Using a novel deal/patent dataset from 1986 through 2005, this paper explores the role of knowledge flow on the firm boundary decision. I use patent self-citations and cross-citations from the United States patent database as a proxy to measure knowledge flow between and within firms. When analyzing partnerships (strategic alliances and joint ventures), I find that firms with a higher percentage of patent self-citations are more likely to choose a more integrative boundary. Additionally, the level of integration chosen is positively related to the frequency of cross-citations between firms following the formation of the partnership. Firms in partnerships also see higher abnormal returns around the partnership announcement date when their partnering firm has a higher percentage of self-citations. I find weak to no evidence that these results hold for mergers/acquisitions. Overall, the evidence suggests that knowledge assets do play a pivotal role in the firm boundary choice.

Essay 1: An Examination of the Efficiency, Foreclosure, and Collusion Rationales for Vertical Takeovers We investigate the efficiency, foreclosure, and collusion rationales for vertical integration using a large sample of vertical takeovers. The efficiency rationale posits that vertical integration prevents future holdup between non-integrated suppliers and customers. In contrast, the foreclosure and collusion rationales suggest that vertical integration harms competition. To distinguish between these hypotheses, we examine the wealth effects of the merging firms, acquirer rivals, target rivals, and corporate customers on announcement of vertical takeovers. Our univariate and cross-sectional results suggest that firms alter their vertical boundaries in a manner that is consistent with the efficiency rationale. Our tests do not find evidence supportive of the anti-competitive rationales for vertical integration. Essay 2: Determinants of Firm Vertical Boundaries and Implications for Internal Capital Markets In this paper, we investigate the determinants of vertical relatedness between business segments of multi-segment firms and how vertical relatedness affects the internal allocation of capital. Consistent with theory, we observe a higher degree of vertical relatedness between segments in environments likely to involve contracting problems. Further, there is a greater tendency for investments to flow towards segments with better investment opportunities as the degree of vertical relatedness between business segments in the firm increases. This indicates that internal capital markets function better in the presence of significant vertical relatedness between segments. This finding supports the Stein (1997) model, which suggests that the headquarters is able to do a better job of “winner-picking” when firms operate in related lines of businesses.

This article shows the relationship between market and firms through the theory of transactional cost and the relationsthat determine the structure and boundaries of the firm. Using the assumptions from the transactional cost approach,this article proposes some variables that determine optimal organizational structures and their boundaries. / Este artículo muestra la vinculación entre mercado y empresas por medio del enfoque de los costos de transacción, y lasrelaciones que influyen en la determinación de la estructura y los límites de la empresa. Mediante el uso de los supuestosde la teoría de los costos transaccionales, el artículo propone algunas variables que determinan estructuras organizacionalesóptimas y sus respectivos límites.

This doctoral thesis presents the basic and the main developments of the theories of the firm rooted in Transaction Cost Theory (TCT). Since the article of Coase on the nature of the firm, this question has been elaborated by number of economists. In my point of view, I would like to introduce the last theory developed by the representative of the school called New Institutional Economics. The theory concentrates on the role of institutions. We distinguish institutions formal and informal. The formal are laws, constitution, regulations, contracts and other written rules. The informal don't require a written form and they represent informal restrictions such as rules of behaviour, conventions, traditions and habits. The main purpose of the institutions in their various forms is mainly to protect property rights, enforce voluntary contracts and establish the physical and regulatory infrastructure to facilitate economic activity. Generally, we can call them the rules of the game. They inform us about possible economic behaviour and give us basic restrictions in this sense. First -- the theoretical part of this thesis, we can find a simple model with human asset specificity based on TCT. The main proposition is that transactions with a high level of asset specificity are more probably internalised because the firm handles better such transactions compared to the market, even if asset specificity increases the cost of coordination in the firm. If the hierarchy, for example through the formation of routines, may enhance the efficiency compared to the market, we can modify the previous model. The model developed according to a Knowledge-based view assumes that asset specificity reduces transaction costs inside the firm and increases transaction costs on the market. In the conclusion of the theoretical part is discussed the reply on first formulate hypothesis if the TCT is still compatible with a newer Capability and Knowledge based view. In my opinion based on the presented arguments and views, both theories are compatible, they can answer more questions and explain more issues. The last step links the aforementioned theories into one Theory of firm boundaries. In the practical part of the thesis, I bring basic arguments about the institutional framework quality in the Czech Republic. These arguments rely on the latest studies of the international institutions such The Transparency International, The Heritage Foundation, The Kurtzman Group and mainly The World Bank. Studies reveal certain weak arrangements concerning for example the number of procedures when starting a business, complicated construction permits, rigidity of working hours, time-consuming and administrative demanding tax system, duration of judicial process which results in ineffective contract enforcement and mainly poor protection of property rights. Taking these disclosures into account we have to say that emergent transaction costs are enormous. These transaction costs influence negatively the competitiveness of the firms and the whole Czech economy. Therefore a negative response to the second hypothesis relating to the quality of the institutional framework in the Czech Republic.