High quality financial reporting is critically important for bank regulation, particularly market discipline, but limited evidence exists on why banks provide different levels of financial reporting quality. I examine whether institutional investors and financial analysts impact bank financial reporting quality. Although I find no impact of analysts on bank financial reporting quality, institutional ownership is positively associated with financial reporting quality, and this relation is strongest for banks with high information asymmetry and for “monitoring” institutional investors. Institutional investors also sell shares following the announcement of a restatement, suggesting they are willing to use the threat of exit as a mechanism to influence bank managers and demand financial reporting quality. Finally, I find institutional investors demand financial reporting quality primarily for high risk banks and also reduce ex-ante bank risk and ex-post non-performing loans. Collectively, these results suggest institutional investors are an important component of bank governance. / text

abstract: Recent research finds that there is significant variation in stock market participation by state and suggests that there might be state-specific factors that determine household stock market participation in the United States. Using household survey data, I examine how accounting quality of public companies at the state level affects households’ stock market participation decisions. I find that households residing in states where local public companies have better accounting quality are more likely to invest in stocks. Moreover, those households invest greater amounts of their wealth in the stock market. Cross-sectional tests find that the effect of accounting quality on stock market participation is more pronounced for less affluent and less educated households, consistent with prior findings that lacking familiarity with and trust in the stock market is an important factor deterring those types of households from stock investments. In state-level tests, I find that these household outcomes affect income inequality, which is less severe in states where high public-firm accounting quality spurs more stock market participation by poorer households. Conversely, in states where public firms have lower accounting quality, stock market participation among poorer households is less common, and a larger share of high equity returns accrues to richer households, exacerbating income inequality. / Dissertation/Thesis / Doctoral Dissertation Accountancy 2020

Though at the enterprises the estimation of a financial condition is annually, it is necessary to develop, to improve constantly and to evaluate the system of the internal control, necessary to develop a technique of the reporting quality estimation of the enterprise specially for the certain enterprise in view of all features, to take advantage of statistical data and to draw corresponding conclusions, to make constant monitoring. The purpose of development of the mechanism - detection of deviations of data in the reporting from actual results of activity, definition of clauses causing distortion of a real financial condition of the enterprise, revealing of size of influence of the given distortions and qualities of the reporting as a whole on decision-making, and also revealing of the reasons causing these deviations and distortions, and development of recommendations on corresponding correction separate directions for improvement of quality of the reporting. How can high reporting quality and internal control create an advantage? In survey of institutional investors is reported that investors apply a penalty if they believe a company’s internal control to be insufficient. Sixty-one percent of respondents said they had avoided investing in companies and 48% had de-invested in companies where internal control was considered inadequate. As additional support, they study went on to report that 82% of respondents agreed that good internal control was worth a premium on share price. These institutional investors are pushing for greater transparency on risk issues and related internal control efforts. Simply put, an organization’s ability to implement and maintain a leading-class control framework can create competitive advantage in today’s market. A system of the financial reporting conducting with strong management, quality control and good legislative base is the key factor of economic development. The trust of investors in the financial and not financial information is based on strong Internal Control, high-quality standards of the financial reporting, audit and ethics, thus, standards and Internal Control play the leading part in assistance of economic growth and financial stability in the country. Nevertheless, every company meets the problems of implementation of the internal control. Among them there can be problems in labor qualification, legislation and so on. It is also necessary to examine the successful experience at the micro level.

In this paper, we present the ban on progressive depreciation of housing associations in connection with the change to K-regulatory frameworks. Bokföringsnämnden (2014) stated that progressive depreciation was no longer allowed, and this study explores what kind of implications it had for the housing associations' income statements. Additional problems have been addressed by examining what effects it could have on the perception of that accounting must be based on giving a fair view (Artsberg, 2005), and whether stakeholders can access and interpret this financial information (Burks, 2015). Based on theories that consider that a similar framework is not appropriate for housing associations and non-profit organizations, as for profit driven companies, we have used this criticism on the matter (Burks, 2014; Torres and Pina, 2003). We have also taken into consideration why Bokföringsnämnden decided to prohibit the depreciation method. The empirical study focuses on examining twenty newly constructed housing associations annual reports from 2012 to 2014 to see whether they have had to change their depreciation method, and if this in turn has had an influence on their results, and if this has led to changes in their annual report. The end result of this study is based on a quantitative research which shows that a change has occurred in housing associations' income statements. 95 percent of the sample reported a loss in 2014, while in 2012 only 5 percent showed negative results. In a combined analysis of the use of literature and empirical data, there are clear indications that there is a requirement for new regulatory alternative templates for housing associations to report financial information if they are to present a fair view and enable comparison between associations.

I investigate the stock market's reaction to events related to the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board's (PCAOB) development and enactment of Auditing Standard No. 5 (AS 5). The change from Auditing Standard No. 2 (AS 2) to AS 5 was debated in the business press at length. The PCAOB stated that the goal of AS 5 was to reduce the prohibitive costs of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 - Section 404 and AS 2 (Krishnan et al. 2008) while maintaining the effectiveness of the internal control audits required by those policies. However, there was concern that internal control audit quality would decrease under AS 5. My study examines how investors perceived this change by considering stock market reaction around 10 event dates related to PCAOB and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) actions with regard to the development and enactment of AS 5. I find evidence that the market's reaction to key AS 5 events was significantly negative, which is consistent with investors perceiving AS 5 as a significant decrease in internal control audit quality. I also study these investor reactions cross-sectionally to further examine the two potential effects of AS 5 (decrease in compliance costs and decrease in internal control audit quality) and how they relate to firm characteristics (size, complexity, litigation risk, and fraud risk). I find evidence consistent with my main finding: investors' perceived increase in information risk under AS 5 is apparent when considering firm characteristics. Finally, I consider ex-post financial reporting quality under AS 5 and find no significant change in financial reporting quality compared to under AS 2. This study contributes to accounting research by being the first to study the stock market's perception of this significant policy change archivally and the first to consider the effectiveness of AS 5 with regard to financial reporting quality.

China and its economic development is today something that affects us all in one way or another. Through economic expansion Chinese companies starts to be an important player on the global scene. They are getting an international competitor, co-operating with foreign companies and it has the latest year been heavily invested in by foreign financiers. Conversely, according to recent research a vast majority of the experts claims that the Chinese companies’ financial reporting disclosure holds a low quality. That these financial reports include plentiful falsified information is disturbing the market and prevents shareholders a fair and free view of the companies, it also reduces the control possibilities. Voices have been raised demanding changes to ensure a higher FRQ in the future. But to find the right actions and point out needed changes, the first requirement is finding the roots behind the presumed low FRQ. Experts’ point at different directions, comprising of nine main underlying reasons that are primarily considered affecting the FRQ in negative matters. These nine explanations will be evaluated against each other in this thesis to find out where the main focus needs to be to prevent future falsified financial statements. The nine reasons where it is claimed that China are lacking are: - Legal system -Education -Pressure -Political impact -Ownership structure -Auditing -Low Business ethics -Tax avoidance -Cost reduction This thesis finds that the main underlying reasons behind Chinese firms’ falsified financial stamen are: (1) Pressure – that influences managers and is a great incentive for earnings management. (2) Political impact – the political impact seem to have a substantial negative influence on companies FRQ. (3) Ownership structure – low transparency and hierarchal business structures appears to be biggest problems within the corporate governance. (4) Low business ethics – a too corrupt and non-moral business structure threatens the integrity of the financial reports. (5) Tax avoidance – the unwillingness to pay taxes makes many companies reduce earnings or hide sales to avoid value added tax (VAT). (6) Cost reduction – The high endeavor to keep costs down might in many cases also bring effects on the quality of disclosed material.

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In this thesis I investigate the economic determinants and consequences of corporate governance (broadly defined) in Canadian “comply or explain” governance disclosure regime. I find that the quality of governance in firms varies in the cross-section and is associated with firm value as economic theory suggests. Furthermore, I find the effectiveness of board and audit committee has a strong impact on the auditor-client management relationship in their negotiation over financial reporting. Such relationships then influence financial reporting quality and audit fees. Overall, my results support that the theorized advantages of “comply or explain” allow firms greater flexibility in tailoring their governance practice to their specific circumstances. Such tailored governance practice is more efficient and cost-effective and serves the interests of shareholders by 1) improving firm value; 2) constraining managerial opportunism; and 3) improving audit quality without incurring higher audit fees. / Thesis (Ph.D, Management) -- Queen's University, 2013-07-26 11:29:18.86

Due to the fact that corporate environmental reporting (CER) is largely voluntary and unregulated, practice has evolved in the absence of a meaningful conceptual framework. This lack of a normative theory stating what should be the content of CER as well as the methods for measuring reported information being largely volumetric or content based, is advanced as a major limitation in the existing literature. In this study, the wellestablished conceptual frameworks for financial reporting are adapted as the basis for a CER conceptual framework in which four characteristics of CER indicate its quality. Empirical methods for the measurement of such characteristics are also adapted from the financial reporting literature. The main aim of this research is to use the adapted framework to examine the extent of variation in the quality of CER and then to test its applicability to the key motivational theories. The empirical work involves a panel of US and UK firms over a two-year period. This allows cross-sectional comparison to be made between different financial accounting regimes (rules- vs. principles-based) as well as permits examination of the development of CER over time. Further, the empirical work is extended to investigate the interrelationship between the financial and environmental performance of a firm. Evidence in support of the legitimacy and institutional theory explanations for disclosure motivations is comprehensively found through the measures of the qualitative characteristics identified. That is, the use of a novel CER framework based on financial reporting quality here enables a more robust understanding of the reporting behaviours than previous work. Moreover, evidence for CER variation owing to the differences in financial reporting regimes is found and thus, it is reasonable to assert that the culture of financial reporting, to some extent, informs the nature of voluntary non-financial reporting. However, perhaps owing to the short time frame of the investigation, evidence of financial rewards from being environmentally effective or through providing CER is not found. The findings from this research will be of interest to preparers and users of corporate environmental reports as well as to policymakers, particularly in terms of enabling them to assess the quality of reporting and its level of fit with their expectations. Moreover, they also shed light on the link between environmental performance, as manifested in carbon emissions, and what is reported.

Durant la décennie écoulée, une série de scandales financiers impliquant des firmes d’envergure internationale (Enron, Tyco, Parmalat, etc.) a secoué les places boursières en déclenchant une crise de la confiance chez les investisseurs. L’analyse des cas précités a révélé un recours massif à la fraude et aux manipulations comptables ce qui a relancé le débat autour de la question de la Qualité du Reporting Financier et de l’efficience des mécanismes de gouvernance.En effet, de récents constats révèlent que des problèmes d’agence générés par une structure de propriété complexe caractérisée par la concentration de la propriété familiale et le recours accru aux mécanismes de renforcement du contrôle vont favoriser l’extraction des bénéfices privés par les actionnaires de contrôle au détriment des minoritaires et par conséquent accroître leur l’incitation à la manipulation de l’information comptable et financière offerte et ce pour dissimuler leurs agissements opportunistes.Dans ce cadre, la présente thèse se propose d’étudier dans quelle mesure la structure de propriété complexe peut entrainer des conflits d’agence aggravant les problèmes d’incitation chez l’actionnaire contrôlant en favorisant l’extraction des bénéfices privés via les transactions avec les parties liées et d’analyser l’effet de cette expropriation sur la Qualité du Reporting Financier de l’entreprise.Nous poursuivons trois principaux objectifs. Le premier est de savoir comment les attributs de la structure de propriété complexe vont impacter la consommation des bénéfices privés faite via les transactions avec les parties liées. Le second est d’analyser comment la dissimulation de la consommation des bénéfices privés va impacter la qualité du reporting financier mesurée par la gestion des résultats comptable et réelle et le conservatisme conditionnel et inconditionnel tout en prenant en considération l’interaction entre la gestion des résultats et le conservatisme. Le troisième objectif est de tester, dans le cadre du conflit principal-principal, l’efficience du rôle du conseil d’administration dans la discipline des actionnaires contrôlants à travers la réduction des bénéfices privés ainsi que dans la garantie d’un reporting financier de qualité en s’opposant à la manipulation de l’information.C’est ainsi que sur un échantillon d’entreprises françaises cotées sur l’indice SBF 250 observées sur la période 2001 à 2009 notre étude a révélé que l’excès du contrôle de l’actionnaire ultime est associée à une plus grande consommation des bénéfices privés. Nous relevons également une relation en U inversé entre la concentration de la propriété de l’actionnaire ultime et les bénéfices privés. La présence de plusieurs détenteurs de blocs de contrôle entrainant une contestabilité du contrôle s’oppose à la consommation des bénéfices privés. Nous avons pu valider l’hypothèse de la dissimulation en confirmant l’effet médiateur des bénéfices privés du contrôle dans la relation entre la concentration de la propriété de l’actionnaire ultime et la concentration de la propriété institutionnelle d’une part et la gestion réelle des résultats de l’autre. Nos résultats empiriques confirment l’efficience de l’indépendance du conseil d’administration dans la réduction des bénéfices privés et la gestion des résultats.Mots clé : Bénéfices privés du contrôle, transactions avec les parties liées, structure de propriété complexe, conseil d’administration, gestion des résultats et conservatisme. / During the past decade, a series of financial scandals involving firms of international scope (Enron, Tyco, Parmalat, etc.) has shaken the stock exchanges in triggering a crisis of confidence among investors. The analysis of the aforementioned cases revealed a massive use of fraud and accounting manipulations which has relaunched the debate on the financial reporting quality and the efficiency of corporate governance mechanisms.Recent findings reveal that of agency problems generated by a structure of complex ownership structure characterized by the concentration of the family ownership and the increased use of control-enhancing mechanisms will promote the extraction of private profits by the controlling shareholders to the detriment of the minority and therefore increase their incentives to the manipulation of earnings in order to conceal their opportunistic behavior.In this framework, this thesis proposes to study to what extent the structure of complex ownership may cause conflicts of agency aggravating the problems of incitement in the controlling shareholder in favoring the extraction of private profits via the conclusion of related party transactions and to analyze the effect of this expropriation on the financial reporting quality of the firm.We are pursuing three main objectives. The first is to understand how the attributes of the complex ownership structure can affect the private benefits consumption via the conclusion of related party transactions. The second objective is to analyze how the concealment of the consumption of private benefits will impact the financial reporting quality as proxied by the accounting and real earnings management and the conditional and unconditional conservatism. while taking into account the interaction between earnings management and the conservatism. The third objective is to test, in the context of the principal-principal agency conflict, the efficiency of the role of the board of directors in the discipline of the controlling shareholders through the reduction of private profit as well as in the guarantee of the financial reporting of quality.Our study focuses on a sample of 81 French companies listed on the SBF 250 index observed on the period 2001 to 2009. Our results reveal that the excess of the control of the ultimate shareholder is associated with greater private benefits consumption. We also note an inverted U-shaped relationship between the ultimate ownership concentration and private benefits. The presence of multiple large shareholders causing a contestability of control reduces the private benefits extraction. We validate the private benefits dissimulation hypothesis by confirming the mediating effect of the private benefits of control in the relationship between the ultimate shareholder ownership and the institutional ownership the real earnings management. Our empirical results confirm the efficiency of the independence of the board of directors in the reduction of private benefits and the earnings management. Against all expectation, we note a week effect of the Audit Committee on of financial reporting qualityKey words: Private benefits of control, related party transactions, ownership structure, board of directors, earnings management, conservatism.