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I explore the passage of wrongful discharge laws by U.S. state courts that allow workers to sue employers for unjust dismissal as an exogenous increase in employee firing costs. I find that firms reduce debt ratios following the adoption of these laws, and this result is strongest for subsamples of firms that experience larger increases in expected firing costs. Following the passage of these laws, firms also increase cash holdings, firms save more cash out of cash flows, and investors place a higher value on each additional dollar of cash holdings. Overall, my results indicate that employee firing costs can have an important impact on corporate financial policy decisions.

[pt] Esta tese é composta de três capítulos que analisam aspectos do mercado de trabalho. O primeiro capítulo estima o efeito da mudança na Lei do Aviso Prévio em 2011 no Brasil. A nova lei tornou as demissões sem justa causa mais caras para as firmas, e o aumento do custo se deu de maneira crescente no tempo de serviço do empregado. O aviso prévio é parte do arcabouço da legislação de proteção ao emprego, e tem intenção preservar vínculos que, embora não desejados no curto prazo, seriam viáveis no longo prazo. No entanto, os resultados apontam para o aumento das demissões nas firmas mais afetadas e um ambiente de maior rotatividade. Tais resultados são especialmente desfavoráveis considerando o ambiente já de elevada rotatividade no Brasil. Argumentamos com um modelo teórico que o desenho da nova lei é consistente com os resultados, na medida em que se elevou não apenas o custo de demissão, mas também o custo esperado da continuidade do vínculo empregatício. O segundo capítulo avalia os efeitos da expansão das usinas de etanol no Mato Grosso do Sul (MS), pela perspectiva de realocação do trabalho. Seguindo os trabalhadores ao longo dos períodos, encontramos mecanismos que permitiram o ajuste da mão de obra às novas demandas por trabalho geradas por este grande investimento. Exploramos as realocações entre setores, ocupações e regiões. O terceiro capítulo estima impactos da modernização da agricultura (a partir de inovações da década de 1970) no Brasil Central, considerando os efeitos na força de trabalho e nas decisões de investimento em educação. Mostramos que este evento afetou a demanda por trabalho na região, gerando ganhos para a população adulta como um todo. Dessa forma, os incentivos para os mais jovens nas escolhas entre trabalhar (com ganhos imediatos do emprego) e investir em capital humano (e esperar ganhos potencialmente mais altos no futuro) também mudaram. / [en] This thesis consists of three essays on labor markets. The first chapter estimates the effect of the change in the Advance Notice Law in 2011 in Brazil. The new law made unjustified (without cause) dismissals more expensive for firms, and the cost gradually increased with tenure. Advance notice is part of the framework of employment protection legislation and is intended to preserve job contracts that, although undesirable in the short term, would be viable in the long term. However, results point to an increase in layoffs in the most affected firms and a higher turnover environment. These results are especially unfavorable considering the already high turnover rate in Brazil. I argue with a theoretical model that the design of the new law is consistent with the results because it increased not only the cost of dismissal but also the expected cost of continuity of employment. The second chapter evaluates the effects of the expansion of the ethanol mills in Mato Grosso do Sul (MS), from labor reallocation perspective. Tracking workers over the years, the analysis indicated mechanisms that enabled labor adjustment to the new labor demands generated by this large investment. I explore the reallocation across sectors, occupations, and regions. The third chapter estimates the impact of the modernization of agriculture (from the innovations of the 1970s) in Central Brazil, considering the effects on the labor force and investment decisions in education. The analysis shows that this event affected labor demand in the region, generating gains for the adult population. In this way, incentives have also changed for young people to make choices between working, with immediate job gains, and investing in human capital, and thus expect potentially higher gains in the future.

Cette thèse analyse l'effet de la législation de protection de l'emploi sur le taux de chômage, les salaires et la productivité des entreprises. En particulier, je m'intéresse dans cette thèse à l’effet de la réglementation des licenciements et des contrats de travail temporaires. Cette question de recherche est motivée par le fait que dans de nombreux pays de l’OCDE, la législation combine des coûts de licenciements élevés et des restrictions faibles sur les contrats temporaires, ce qui entraîne, d’après un certain nombre d’économistes, une segmentation du marché du travail. Le premier chapitre défend l’idée qu’il est important de comprendre les mécanismes qui expliquent le choix des entreprises de signer des contrats temporaires ou permanents afin d'évaluer l’effet de la protection de l’emploi. Ce chapitre analyse un problème de contrat dynamique entre un travailleur averse au risque et un employeur neutre vis-à-vis du risque. Dans ce chapitre, je soutiens notamment que le choix du type d'emploi est déterminé par un arbitrage entre les gains associés au partage du risque qu’offre un emploi permanent et les gains associés à la flexibilité qu’offre un emploi temporaire. Le deuxième chapitre construit un modèle du marché du travail caractérisé par des frictions de recherche et d’appariement, dans lequel le contrat dynamique du chapitre 1 est intégré. Je propose ainsi un modèle dans lequel l’allocation des agents au sein des différents types d’emplois est déterminée de façon endogène par des considérations reliées au partage du risque. Le modèle, calibré pour reproduire les caractéristiques du marché du travail en France durant les années 2000, suggère que les contrats temporaires ont tendance à augmenter la productivité des entreprises mais également le taux de chômage. Le dernier chapitre propose un modèle de cycle de vie visant à évaluer les effets des coûts de licenciement sur l’emploi et les salaires en fonction du niveau d’éducation et d’expérience. Le modèle est calibré sur les données d’enquête sur la main d’œuvre en France durant les années 2000. Une série d'expériences contrefactuelles indiquent que les coûts de licenciement ont un effet négatif sur l’emploi, concentré principalement sur les jeunes travailleurs avec un niveau d’éducation faible. En revanche, cet effet semble être négligeable pour les travailleurs avec un niveau d'expérience et d'éducation élevé. / This thesis analyzes the effect of employment protection on labor market outcomes. The thesis focuses on the impact of firing restrictions and the regulation of temporary contracts. In many OECD countries, the employment protection legislation combines high firing restrictions and relatively lax regulation of temporary jobs which is, according to several economists, a source of labor market segmentation. The first chapter argues that analyzing the effect of employment protection requires to understand how economic agents choose between permanent and temporary contracts. This chapter examines a dynamic employment contract between a risk-averse worker and a risk-neutral firm. I argue in this chapter that the choice between a permanent and a temporary contract is driven by a trade-off between efficient risk-sharing and flexibility. The second chapter builds a model of the labor market with search frictions, in which the contracting problem of chapter 1 is embedded. Thus, this chapter proposes a model in which the allocation of agents into permanent and temporary jobs is endogenous to risk-sharing considerations. The model is calibrated to the features of the French labor market during the 2000s and indicates that temporary contracts tend to increase productivity but unemployment as well. The third chapter proposes a life-cycle model to evaluate the effect of firing costs across different experience and education groups. The model is calibrated using a French labor force survey dataset. Policy experiments suggest that firing costs have a negative effect on employment, which is concentrated on low experience and education workers.