Thesis (doctoral)--Ruprecht-Karl-Universität zu Heidelberg.

M.A. (Philosophy) / Usually when we think of law, we think of rationality and outcomes that are not swayed by emotion. Modern Western society tends to think of emotion and rationality as incompatible. It is a widely-held belief that it is more morally desirable for people to make ‘rational’ decisions rather than ‘emotional’ decisions in life in general. Perhaps in no other area is this distinction between the two more pronounced as in criminal law, where judges who society considers to be making ‘rational’ judicial decisions are revered, and those who society at large considers to be making ‘emotional’ judicial decisions are distrusted. As Terry Maroney (2006: 120) says, “[a] core presumption underlying modern legality is that reason and emotion are different beasts entirely…the sphere of law admits only of reason; and vigilant policing is required to keep emotion from creeping in where it does not belong”. In this dissertation, I propose to look at the virtue of mercy, where mercy is understood to have a significant emotional component, and to answer the question: Should a judge in a criminal trial employ mercy? If so, under what conditions? The importance of the question of whether a judge should employ mercy in a criminal case is that it addresses one part of the larger enquiry into how the state should respond to offenders. As moral beings, our emotional responses to criminals and their crimes are varied. Sometimes we feel anger, at other times disgust, and at other times mercy, grief and sadness.

The additional tax ("penalties") imposable in terms of section 76(1) of the Income Tax Act (No 58 of 1962) when a taxpayer is in default, can be very harsh (up to 200% of the tax properly chargeable). The Commissioner may, in terms of section 76(2)(a), remit any penalty imposed, as he sees fit. However, when there was intent on the part of the taxpayer to evade the payment of tax, the Commissioner may not remit any portion of the 200% penalty imposable, unless he is of the opinion that "extenuating circumstances" exist. This dissertation examines the meaning of "extenuating circumstances", as interpreted by the judiciary, and lists the factors and defences that a taxpayer may plead to justify a remission of penalties, both in the case of an intention by the taxpayer to evade tax and in cases where the taxpayer is merely in default of section 76(1). / Accounting / MCOM (Accounting)

The additional tax ("penalties") imposable in terms of section 76(1) of the Income Tax Act (No 58 of 1962) when a taxpayer is in default, can be very harsh (up to 200% of the tax properly chargeable). The Commissioner may, in terms of section 76(2)(a), remit any penalty imposed, as he sees fit. However, when there was intent on the part of the taxpayer to evade the payment of tax, the Commissioner may not remit any portion of the 200% penalty imposable, unless he is of the opinion that "extenuating circumstances" exist. This dissertation examines the meaning of "extenuating circumstances", as interpreted by the judiciary, and lists the factors and defences that a taxpayer may plead to justify a remission of penalties, both in the case of an intention by the taxpayer to evade tax and in cases where the taxpayer is merely in default of section 76(1). / Accounting / MCOM (Accounting)