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The determinants of foreign direct investment during transition from a centrally-planned to a market economy: the cases of Bulgaria and HungaryNestorova, Petya January 1999 (has links)
This thesis examines the factors which have influenced the inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) to Bulgaria and Hungary since 1989, in the course of their transitions from centrallyplanned to market economies. It compares two countries that are similar in terms of their market size, industrial structure and openness of the economy (although different in other aspects). In so doing, the thesis seeks explanations of the marked divergence in their FDI patterns. It argues that the timing and scope of inward FDI in Bulgaria and Hungary, and central and eastern Europe more generally, depend upon the progress of transition. More specifically, the pattern of FDI depends upon the changes that transition introduces in the recipient countries' locational advantages. Moreover, the path and pace of transition are also influenced by the scale and characteristics ofFDI inflows. Dunning's eclectic paradigm of international production is used as the conceptual framework underlying the work. The comparison between Bulgaria and Hungary is done both through analysing macro statistical data on their actual FDI patterns, and by means of a survey and interviews with companies which have invested in the two countries. The survey researches a set of location-specific advantages, investors' strategic motivations, the investment process and the impact of the investment on the host economy. The results of the survey and the interviews highlight the importance of location-specific advantages moulded in the process of transition, in relation to the long-term strategies of foreign investors. The thesis argues that Hungary has attracted a much higher level ofFDI than Bulgaria because it has moved faster, and more effectively, towards an economic system based on a market economy. This argument is supported through an analysis of the two countries' legislative frameworks for FDI, their privatisation programmes and competition policies. The thesis also draws contrasts between their macro-economic and business environments, their political climates, and the conditions influencing the formation of investors' perceptions. These comparisons highlight shortcomings in the Bulgarian FDI environment relative to that of Hungary, in particular in the areas of privatisation, competition and general business conditions.
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Market transparency /Nilsson, Arvid, January 1900 (has links)
Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögsk., 2001.
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The politics of merger control in the EU and UKEyre, Sebastian Peter Thomas January 1999 (has links)
No description available.
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Essays on cartel policy with endogenous cartel sizeKalb, Jonas January 2018 (has links)
This thesis examines the role of endogenous size processes in the stability and price setting decisions of cartels. Chapter One analyses how the stability of cartels de- pends on the level of horizontal product differentiation and on costs of collusion under the premise that a cartel can consist of less than all firms in an industry. It is shown that when the size of the cartel is determined endogenously, it is possible that increased costs of collusion make a cartel more stable. Chapter Two analyses how the price setting of firms in collusive industries is affected by three different penalty regimes: i) profits, ii) overcharge, and iii) revenue based penalties. It is found that penalties influence price setting in two ways: directly, by affecting the industry price for a given cartel size and indirectly by affecting cartel size and thereby the price charged. When the penalties are equally tough, in the sense that they deter cartels over the same group of products, over- charge based penalties always lead to the lowest prices, followed by prices computed under profits based penalties and then revenue based penalties. For very few combinations of product differentiation and market size, revenue based penalties lead to lower prices than profits based penalties. Finally, Chapter Three presents a model in which collusive stability is analysed in a dynamic setting of free entry, exit and mergers. Contrary to the previous literature it shows that stable and profitable collusion is possible under free entry, without the need for cartels to play entry deterring strategies. Furthermore, the empirical evidence that a breakdown of collusion can lead to increased merger activity is replicated. An additional contribution of this model is that it defines a new notion of a long run sustainable competitive market size under merger and entry.
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Essai sur l'articulation entre économie, droit et politique de concurrence. Une analyse à partir de la stratégie du prix de prédation / Essay on the link between economices, law and competition policy.An analysis from predatory priceDeschamps, Marc 05 December 2013 (has links)
Cette thèse est une contribution à l'étude de la nécéssaire articulation entre théorie économique, droit et politique de la concurrence / This thesis is a contribution to the study of the necessqary link between economic theory, law and compétition polict
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Regulation of mergers by the UK competition authorities: the effects on shareholder value and management motivations for mergersArnold, Malcolm F. January 2007 (has links)
The UK competition authorities are responsible for regulating company mergers that
were originally considered to have adverse effects that were “against the public
interest”, or presently that could result in a “substantial lessening of competition”. The
research in this thesis examines wider economic side effects of this regulatory policy
that fall outside the remit of the competition authorities. Data on 63 merger cases that
were subject to the merger regulatory process by the UK competition authorities
between 1989 and 2002 are studied for effects on two economic aspects, shareholder
value and managers’ motivations to undertake mergers.
Some previous studies have suggested that competition regimes can destroy shareholder
value. The research in this thesis confirms the finding from earlier studies of greater
gains to shareholders in target rather than bidding companies, but does not find
evidence supporting overall loss of shareholder value to target company shareholders
when a merger is prohibited. It finds evidence that when the regulatory regime is stable
and well understood the capital market behaves efficiently in response to new
information. However, for a sub group of the mergers involving companies with a new
regulatory regime, of which industry and the market had little or no experience with
respect to mergers, the capital market operated less efficiently.
A number of studies have also considered the motivation of managers to follow a
merger strategy. Apparently, none has looked at the influence of competition regulation
on merger motives using stock market data and event study techniques. This research
examined data for the stock market’s perceptions of what motivated managers to pursue
their initial merger bid. The findings suggest that Synergy and Hubris dominate as
motivations for mergers and that, unintentionally, competition policy may help to
reduce the number of mergers motivated by Managerialism.
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Regulation of mergers by the UK competition authorities : the effects on shareholder value and management motivations for mergersArnold, Malcolm F. January 2007 (has links)
The UK competition authorities are responsible for regulating company mergers that were originally considered to have adverse effects that were “against the public interest”, or presently that could result in a “substantial lessening of competition”. The research in this thesis examines wider economic side effects of this regulatory policy that fall outside the remit of the competition authorities. Data on 63 merger cases that were subject to the merger regulatory process by the UK competition authorities between 1989 and 2002 are studied for effects on two economic aspects, shareholder value and managers’ motivations to undertake mergers. Some previous studies have suggested that competition regimes can destroy shareholder value. The research in this thesis confirms the finding from earlier studies of greater gains to shareholders in target rather than bidding companies, but does not find evidence supporting overall loss of shareholder value to target company shareholders when a merger is prohibited. It finds evidence that when the regulatory regime is stable and well understood the capital market behaves efficiently in response to new information. However, for a sub group of the mergers involving companies with a new regulatory regime, of which industry and the market had little or no experience with respect to mergers, the capital market operated less efficiently. A number of studies have also considered the motivation of managers to follow a merger strategy. Apparently, none has looked at the influence of competition regulation on merger motives using stock market data and event study techniques. This research examined data for the stock market’s perceptions of what motivated managers to pursue their initial merger bid. The findings suggest that Synergy and Hubris dominate as motivations for mergers and that, unintentionally, competition policy may help to reduce the number of mergers motivated by Managerialism.
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Ochrana hospodárskej súťaže a leniency program / Protection of Competition and the leniency programKrausová, Simona January 2013 (has links)
The diploma thesis addresses the issue of the effect of the introduction of leniency program and its reforms on the European competition policy and above all of its effect on investigation of forbidden cartel agreements. Leniency program is currently one of the main tools being implemented in fighting cartels. It works by providing immunity to the first company that provides relevant proof of the cartels existence. This work has three main goals. Firstly it aims to analyse the effectiveness of the leniency program and its reforms when it comes to uncovering cartels. The second goal is to unveil the European Commissions strategy concerning granting leniency and its development over the time. The last goal is to provide a quality analysis of all three forms of leniency and their mutual comparison. This diploma thesis is divided into four chapters: two theoretical and two practical chapters. The first one explains the issue of cartel agreements, individual types of cartels, investigation and its methods and the principals of imposing fines. The analysis of the leniency program itself, its introduction in 1996 and the following reforms in 2002 and 2006 will be the main topics of the second chapter. The third chapter contains the analysis of all Commissions decisions against cartels from 1993 till April 2016. It contains data relating to the development of number of decisions, the amount of fines, the size of the cartels and the percentage of the leniency granted in this period. The forth and the last chapter will focus on a case study of the LCD cartel and on the basis of theoretical findings contained in the first two chapters it will uncover the principles of this particular cartel and the investigation procedures.
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Consumer protection in the Hong Kong telecommunications sector : implications for competition policyCHEUNG, Ching Yi, Cherry 01 January 2007 (has links)
Competition policy is meant to ensure a level-playing in the market, but its ultimate goal is to enhance consumer interests. The telecommunications sector is one of the two sectors that have set up a competition policy in Hong Kong. This paper examines the current competition policy framework in the telecommunications sector by analyzing the level of consumer protection using the Structure-Conduct-Performance Paradigm. It examines in detail the consumer related complaint cases received by the Office of the Telecommunications Authority in four markets: fixed line telephone services, mobile phone services, International Direct Dialing services, and Internet services. Regression analysis results reveal that more competition in a market has a positive and significant effect on the frequency of complaints about misleading or deceptive conduct on the part of operators in the period from 1999 to 2006. Also, smaller and newer operators tend to receive more complaints. From the lessons we have drawn from the telecommunications sector, a more comprehensive policy coped with consumer protection regulation is needed in order to better promote consumer interests in Hong Kong.
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Competition policy and its effects on growth in South AfricaMohamed, Khalid January 2000 (has links)
Magister Administrationis - MAdmin / This paper aims to critically evaluate the New Competition Act of South Africa and further
suggests that this form of government policy tends to harm the economy more than the
benefits it reciprocates.
The first chapter provides a critical overview of the New Competition Act, Competition Act
NO.89 of 1998 which was signed into law on the 20 October 1998, but would only come into
force on the 1 September 1999.
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