面臨貿易流程的繁文縟節。隨著各國的關稅逐漸降低，業者進行國際貿易時的貿易成本甚至已超過關稅成本。因此，有望透過貿易便捷化來簡化貿易程序，降低貿易成本。 　近年來，兩岸貿易依存度日益提高，中國大陸更成為台灣最大的出口市場。兩岸各自推動的貿易便捷化皆獲得相當成效，然法規不透明為目前中國大陸對台最嚴重之非關稅障礙，而法規透明化又是貿易便捷化工作的其中一環，因此法規透明化為當前亟需進行之貿易便捷化工作。 由於兩岸皆為世界貿易組織會員，且貿易便捷化已納入WTO的談判架構，而GATT 1994第十條（貿易法令之公布與施行）亦揭示法規透明化乃世界貿易組織協定重要原則，因此本文檢視兩岸的法規公布、措施通知、提供草案評論、回覆諮詢、正當程序和司法救濟等透明化之世界貿易組織義務，作為兩岸法規透明化程度的衡量指標。 透明化雖然是內部即可進行之工作，但由於透明化的重要性不受中國大陸重視，因此其透明化成效有限。為解決此問題，有待建立法規透明化的兩岸合作機制，而該機制之完善將使兩岸業者受惠，雙方政府基於互惠立場，會使兩岸業者獲得更大幅公開的政府資訊，所適用行政程序中的相關權利更受到保障。 / International trade is important to economics, while there are plenty of red tape still existing in moving goods across borders, whether in developing or development countries. Following the decreasing of tariff barriers, trade costs to traders are much more than tariff costs. Therefore, it is necessary to cut down the trade cost by trade facilitation. Recently, cross-strait trade relationship is closer and Mainland China has become the biggest trade partner of Taiwan. The cross-strait development of trade facilitation is significant, but the greatest trade barrier between is non-transparency. Since transparency of trade policy is part of trade facilitation programs, the authorities have to improve the transparency of trade policies. China and Taiwan are the members of the WTO, and WTO Members agreed to launch negotiations on trade facilitation several years ago. Besides, Article X of the GATT 1994 provides that transparency is also the principle of the WTO Agreements. Transparency obligations in WTO include publication of trade policies, notification on measures, providing the opportunity for prior comments, responding to requests for information, due process of administrative procedures and ensuring the right of review and appeal. This article aims at assessing the compliance of China and Taiwan with WTO obligations in transparency. Because the importance of transparency, which can be improved unilaterally, is neglected by China, efforts paid to this transparency issue limited. To solve this problem, it is necessary to establish a cross-strait cooperation mechanism that benefits the traders in both China and Taiwan. Accordingly, the authorities would take reciprocal actions on opening information of the government and ensuring the rights of administrative procedures in a larger extent.

This study discusses how the World Trade Organization could promote the development of an international gas market by playing a more prominent role in regulating rights essential to effective pipeline gas transit. Gas transit is network-dependent in the sense that it cannot be established without the existence of pipeline infrastructure in the territory of a transit State and the ability to access this infrastructure. Nevertheless, at an inter-regional level, there are no sufficient pipeline networks that would allow gas to travel freely from a supplier to the most lucrative markets. The existing networks are often operated by either private or State-controlled vertically-integrated monopolies that are usually reluctant to release unused pipeline capacity to their potential competitors. These obstacles diminish the gains from trade for States endowed with scarce and relatively immobile natural resources, such as gas, including developing land-locked countries that rely on revenues from gas exports. These obstacles can also undermine Members’ energy security and their sustainable development achieved by shifting domestic production from dirty fuels to cleaner energy sources – namely gas. From a technical perspective, gas transit can be established by invoking what is referred to in this study as ‘third-party access’ and/or ‘capacity establishment’ rights. The first main question that this thesis analyses is, therefore, whether, and, if so, how these rights are regulated by WTO rules relevant to transit, including: GATT Article V:2 (first and second sentences) establishing the principles of freedom of transit and non-discrimination, the ‘non-violation complaint’ provision under GATT Article XXIII:1(b), and the GATS. This question has not been answered by WTO panels or examined sufficiently by scholars. The key contribution of this study to the existing academic literature on energy transit lies in the fact that this study analyses the above rules through the prism of systemic integration of WTO law sources with other relevant rules of public international law, including principles of general international law and treaties regulating transit. By contrast, previous researchers discussed the regulation of third-party access and capacity establishment rights from a limited perspective of WTO law. The second main question examined in this study is how WTO transit rules could be improved through a legislative reform to regulate particular aspects of trade in pipeline gas better – namely third-party access and capacity establishment rights. This question is answered by exploring two options: the codification of the existing principles of general international law relevant to these rights in the WTO legal system and the progressive development of WTO transit rules through the expansion of additional commitments of Members on energy services under the GATS. While this study analyses the relationship between WTO transit obligations and inherent ancillary rights (namely third-party access and capacity establishment rights) implied in these obligations in the context of trade in pipeline gas, the conclusions reached here may have practical application in other areas of network-bound trade, such as trade in electric power.

稀土作為國防工業和科技產品之主要原料，因其材質具有特殊性及不可替代性，故原料供給來源之穩定有其重要性。目前全球稀土90％以上皆產於中國，然中國近年來積極地對於稀土之開採及出口，透過配額及許可證、出口關稅、價格控制、開採量限制等，對稀土採取管制措施，造成各國製造能源科技設備原料短缺，而引發美國、日本、歐盟等科技產品製造大國的不滿。 本文以GATT 1994及中國入會議定書對貨品貿易所作之承諾，作為分析中國稀土出口限制政策之法律依據，並主要參考「中國－原物料案（China-Raw Materials）」之小組裁決，輔以「中國－視聽服務案（China- Audiovisual Services）」之裁決，探究違反中國入會議定書承諾之稀土出口管制措施，是否有援用GATT 1994第20條一般例外條款之正當性，並對於中國稀土出口管制政策於WTO規範下之適法性進行分析，最後作出結論。 / The rare earths are essential for many hundreds of applications. The versatility and specificity of the rare earths has given them a level of technological, environmental, and economic importance considerably greater than might be expected from their relative obscurity. China supplies over 90 percent of rare earths globally, but has applied a series of restraints to limit the exportation and production of rare earths, including export duties and export quotas, and price and production control , leadind to raise serious concerns among industry in the U.S., Japan and European Unions. This thesis takes GATT 1994 and the Protocol of the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter China’s Accession Protocal) as the legal basis to analyze China’s rare earths export restriction measures. And in order to examine whether these dispute measures are pursuant to the WTO’s agreements, and whether Article XX of the GATT 1994 is available as a defense under China’s Accession Protocal, this thesis takes China-Raw Materials and China- Audiovisual Services’s ruling as the main references, and providing the conclusion of the study.

<p>The Central African Monetary and Economic Community, known by its French acronym CEMAC (Communaut&eacute / Economique et Mon&eacute / taire de l&rsquo / Afrique Centrale), is one of the oldest regional economic blocs in the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of states. Its membership comprises of Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon. It has a population of over 32 million inhabitants in a three million (3 million) square kilometre expanse of land. The changes in the world economy, and especially between the ACP countries, on the one hand, and the European Economic Community-EEC (hereinafter referred to as European Union (EU)), on the other hand, did not leave the CEMAC region unaffected. CEMAC region, like any other regional economic blocs in Africa was faced with the need to readjust in the face of a New International Economic Order (NIEO). The region which had benefited from preferential access to the EU market including financial assistance through the European Development Fund (EDF) had to comply with the rules laid down in the World Trade Organisation (WTO). This eventually led to a shift in the EU trade policy, in order to ensure that its trade preferences to developing countries were compatible to the rules and obligations of the WTO.</p>

<p>The Central African Monetary and Economic Community, known by its French acronym CEMAC (Communaut&eacute / Economique et Mon&eacute / taire de l&rsquo / Afrique Centrale), is one of the oldest regional economic blocs in the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of states. Its membership comprises of Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon. It has a population of over 32 million inhabitants in a three million (3 million) square kilometre expanse of land. The changes in the world economy, and especially between the ACP countries, on the one hand, and the European Economic Community-EEC (hereinafter referred to as European Union (EU)), on the other hand, did not leave the CEMAC region unaffected. CEMAC region, like any other regional economic blocs in Africa was faced with the need to readjust in the face of a New International Economic Order (NIEO). The region which had benefited from preferential access to the EU market including financial assistance through the European Development Fund (EDF) had to comply with the rules laid down in the World Trade Organisation (WTO). This eventually led to a shift in the EU trade policy, in order to ensure that its trade preferences to developing countries were compatible to the rules and obligations of the WTO.</p>

Magister Legum - LLM / South Africa