In recent decades, political parties espousing extreme nationalist, xenophobic, and even outright racist platforms have enjoyed variable success in national elections across Europe. While a vibrant research literature has sought to better understand the sources of support for such parties, remarkably little attention has been paid to the interplay between parties and the broader social networks of extremism in which they are embedded. To remedy this deficiency, the present study examines the relations between far-right parliamentary parties and their extra-parliamentary networks. One level of analysis tests whether there is a relationship between a party’s position within a network and its sustainability. Social network analysis is employed to assess the nature and structure of ties between Belgian organizations online. In addition, systematic textual analysis of website content is used to determine how a party’s ideological position within the network impacts its sustainability. The second level of analysis is a qualitative study based on in-depth interviews with members of Flemish nationalist organization in order to better understand how actors experience social networks. Evidence suggests that the most sustainable parties are those that have dense connections with other nationalist organizations. Mapping relations between far-right parties that compete openly within the rules of institutionalized democracy and their wider social networks can provide important policy-relevant insight into contemporary challenges posed by illiberal forces.

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The use of the Internet as vehicle of socialization has exploded in the 21st century and while this presents exciting possibilities, it also comes with troubling ones. Among those who have embraced this new medium are extremist groups, who use the Web as a space in which to communicate, exchange ideas, network and reach new followers. In regards to this last point, it provides them near unlimited opportunities to gain access to potential recruits and converts, raising interesting questions in terms of the dynamics of the radicalization process and how it manifests itself within the confines of this new arena. Through an analysis of postings made to the discussion board of Stormfront.org, this research paper examines whether or not the radicalization process follows the same transformative pattern in the virtual world as has been described in some of the leading academic theories that address this phenomenon in the physical one.

This research analysis is an investigative effort at applying a methodological theory of Islamic extremism to Britain's far-right. Using four assigned categories-the defined 'puzzle pieces' of Hafez and Mullins theory-the research presented will draw heavily from recent history and contemporary societal examples to demonstrate how far-right radicalisation takes place. By looking at grievances, ideology, networks and enabling environment the aim of such an exercise is to demonstrate the intricate processes involved in radicalising someone to support far-right parties and ideologies. One of the most important themes of this analysis is the increasing politicisation of 'culture' by both the government and the far-right. Consequently, there will be discussion on Britain's Prevent programme and the far-right's adaptability in using culture to promote a 'new racism' that presents itself as different from traditional, fascist styles of Othering.

This dissertation examines the dynamic intersections of the relationship between migration and the far-right through three empirical, stand-alone chapters. The first substantive chapter re-evaluates existing theories of far-right support using a novel theory and comprehensive dataset to assess how immigration opinion and immigration levels interact to shape individual far-right support. The findings suggest that increases in asylum-based migration are associated with increased far-right voting, but that this is effect is mainly observed in those with negative or neutral opinions toward immigration. The second substantive chapter examines the other side of this relationship by analyzing the impact of far-right electoral and legislative success on asylum-recognition rates in EU member states. The results of empirical analyses show that when far-right parties gain legislative seats, the expected rate of asylum approvals decreases. This suggests that far-right parties in legislatures have measurable effects on migration outcomes. Finally, the third substantive chapter uses original field research to assess how far-right politics impacts the lived experiences of immigrants in France and Switzerland, relying on a small survey and interviews conducted in the field. The results show that immigrants are generally aware of far-right parties and distrustful toward them. However, undocumented migrants and asylees are among the most negatively impacted by far-right activity. Overall, this dissertation moves beyond the entrenched debate of how migration does or does not facilitate far-right support and contributes to the academic understanding of how migration and far-right politics interact.

Le nationalisme, la xénophobie, le racisme et lantisémitisme, lopposition aux élites, la stigmatisation des étrangers, les discours anti-immigrés, mais aussi lautoritarisme, lidéologie loi et ordre (Law and order), lantiparlementarisme et lanticommunisme, entre autres traits caractéristiques, représentent quelques-uns des qualificatifs les plus souvent cités dans la littérature consacrée au populisme et à lextrême droite. En fonction des partis politiques concernés, des contextes institutionnels et des particularités nationales et géographiques, ces qualificatifs prendront une dimension centrale ou secondaire selon quil sagira de caractériser un courant populiste ou un parti dextrême droite. A lappui dune comparaison entre la France et les Etats-Unis, louvrage vise à démontrer que lensemble de ces qualificatifs entretiennent tous à des degrés divers un rapport fondamental avec un imaginaire du complot, cest-à-dire avec un monde de significations structuré et cohérent (normes, significations, images, symboles, valeurs et croyances) qui privilégie la théorie du complot pour expliquer la politique et lhistoire.

This thesis uses critical discursive psychology to analyse anti-Semitic and Islamophobic discourse on the Facebook pages of two far-right organisations: Britain First and the English Defence League. Using the Charlie Hebdo attack as a time frame, I examine how the far-right manage their identity and maintain rationality online, as well as how users on Facebook respond to the far-right. This thesis demonstrates how Britain First and the English Defence League present themselves as reasonable in their anti-Semitic and anti-Islamic stance following the Charlie Hebdo shooting. Ultimately, I bring together the study of fascist discourse and political discourse on social media using critical discursive psychology, in a novel synthesis. The Charlie Hebdo shooting and the shooting at the kosher supermarket in Paris in January 2015 (as well as other attacks by members of the Islamic State) have led to Muslims being seen as a threat to Britain, and thus Muslims have been exposed to Islamophobic attacks and racial abuse. The current climate is a challenging situation for the far-right, as they are presented with the dilemma of appearing as rational and even mainstream, whilst nevertheless adopting an anti-Islamic stance. The analysis focuses on how Britain First and the English Defence League used the shooting at the Kosher supermarket to align with Jews in order to construct them as under threat from Islam, and promote its anti-Islamic stance. I also analyse visual communication used by Britain First to provide evidence that Britain First supported Jewish communities. Discourse from Facebook users transitioned from supportive towards Jews, to questioning the benefits that Jews brought to Britain, and expressing Holocaust denial. Furthermore, I discuss how other far-right politicians in Europe such as Geert Wilders from the Dutch Party for Freedom, portrayed himself as a reasonable politician in the anti-Islamic stance he has taken in the wake of the Charlie Hebdo attack. Findings are discussed in light of how the far-right communicate about the Charlie Hebdo shooting whilst maintaining a reasonable stance when projecting anti-Semitic and Islamophobic ideology, and how such discourse can encompass hate speech. I demonstrate how critical discursive psychology can be used to show how various conflicting social identities are constructed and interact with each other online. This thesis shows how the far-right use aligning with Jews as means to present Muslims as problematic, and how such alignment has resulted in the marginalisation of both Jews and Muslims.

The aim of this paper is twofold. Firstly, a systematic theology of the Sweden Democrats is reconstructed from the party’s party program (Valplattform 2021) and Swedish Church election pamphlet (En kyrka för Sverige). This theological reconstruction is limited to the categories of ecclesiology (the Church), theological anthropology (the Human Creature), and soteriology (Salvation), which together serve to detail the party’s theological vision for the Swedish Church, its members, and in turn, Swedish society. The aforementioned theological concepts are selected and consequently examined on account of the thematic attention and allocation they receive by the party. A qualitative method is further employed in an effort to explore to what extent the Sweden Democrats not only define their theological foundations but also utilize this basis in their political discourse. Secondly, the salience of religion, along with other works on populism in Europe, provides this paper with a theoretical framework to explore the populist underpinnings that support and inform the Sweden Democrats’ theological beliefs. This research concludes by demonstrating how the reconstructed theology in the election material provides utility for the party’s populist ambitions and empowers the Sweden Democrats to develop a Christian justification for their own vision of a homogenous social order.

This project focuses on a comparative analysis of governing coalitions between conservative and far-right parties in recent years in Italy (1994) and Poland (2005). The aim is to show how the inclusion of the radical right in government coalitions in these countries reflects recent changes in Western and Eastern European party systems through the reformulation of the old and formation of new party cleavages. The focus in the recent literature on personality clashes of party leaders over the distribution of ministry portfolios does not explain the nature of the disagreement between these leaders about key issues of national politics. I argue that the mechanism of policy formulation between prospective coalitional partners can be traced at the level of party cleavages which pre-exist the negotiation process between party leaders. The political breakthrough of the far-right parties became possible because of the development of new issues related to the process of European integration and based on the longstanding confrontation between the left and right parties since the beginning of the Cold War. The disintegration of the previous party systems as a result of the collapse of the Communist regime in Poland and the First Republic in Italy in the post-Cold War era created a vacuum partly exploited by the previous anti-system far-right parties and the new emerging ones. At the same time, a clear tendency toward the cartelization of the programmatic supply was prominent on both the left and right sides of the political spectrum. I argue that the rise to prominence of center-right coalitions in the two countries led by Silvio Berlusconi and Jaroslav Kachinskiy respectively represents not only a new dimension in the development of the right wing in Europe but also constitutes a model of political realignment where new cleavages are gradually substituting for the old cleavages described in the Lipset-Rokkan model.

Decentralization is the process by which the decision making, and planning activities of a community or movement are distributed away from a central authority and spread out more evenly among its members. Decentralized movements have started to regain prominence as digital networking became widely available around the world through the internet and mobile phones over the last two decades. However, there is still a gap in understanding whether digitally networked movements can be sustained over longer periods of time and under what conditions. This dissertation is a mixed-methods study consisting of content analysis and semi-structured in-depth interviews with users of online far-right communities. Specifically, it is a comparative analysis of a decentralized online far-right community (4chan/pol) and centralized online far-right and mainstream communities (Stormfront and Twitter, respectively). The central aim of this dissertation is to show how decentralization impacts essential elements of digitally networked mobilization. The research questions are threefold. First, what is the impact of decentralization on which logic of mobilization (connective or collective action) a movement adapts? Second, does connective action truly do away with the need for collective identity formation, as its proponents have claimed? Third, what is the role of decentralized movement communities during major on-the-ground mobilization events? In chapter two I identify how decentralization impacts the logic of mobilization used by proponents of the far-right political project to sustain decentralized protest for a generalized far-right position. In chapter three I use interview data to show how collective identity remains an integral component of decentralized communities by introducing the concept of Oppositional Identity. Finally, chapter four follows the use of online memes and discourse during the events of the January 6th Insurrection on the Capitol to reveal how decentralized communities capitalize on failed offline mobilization attempts of specific issue-based movements to further radicalize individuals who engage in right-wing activism. / Dissertation / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) / This thesis uncovers important differences between online based social movements on the far-right. This thesis compares two far-right communities: the decentralized 4chan/pol to the centralized Stormfront. The findings make three important contributions to the field of social movements and far-right studies. First, the findings reveal that members of 4chan/pol are able to successfully sustain mobilization that does not depend on organizational involvement and cultivation of solidarity among constituents. This allows members to bypass significant upfront costs of activism without eventually dissipating, similar to movements on the left. Second, the findings reveal that solidarity amongst ingroup members is achieved as a result of mobilization, and not the other way around. For 4chan/pol members, solidarity is sustained through the opposition to the mainstream media rather than through building bonds with members of the ingroup. Finally, the findings reveal how decentralized spaces like 4chan/pol capitalize on offline mobilization of other far-right movements to radicalize supporters during and immediately after the unsuccessful insurrection on the United States Capitol on January 6th, 2021.