Global ETD Search

11	Utilisation of the financial intelligence centre as a crime intelligence source Mostert, Derick 11 1900 (has links) The research was conducted as a result of the researcher‟s concern that the possibility exists that members of the different law enforcement agencies in South Africa might have a misconception about the mandate and functions of the Financial Intelligence Centre. If such a misconception in fact exists, it poses a huge challenge towards fruitful co-operation among the Centre and the different law enforcement agencies. The researcher identified certain practical problems, namely, that investigators are not aware of the types of intelligence that the Centre could provide them with, and that investigators might not be informed about the specific procedures to follow when they need to request intelligence from the Centre. The research has shown that, in the past, the Centre has been a useful source of crime intelligence concerning a range of predicate offences including narcotics, fraud and tax related crimes. The research has further found that, although the majority of participants gained a lot of experience in law enforcement and investigations, they had limited awareness about the Financial Intelligence Centre and its functions. This research project studied the utilisation of the Financial Intelligence Centre as a crime intelligence source. / Police Practice / M. Tech. (Forensic Investigation) Financial Intelligence Centre Money laundering Financial Action Task Force Investigation of crime Forensic investigation Intelligence cycle Financial investigation Financial crime Suspicious transaction reports Financial intelligence units 363.25 Forensic accounting Commercial crimes -- Prevention Criminal investigation Organized crime investigation Organized crime -- Prevention
12	Utilisation of the financial intelligence centre as a crime intelligence source Mostert, Derick 11 1900 (has links) The research was conducted as a result of the researcher‟s concern that the possibility exists that members of the different law enforcement agencies in South Africa might have a misconception about the mandate and functions of the Financial Intelligence Centre. If such a misconception in fact exists, it poses a huge challenge towards fruitful co-operation among the Centre and the different law enforcement agencies. The researcher identified certain practical problems, namely, that investigators are not aware of the types of intelligence that the Centre could provide them with, and that investigators might not be informed about the specific procedures to follow when they need to request intelligence from the Centre. The research has shown that, in the past, the Centre has been a useful source of crime intelligence concerning a range of predicate offences including narcotics, fraud and tax related crimes. The research has further found that, although the majority of participants gained a lot of experience in law enforcement and investigations, they had limited awareness about the Financial Intelligence Centre and its functions. This research project studied the utilisation of the Financial Intelligence Centre as a crime intelligence source. / Police Practice / M. Tech. (Forensic Investigation) Financial Intelligence Centre Money laundering Financial Action Task Force Investigation of crime Forensic investigation Intelligence cycle Financial investigation Financial crime Suspicious transaction reports Financial intelligence units 363.25 Forensic accounting Commercial crimes -- Prevention Criminal investigation Organized crime investigation Organized crime -- Prevention
13	The South African anti-money laundering regulatory framework relevant to politically exposed persons Ahlers, Christelle January 2013 (has links) Politically exposed persons have become a specific risk factor in money laundering. The Financial Action Task Force has formulated clear and specific requirements for dealing with these individuals. Internationally, various jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom and the European Union have adopted effective legislation encompassing the 2003 Financial Action Task Force Recommendations. In South Africa the requirement to apply appropriate, risk based procedures to politically exposed persons has been limited to banks. The aim of this research study was to identify whether the South African anti-money laundering regulatory framework, adequately addresses managing the risks of politically exposed persons. The regulatory frameworks of the United Kingdom and the European Union, as well as the requirements of the Financial Action Task Force, were used to determine whether best practice is followed in South Africa with regard to politically exposed persons. The process of how money is laundered has been examined as well as the methods that corrupt politically exposed persons use in order to launder money. The study has shown that politically exposed persons are not regulated in South Africa in accordance with the Financial Action Task Force Recommendations issued in 2003, while the South African Anti-Money Laundering Regulatory Framework does not adequately address the risk posed by corrupt, politically exposed persons. Both international best practice and the recommendations of the World Bank were considered in terms of the way in which to address the risks posed by these persons effectively. / Dissertation (MPhil)--University of Pretoria, 2013. / Auditing / unrestricted Money laundering Financial Intelligence Centre Act (FICA) South African anti-money laundering UCTD Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Risk based approach Politically exposed person (PEP) European Union (EU) Customer due diligence Corruption Anti-money laundering
14	Aspects of money laundering in South African law Van Jaarsveld, Izelde Louise 04 1900 (has links) Money laundering involves activities which are aimed at concealing benefits that were acquired through criminal means for the purpose of making them appear legitimately acquired. Money laundering promotes criminal activities in South Africa because it allows criminals to keep the benefits that they acquired through their criminal activities. It takes place through a variety of schemes which include the use of banks. In this sense money laundering control is based on the premise that banks must be protected from providing criminals with the means to launder the benefits of their criminal activities. The Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001 (‘FICA’) in aggregate with the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998 (‘POCA’) form the backbone of South Africa’s anti-money laundering regime. Like its international counterparts FICA imposes onerous duties on banks seeing that they are most often used by criminals as conduits to launder the benefits of crime. In turn, POCA criminalises activities in relation to the benefits of crime and delineates civil proceedings aimed at forfeiting the benefits of crime to the state. This study identifies the idiosyncrasies of the South African anti-money laundering regime and forwards recommendations aimed at improving its structure. To this end nine issues in relation to money laundering control and banks are investigated. The investigation fundamentally reveals that money laundering control holds unforeseen consequences for banks. In particular, a bank that receives the benefits of crimes such as fraud or theft faces prosecution if it fails to heed FICA’s money laundering control duties, for example, the filing of a suspicious transaction report. However, if the bank files a suspicious transaction report, it may be sued in civil court by the customer for breach of contract. In addition, if the bank parted with the benefits of fraud or theft whilst suspecting that the account holder may not be entitled to payment thereof, it may be sued by the victim of fraud or theft who seeks to recover loss suffered at the hand of the fraudster or thief from the bank. Ultimately, this study illustrates that amendment of some of the provisions of South Africa’s anti-money laundering legislation should enable banks to manage the aforementioned and other unforeseen consequences of money laundering control whilst at the same time contribute to the South African anti-money laundering effort. / Criminal and Procedural Law / Mercantile Law / LL.D. Money laudering control Banks Globalisation of criminal activity Money Bank-customer relationship Bank confidentiality Safe-harbour provisions Ownership of deposited money Proceeds of crime Statement of Principles Forty Recommendations Council of Europe Third Anti-Money Laundering Directive KYC Standard Customer due diligence Vienna Convention Strasbourg Convention Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 Bank Secrecy Act Patriot Act Financial Crimes Enforcement Network Common-law ownership remedies Constructive trust Tracing Rei vindicatio Quasi-vindictory action Actio Pauliana Interdicts Unjust enrichment condictiones Civil forfeiture Innocent owner defence 345.268068 Money laundering -- Prevention Banking law -- South Africa Banking law
15	Aspects of money laundering in South African law Van Jaarsveld, Izelde Louise 04 1900 (has links) Money laundering involves activities which are aimed at concealing benefits that were acquired through criminal means for the purpose of making them appear legitimately acquired. Money laundering promotes criminal activities in South Africa because it allows criminals to keep the benefits that they acquired through their criminal activities. It takes place through a variety of schemes which include the use of banks. In this sense money laundering control is based on the premise that banks must be protected from providing criminals with the means to launder the benefits of their criminal activities. The Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001 (‘FICA’) in aggregate with the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998 (‘POCA’) form the backbone of South Africa’s anti-money laundering regime. Like its international counterparts FICA imposes onerous duties on banks seeing that they are most often used by criminals as conduits to launder the benefits of crime. In turn, POCA criminalises activities in relation to the benefits of crime and delineates civil proceedings aimed at forfeiting the benefits of crime to the state. This study identifies the idiosyncrasies of the South African anti-money laundering regime and forwards recommendations aimed at improving its structure. To this end nine issues in relation to money laundering control and banks are investigated. The investigation fundamentally reveals that money laundering control holds unforeseen consequences for banks. In particular, a bank that receives the benefits of crimes such as fraud or theft faces prosecution if it fails to heed FICA’s money laundering control duties, for example, the filing of a suspicious transaction report. However, if the bank files a suspicious transaction report, it may be sued in civil court by the customer for breach of contract. In addition, if the bank parted with the benefits of fraud or theft whilst suspecting that the account holder may not be entitled to payment thereof, it may be sued by the victim of fraud or theft who seeks to recover loss suffered at the hand of the fraudster or thief from the bank. Ultimately, this study illustrates that amendment of some of the provisions of South Africa’s anti-money laundering legislation should enable banks to manage the aforementioned and other unforeseen consequences of money laundering control whilst at the same time contribute to the South African anti-money laundering effort. / Criminal and Procedural Law / Mercantile Law / LL.D. Money laudering control Banks Globalisation of criminal activity Money Bank-customer relationship Bank confidentiality Safe-harbour provisions Ownership of deposited money Proceeds of crime Statement of Principles Forty Recommendations Council of Europe Third Anti-Money Laundering Directive KYC Standard Customer due diligence Vienna Convention Strasbourg Convention Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 Bank Secrecy Act Patriot Act Financial Crimes Enforcement Network Common-law ownership remedies Constructive trust Tracing Rei vindicatio Quasi-vindictory action Actio Pauliana Interdicts Unjust enrichment condictiones Civil forfeiture Innocent owner defence 345.268068 Money laundering -- Prevention Banking law -- South Africa Banking law

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