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Since the start of the financial crisis in 2008, the Federal Reserve has been engaging in quantitative easing. Quantitative easing is a form of open market operation in which the Federal Reserve buys long-term U.S. government and other securities, versus traditional open market operations that occur through the short-term Treasury bill market. At the same time, the shadow bank system, which is a system of financial intermediaries that perform unregulated credit intermediation outside of traditional banks, has contracted significantly. Some argue that this contraction is due to a collateral crunch induced by quantitative easing in the shadow bank system—a crunch that occurred when the Federal Reserve’s quantitative easing program took high-quality collateral off the market. I will focus specifically on repurchase agreements, an instrument within the shadow banking that uses the same types of securities that the Federal Reserve has been buying during quantitative easing as collateral, to determine whether quantitative easing has led to a contraction of the repurchase agreement market. I find that increases in Federal Reserve asset holdings from 2005-2013, and specifically during QE1, are associated with decreases in primary dealer repurchase agreements. This shows that under certain circumstances, Federal Reserve asset purchases lead to contractions in the shadow bank system. This paper aims to increase understanding of how monetary policy affects shadow banking and understanding of the unintended consequences of monetary policy, such as decreased shadow bank lending caused by quantitative easing.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Nevada, Reno, 2008. / "May, 2008." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 87-96). Library also has microfilm. Ann Arbor, Mich. : ProQuest Information and Learning Company, [2009]. 1 microfilm reel ; 35 mm. Online version available on the World Wide Web.

Doctorat en sciences sociales, politiques et économiques / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

The thesis describes the chain of causation that leads from the causes of the financial crisis over its consequencies towards the reactions of the Federal Reserve System. After the consequencies of the Crisis have been identified, the author deals in detail with the measures taken -- with their characteristics and the way they function. Afterwards, the author evaluates efficiency of these meausures and describes the role they played in the overall attitude of the Federal Reserve System to handling the Crisis.

This master thesis deals with a number of international processes in terms of geoeconomics. The main goal of this work is to research the position of dollar, ruble and petroleum in geoeconomic processes. At first goes the analysis of the current condition of the United States dollar, the assessment of exposure level of the system to other countries to establish the real role of the U.S. Federal Reserve. Then goes the analysis of the current status of Russian ruble and the Central Bank of Russian Federation. A large part of the work is devoted to petroleum as a basic raw material at present and its relations to U.S. dollar. At the end is the assessment of the U.S. dollar prospects in the 21 century and possible solutions, which will probably help to eliminate the negative consequences in case of using dollar as the dominant financial system in the world.

This thesis deals with monetary policy implemented by the Central bank of the United States the Federal Reserve System (Fed) from the 90s to the present day. The goal of this thesis is to assess the impact of monetary policy of the Fed on the American and the world economy in a given time interval. The first chapter deals with the general theory of functions of the central bank, its structure and history. The rest of the chapters are devoted to the description of the economic situation in the USA in the sub-periods and analyzing the steps and procedures that Fed had undertaken in response to these economic situation. The last chapter deals with the financial crisis of recent years, including possible causes and consequences, focusing on the main measures applied by the Fed in an effort to avoid or at least mitigate the crisis and the current development of the Fed.

One policy reaction of the Federal Reserve to the 2008 financial crisis was the extension of currency swap lines to various foreign central banks; this constituted the global transfer of billions of US dollars of wealth and exhibited the role of the US as a global lender of last resorts. Some have attempted to explain the supply of these lines as a function of risk mitigation for domestic US banks with foreign holdings, but no one has yet investigated the social dynamics of this phenomenon. In recognizing that the global demand for emergency liquidity was greater than the Federal Reserve’s supply, this paper investigates how the similarity of foreign central banks affected the selection of which banks would receive liquidity extensions. I calculate similarity scores to the US Federal Reserve for foreign banks which applied for liquidity extensions during the crisis. These scores measure the textual similarity of foreign central bankers’ speeches to those of the Fed, the institutional design similarity to that of the Fed, and the similarity of foreign central banks’ governors’ educational and professional backgrounds to those of the 2008 Federal Open Markets Commission members. I find that the similarity of foreign central banks to the US with regard to these three criteria offers a significantly stronger and statistically more robust answer to the question of what drove this decision process, and offer implications for international regulatory mechanisms to ameliorate this tendency toward social homophily.

In this doctoral dissertation, I broadly study the impact of information on economies from both a theoretical and an empirical perspective. Specifically, I study how strategic agents in a heterogeneous interacting network make decisions under incomplete information and how their actions are affected by the parameters that define the incompleteness of the information, with an emphasis on the social value of information. I then estimate the impact of information disclosure on the stock market by studying the specific example of the annual CCAR and DFAST bank stress tests conducted by the Federal Reserve. This dissertation consists of two chapters. In the first chapter, I study a game of heterogeneous strategic interactions under incomplete information. I characterize the equilibrium actions and compare them to the benchmark constrained-efficient allocation. I parameterize the available information in terms of pairwise information commonality and accuracy and study how changing the said commonality and accuracy affects the social welfare. I also study how the structure of interactions between players affects the social value of information. I find that the extent of the inefficiency of the economy dictates the social value of information. I provide a complete characterization of the comparative statics of the social welfare with respect to commonality and accuracy for completely efficient economies. I find that when interactions are heterogenous, it is possible for social welfare to be non-monotonic with respect to information commonality, a behavior unseen in economies with homogeneous interactions. For inefficient economies, I provide sufficient conditions under which the social welfare exhibits monotonic behavior. In the second chapter, I study the predictability of the results of the annual Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR) and Dodd-Frank Act Stress Test (DFAST) conducted by the Federal Reserve. I find that these results are highly predictable on year-to-year basis. I also find a high degree of predictability within the adverse scenario and the severely adverse scenario results within a given year. I find that that these predictable trends hold over time, from 2012 to 2020. I also try to ascertain the impact of the announcement of these results on the stock market and find no statistically significant effect. Lastly, I study the fixed effect impact of the disclosure events on the stock and options market. I find that while there are individual instances of significant impact, there is no significant impact across the years. I discuss potential implications of these patterns for the further development and application of stress testing.

The field of macroeconomics has increasingly turned its attention towards understanding the state dependent effects of macroeconomic policies, the idea being that different macroeconomic conditions—e.g., the state of the business cycle, or the distribution of income over the population—can cause a single economic policy shock to propagate differently through the economy. I turn this thinking around in this dissertation, and instead ask whether the policies that we study are, in practice, “single economic policy shocks” or are, instead, aggregates of multiple policies with different effects. In chapter 1, I decompose monetary policy into an interest rate component, and a component that captures macroeconomic information provision. In chapter 2, I discuss the consequences of tariff policy in light of the view that tariffs in the United States are extremely heterogeneous and, on average, regressive in nature. In chapter 3, I return to monetary policy, asking whether more-transparent communications from the Federal Reserve have allowed for a more effective transmission of monetary policy. To summarize my findings, in all cases I find that the economic consequences estimated using disaggregated policy measures differ substantially from the consequences estimated using aggregated measures.