This study focuses on the influence of mitigating circumstances on the sentencing outcome before and after the McKoy (1990) decision. In McKoy (1990) the Supreme Court decided that the jurors did not have to find mitigating circumstances unanimously. Results are reported based on a sample of North Carolina first-degree murder cases where the state sought the death penalty. Logistic regression is used to determine the importance of mitigating circumstances as predictors of jury decision-making in North Carolina, controlling for the variety of other factors that influence that decision. The descriptive statistics show that the average number of mitigating circumstances submitted and accepted had doubled in the post-McKoy cases. At the same time, the number of aggravating circumstances presented and submitted stayed about the same. The analysis then moved to the consideration of the impact of mitigating circumstances, and whether there had been a change between the two eras. Separate logistic regression analysis revealed that there had indeed been a shift in the effects of aggravation and mitigation, but no in the manner that might have been anticipated, Specifically, in the post-McKoy era, mitigating circumstances had a diminished impact on the probability of a death sentence while, conversely, aggravating circumstances carried an increased impact.

This study analyzed case and sentencing data from 632 capital cases involving Black and White defendants and victims, processed in North Carolina from May 1990 through December 2002. Logistic regression analysis of all cases and race-specific data allowed assessment of the variable effects of jury acceptance of statutory aggravating and mitigating factors on capital sentencing outcomes (death versus life). The purpose was to evaluate the role race plays in shaping jury use of legally defined factors in capital sentencing. Significant variance in the effect of jury acceptance of aggravators was observed between Black and White defendants. Black defendants pay a higher premium in terms of the risk of a death sentence than do White defendants whose crimes are comparably aggravated. There was no overall disparity in the effect of jury acceptance of mitigatory factors observed, although certain mitigators reduced the risk of a death sentence significantly more for Black or White. Overall, the aggravators had a statistically significantly stronger effect on sentencing outcomes than did the mitigators, regardless of race, and on cases involving Black defendants, regardless of victim race. Racial invariance was not shown.

En tant que concept social, la parenté peut influer sur les dispositions du droit pénal dans la mesure où certains textes pénaux spéciaux, tant français que libyens, la prennent en compte dans de nombreuses infractions, qu’il s’agisse d’atteintes aux biens (vol, par exemple) ou encore d’atteintes aux personnes (infractions sexuelles, parricide, infanticide…). De tels textes protègent parfois l’institution familiale en tant que telle, ce qui est le cas pour l’abandon de famille. Ils se rattachent à l’autorité parentale, la solidarité familiale, l’intimité familiale, l’affection ou encore la dignité… Le Code pénal, à la fois français et libyen, consacre ainsi un chapitre aux infractions d’atteintes à la famille. Cependant, il ne saurait être question de limiter le champ de notre étude aux seules infractions figurant au sein de ce chapitre. Notre étude s’intéressera à toutes les infractions que l’on pourrait qualifier de parentales, de même qu’à toutes les dispositions pénales concernant ces infractions. La parenté se présente à la fois comme un facteur de sévérité accrue et d’indulgence. Elle peut représenter un élément constitutif des infractions purement familiales ou de la responsabilité pénale du fait des enfants. Le Code pénal renforce alors la répression en aggravant la peine en matière d’atteintes à la vie ou à l’intégrité physique et d’agressions sexuelles si l’infraction est commise par une personne proche de la victime. À cet égard, le législateur français, par la loi n° 2006-399 du 4 avril 2006, la loi n° 2010-769 du 9 juillet 2010 et celle n° 2013-711 du 5 août 2013, a renforcé la répression des violences au sein de la famille. Au contraire, le lien de parenté peut représenter un obstacle à la répression, en constituer un fait justificatif, une condition de l’atténuation de la peine ou une entrave à la marche de la justice pénale surtout en matière de récusation de magistrat et de témoignage. / As a social concept, parenthood can influence the provisions of criminal law as some special criminal texts, either French or Libyan, include numerous offences, whether trespass to goods (theft, for instance) or violent crimes ( sexual offences, parricide, infanticide…). Such texts sometimes protect the family institution as such, which is the case for the desertion of the marital home. They are connected with the parental authority, family solidarity, family intimacy, love or even dignity… The criminal codes, both French and Libyan, devote a chapter to the family-related offences. However, the field of our study cannot be limited to the offences mentioned in this chapter only. Our study will deal with all the offences that can be linked to parenthood, as well as all the criminal provisions concerning these offences. Parenthood appears at the same time as a factor of greater severity and indulgence. It can represent a constituent element of the purely family-related offences or of the criminal juvenile liability. The Criminal code then reinforces the repression by increasing the penalty if it concerns lethal assaults or grievous bodily harm and sexual assaults provided the offence is committed by a close relative of the victim. In this respect the French legislator, by the law N2006-399 of April 4th, 2006, the law N 2010-769 of July 9th, 2010 and that N 2013-711of August 5th, 2013, reinforced the repression of family-related violence. On the contrary, the parental link may represent an obstacle to repression, may constitute a justifying element, a mitigating condition of the penalty or an interference with the functioning of criminal justice, especially concerning the challenging of magistrates or of witnesses.

The additional tax ("penalties") imposable in terms of section 76(1) of the Income Tax Act (No 58 of 1962) when a taxpayer is in default, can be very harsh (up to 200% of the tax properly chargeable). The Commissioner may, in terms of section 76(2)(a), remit any penalty imposed, as he sees fit. However, when there was intent on the part of the taxpayer to evade the payment of tax, the Commissioner may not remit any portion of the 200% penalty imposable, unless he is of the opinion that "extenuating circumstances" exist. This dissertation examines the meaning of "extenuating circumstances", as interpreted by the judiciary, and lists the factors and defences that a taxpayer may plead to justify a remission of penalties, both in the case of an intention by the taxpayer to evade tax and in cases where the taxpayer is merely in default of section 76(1). / Accounting / MCOM (Accounting)

The additional tax ("penalties") imposable in terms of section 76(1) of the Income Tax Act (No 58 of 1962) when a taxpayer is in default, can be very harsh (up to 200% of the tax properly chargeable). The Commissioner may, in terms of section 76(2)(a), remit any penalty imposed, as he sees fit. However, when there was intent on the part of the taxpayer to evade the payment of tax, the Commissioner may not remit any portion of the 200% penalty imposable, unless he is of the opinion that "extenuating circumstances" exist. This dissertation examines the meaning of "extenuating circumstances", as interpreted by the judiciary, and lists the factors and defences that a taxpayer may plead to justify a remission of penalties, both in the case of an intention by the taxpayer to evade tax and in cases where the taxpayer is merely in default of section 76(1). / Accounting / MCOM (Accounting)