Kant famously claims that autonomy is the ground of dignity. If he is correct about the grounding relationship, then doubts about our autonomy entail doubts about our dignity. Here, I attempt to show that Kant is sensitive to this problem, and invokes the ‘fact of reason’ (Faktum der Vernunft) as the key piece of evidence for our autonomy, and therefore our dignity. But as is well known, Kant’s appeal to the Faktum is controversial. After presenting an exegetical case for the connection between dignity and the fact of reason, I respond to two prominent criticisms of Kant’s strategy in the Critique of Practical Reason in attempt to defend Kant’s use of the Faktum, and hence to preserve his conception of the dignity of humanity.

An ontology of the intelligible world cannot explain the phenomenon of a „free will“, which is able to decide between good and evil. It follows that a Moralontologie also cannot explain an agents freely determining his actions as good or evil.